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Résumé 
Le premier des trois essais qui composent cette thèse démontre empiri-
quement que la contrainte de crédit à laquelle font face les intermédiaires 
financiers affecte leur capacité à supporter un marché, liquide. Dans le cadre 
des marchés américains, cet essai mesure les variations du' prix de cette 
contrainte et les relient aux variations des primes de risque dans différents 
marchés. L'évidence démontre que cette contrainte financière induit un fac-
teur de risque agrégé et cause des variations importantes et communes des 
primes de liquidité à travers les marchés monétaires et obligataires. 
Le second essai s'intéresse au contenu informatif des taux d'intérêts et 
des contrats à terme liés aux décisions futures de la Réserve Fédérale améri-
caine. Je développe un modèle joint de la politique monétaire, de la structure 
des taux d'intérêts ainsi que des contrats à termes. En particulier, le modèle 
permet une prime de liquidité différente dans chaque marché. Les résultats 
montrent que cette approche permet d'identifier plus précisément les antici-
pations incorporées dans le prix de ces actifs et, ainsi, d'améliorer la prévision 
des décisions monétaires. L'identification, par le modèle, des variations dans 
la prime de liquidité contribuent pour beaucoup à ces résultats. 
Finalement, le dernier essai s'intéresse à l'importance de l'asymétrie des 
rendements boursiers. En particulier pour expliquer les écarts systématiques 
observés entre la volatilité des rendements futurs et celle implicite dans les 
prix d'options liées aux rendements futurs. Le modèle prévoit, et les résultats 
supportent cette conclusion, que tenir compte de l'asymétrie anticipée, telle 
que mesurée à partir de prix d'options, apporte une contribution à la prévi-
sion de la prime de risque et à notre capacité à mesurer et couvrir les risques 
reliés aux options. Les liens entre l'asymétrie des rendements et l'écart de 
volatilité sont des élément-clés pour notre compréhension des rendements 
boursiers. 
Mots-clés Économie financière, Économétrie financière, prime de li-
quidité, taux d'intérêts, prix d'option, asymétrie et prime de risque. 
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Abstract 
The first essay of this thesis provides evidence that the credit constraint 
of financial intermediaries affect their ability to support liquid markets. The 
essay studies the case of US markets and provides a direct measurement, 
based on observed asset priees, of that constraint's price variations. The 
evidence shows that these variations represent an aggregate risk factor and 
induce large common variations of the liquidity premia across money markets 
and bond markets. 
The second essay considers the information content of interest rates and 
futures contracts linked to future policy decision by the US Federal Reserve. 
l develop a joint model of the monetary policy response function, of inter-
est rates and of futures rates. In particular, the model allows for different 
liquidity premia across the two markets. Empirically, this approach identifies 
more precisely the expectations of future policy implicit in observed priees 
and, henee, enhances our ability to forecast monetary decisions. Measuring 
the liquidity premium contributes significantly to these improvements. 
Finally, the last essay studies the importance of the skewness of stock in-
dex returns. In partieular, we analyze the role of skewness in the systematic 
spread between the observed volatility of equity returns and the volatility 
implicit in index option prices. The model predicts and the evidence supports· 
that conditioning on implied skewness, as measured from option prices, im-
proves our ability to predict the risk premium and our ability to measure 
and hedge option-related risk exposures. We argue that the linkages between 
skewness and the volatility spread are key to our understanding of the equity 
premium. 
Keywords : Financial Economies, Financial Econometries, Liquidity 
Premium, interest rates, option prices, skewness and risk premium. 
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Abstract 
Recent asset pricing models of limits to arbitrage emphasize the role of 
funding conditions faced by financial intermediaries. In the VS, the repo 
market is the key funding market. Then, the premium of on-the-run V.S. 
Treasury bonds should share a common component with risk premia in other 
markets. This observation leads to the following identification strategy. We 
measure the value of funding liquidity from the cross-section of on-the-run 
premia by adding a liquidity factor to an arbitrage-free term structure model. 
As predicted, we find that funding liquidity explains the cross-section of risk 
premia. An increase in the value of liquidity predicts lower risk premia for 
on-the-run and off-the-run bonds but higher risk premia on LIBOR loans, 
swap contracts and corporate bonds. Moreover, the impact is large and 
pervasive through crisis and normal times. We check the interpretation of 
the liquidity factor. It varies with transaction costs, S&P500 valuation ratios 
and aggregate uncertainty. More importantly, the liquidity factor varies with 
narrow measures of monetary aggregates and measures of bank reserves. 
Overall, the results suggest that different securities serve, in part, and to 
varying degrees, to fulfill investors' uncertain future needs for cash depending 
on the ability of intermediaries to provide immediacy. 
JEL Classification: E43, H12. 
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" a part of the interest paid, at least on long-term securities, 
is to be attributed to uncertainty of the future course of interest 
rates." 
(p.163) 
" ... the imperfect 'moneyness' of those bills which are not money 
[ ... ] causes the trouble of investing in them and [causes them] to 
stand at a discount." 
(p.166) 
"... ln practice, there is no rate so short that it may not be 
affected by speculative elementsj there is no rate so long that it 
may not be affected by the alternative use of funds in holding 
cash." 
(p.166) 
John R. Hicks, Value and Capital, 2nd edition, 1948. 
Introduction 
3 
Bond traders know very well that liquidity affects asset priees. One promi-
nent case is the on-the-run premium, whereby the most recently issued (on-
the-run) bonds sell at a premium relative to seasoned (off-the-run) bonds 
with similar coupons and maturities. Moreover, systematic variations in 
liquidity sometimes drive interest rates across several markets. A case in 
point occurred around the Federal Open Market Committee [FOMe] de ci-
sion, on October 15, 1998, to lower the Federal Reserve funds rate by 25 basis 
points. ln the meeting's opening, Vice-Chairman McDonough, of the New 
York district bank, noted increases in the spread between the on-the-run 
and the most recent off-the-run 30-year Treasury bonds (0.05% to 0.27%), 
the spreads between the rate on the fixed leg of swaps and Treasury notes 
with two years and ten years to maturity (0.35% to 0.70%, and 0.50% to 
0.95%, respectively), the spreads between Treasuries and investment-grade 
corporate securities (0.75% to 1.24%), and finally between Treasuries and 
mortgage-backed securities (1.10% to 1.70%). He concluded that we were 
seeing a run to quality and a serious drying up of liquidityl. These events 
attest to the sometimes dramatic impact of liquidity seizures2 . 
1 Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, October 15, 1998 conference cali. 
See http:j jwww.federalreserve.gov jFomcjtranscriptsj1998j981015confcalLpdf. 
2The liquidity crisis of 2007-2008 provides another example. Facing sharp increases 
of interest rate spreacis in most markets, the Board approved reduction in discount rate, 
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A common explanation for that and the more recent market turmoil 
is based on a common wealth shock to capital-constrained intermediaries 
or speculators (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Kyle and Xiong (2001), Gromb 
and Vayanos (2002)). Intuitively, lower wealth hinders the ability_t~:LP~ue ;7 
quasi-arbitrage opportunities across markets. In practice, the~~et is 
the key market where investment banks, hedge funds and other speculators 
obtain the marginal funds for their activities and manage their leveraged 
exposure to risk (Adrian and Shin (2008)). Then, the risk premia for each 
market intermediated by a common set of intermediaries share a compo-
nent measuring tightness in the funding market (Brunnermeier and Peder-
sen (2008), Krishnamurthy and He (2008)). This paper tests the implication 
that tightness of funding conditions in repo markets should be reflected in 
risk premia across financial markets. 
We introduce liquidity as an additional factor in an otherwise standard 
term structure model. Indeed, the modern term structure literature has not 
recognized the importance of aggregate liquidity for government yields. We 
extend the no-arbitrage dynamic term structure model of Christensen et al. 
-~ .... _-- _. .-
(2007) [CDR, hereafterJ ~:':Ving for liquiditr and we extract a common 
factor driving on-the-run premia across maturities. Identification of the liq-
uidity factor is obtained by estimating the model from a panel of pairs of 
U .S. Treasury securities where each pair has similar cash flows but different 
ages. This sidesteps credit risk issues and delivers direct estimates of funding 
liquidity value: it isolates priee differences that can be attributed to liquid-
ity. A recent empirical literature suggests that liquidity is priced on bond 
markets4 but these empirical investigations are limited to a single market. 
Moreover, none consider the role of funding constraints. 
Our main contribution is precisely to show that funding liquidity is an 
aggregate risk factor that drives a substantial share of risk premia across 
interest rate markets. In particular, we document large variations in the 
liquidity premium of U.S. Treasury bonds. By construction, an increase in 
the liquidity factor is associated with lower expected returns for on-the-run 
target Federal Funds rate as weil as novel policy instruments to deal with the ongoing 
liquidity crisis. 
3This model captures parsimoniously the usuallevel, slope and curvature factors, while 
delivering good in-sample fit and forecasting power. Moreover, the smooth shape of 
Nelson-Siegel curves identifies smalI deviations, relative to an idealized curve, which may 
be caused by variations in market liquidity. 
4See Longstaff (2000) for evidence that liquidity is priced for short-term U.S. Treasury 
security and Longstaff (2004) for U.S. Treasury bonds of longer maturities. See Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001), Longstaff et al. (2005), Ericsson and Renault (2006), Nashikkar 
and Subrahmanyam (2006) for corporate bonds. 
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bonds. What we show is that the risk premium of any V.S. Treasury bonds 
also decreases substantially. On the other hand, tight funding conditions 
rai se the risk premium implicit in LIB OR rates, swap rates and corporate 
bond yields. This pattern is consistent with accounts of flight-to-quality but 
the relationship is pervasive even in normal times. This adds considerably to 
the existing evidence pointing toward the importance of funding liquidity as 
an aggregate risk factor. Moreover, it suggests that different securities serve, 
in part and to varying degrees, to fulfill investors uncertain future needs for 
cash. 
We estimate the model and obtain a measure of funding liquidity value 
from a sample of end-of-month bond prices running from December 1985 un-
til the end of 2007. Hence, our results cannot be attributed to the extreme 
influence of 2008. In a concluding section, we repeat the estimation includ-
ing 2008 and find, not unexpectedly, that importance of funding liquidity 
increases. Our empirical findings can be summarized as follows. Panel (a) 
of Figure 1.1 presents the measure of funding liquidity value. Clearly, it ex-
hibits significant variations through normal and crisis periods. In particular, 
the stock crash of 1987, the Mexican Peso devaluation of December 1994, 
the LTCM failure of 1998 and the recent liquidity cri sis are associated with 
peaks in investors' valuation of the funding liquidity of on-the-run bonds. 
The relationship with the risk premium of government bonds is illustrated 
in Figure 1.2. Panel (a) compares the funding liquidity factor with annual 
excess returns on a 2-year to maturity off-the-run bond. Clearly, an increase 
in the value of liquidity predicts lower expected excess returns and, thus, 
higher current bond prices. For that maturity, a one-standard deviation 
shock to liquidity predicts a decrease in excess returns of 85 basis points 
[bps] compared to an average excess returns of 69 bps. We obtain similar 
results using different maturities or investment horizons. Intuitively, while 
an off-the-run bond may be less liquid relative to an on-the-run bond with 
similar characteristics, it is still viewed as a liquid substitute. In particu-
lar, it can still be quickly converted into cash, at low costs, via the funding 
market. 
Next, we consider the predictive power of funding liquidity for the risk 
premium on short-term Eurodollar loans. Panel (b) of Figure 1.2 shows 
that variations of LIBOR excess returns are positively linked to variations 
of funding liquidity. The relationship is significant, both statistically and 
economically. Con si der excess returns from borrowing at the risk-free rate 
for 12 months and rolling a 3-month LIBOR loans. On average, returns 
fi 
from this strategy are not statistically different than zero since the higher 
term premium on the borrowing leg compensates for the 3-month LIBOR 
spread earned on the lending leg. However, following a one-standard devia-
tion shock to the funding liquidity factor, rolling excess returns increase by 
42 bps. We reach similar conclusions using LIBOR spreads as ex-ante mea-
sures of risk premium. The effect of funding liquidity also extends to swap 
markets. Panel (d) compares the liquidity factor with the spread, above the 
par Treasury yield, of a swap contract with 5 years to maturity. We find 
that a shock to funding liquidity predicts an increase of fi bps the 5-year 
swap spread. This is economically significant given the higher sensitivity 
(i.e. duration) of this contract value to changes in yields. In each regression, 
we control for variations in the level and shape of the term structure of Trea-
sury yields. The marginal contribution of liquidity to the predictive power 
is high. 
Finally, we consider a sample of corporate bond spreads from the NAIC. 
We find that the impact of liquidity is significant and follows a fiight-to-
quality pattern across ratings. For bonds of the highest credit quality, 
spreads decrease, on average, following a shock to the funding liquidity fac-
tor. In contrast, spreads of bonds with lower ratings increase.· We also 
compute excess returns on AAA, AA, A, BBB and High Yield Merrill Lynch 
corporate bond indices (see Figure 1.3) an~ reach similar conclusions. Bonds 
with high credit ratings were perceived to be liquid substitutes to government 
securities and offered lower risk premium following increases of the liquidity 
factor. This corresponds to an average effect through our sample, the recent 
events suggests that this is not always the case. 
These results raise the all important issue of identifying macroeconomic 
drivers of the liquidity factor. Can we characterize the aggregate liquidity 
premium in terms of ecoriomic state variables? First, consistent with theory, 
our liquidity factor varies with measures of transaction costs on the bond 
market. Second, we find that funding liquidity is linked to stock market 
valuation ratios and option-implied volatility from S&P 500 index options. 
These results support empirically the link between conditions on the funding 
market, the ability of intermediaries to provide liquidity and the level and 
risk of aggregate wealth. Most importantly, we find that measures of changes 
in monetary aggregates and changes in bank reserves are key determinants 
of our liquidity measure. These findings support our interpretation of the 
liquidity factor as a measure of conditions on the funding market. This 
provides a third important empirical contribution. 
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Related Literature 
A few empirical papers document the effects of intermediation constraints 
in specifie markets5 but we differ in significant ways from existing work. 
First, we me as ure the effect of intermediation constraints directly from ob-
served priees rather than quantities. Priees aggregate information about and 
anticipations of intermediaries wealth, their portfolios and the margins they 
face. Second, we study a cross-section of money-market and fixed-income 
securities, providing evidence that funding constraints should be thought as 
an aggregate risk factor driving liquidity premia across markets. 
We introduce a measure of funding liquidity value based on the higher 
valuation of on-the-run bonds relative to off-the-run bonds .6 The on-the-
run liquidity premium was first documented by Warga (1992). Amihud and 
Mendelson (1991) and, more recently, Goldreich et al. (2005) confirm the 
link between the premium and expected transaction costs. Duffie (1996) 
provides a theoretical channel between on-the-run premia and lower financing 
costs on the repo market. Vayanos and Weill (2006) extend this view and 
model se arch frictions in both the repo and the cash markets explicitly.7 
The key frictions differentiating bonds with identical cash flows lies in their 
segmented funding markets. The link between the repo market and the on-
the-run premium has been confirmed empirically. (See Jordan and Jordan 
(1997), Krishnamurthy (2002), Buraschi and Menini (2002) and Cheria et al. 
(2004).) 
We differ from the modern term structure literature in two significant 
ways. First, the latter focuses almost exclusively on .l.ootstrapped zero-
coupon yields8 . This approach is convenient because a large family of models 
delivers zero-coupon yields which are linear in the state variables (see Dai 
and Singleton (2000)). However, we argue that pre-processing the data wipes 
out the most accessible evidence on liquidity, that is the on-the-run premium. 
5See Froot and O'Connell (2008) for catastrophe insurance, Gabaix et al. (2009) for 
mortgage-backed securities, Gârleanu et al. (2009) for index options and Adrian et al. 
(2009) for exchange rates. 
6The V.S Treasury recognizes and takes advantages of this price differential: "In ad-
dition, although it is not a primary reason for conducting buy-backs, we may be able to 
reduce the government's interest expense by purchasing older, "off-the-run" debt and re-
placing it with lower-yield "on-the-run" debt." [Treasury Assistant Secretary for tinancial 
markets Lewis A. Sachs, Testimony before the Rouse Committee on Ways and Means]. 
7Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) introduced search frictions in monetary theory and Shi 
(2005) extends this framework to include bonds. See Shi (2006) for a review. Search 
frictions can also rationalize the spreads between bid and ask priees offered by market 
intermediaries (Duffie et al. (2005)). 
BThe CRSP dàta set of zero-coupon yields is the most commonly used. It is based on ') 
the bootstrap method of Fama and Sliss (1987) [FS). 
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Therefore, we use coupon bond priees directly. However, the state spaee is no 
longer linear and we handle non-linearities with the Vnseented Kalman Filter 
[VKF], an extension of the Kalman Filter for non-linear state-space systems 
(.lulier et al. (1995) and Julier and Vhlmann (1996)). We first estimate a 
model without liquidity and, notwithstanding differenees in data and filtering 7 
methodologies, our results are consistent wit~owever, pricing errors 
in this standard term structure model reveals systematic differences within 
pairs, correlated with ages. Estimation of the model with liquidity produces 
a persistent factor capturing differenees between priees of reeently issued 
bonds and priees of older bonds. The on-the-run premium increases with 
maturity but decays with the age of a bond. These new features complete 
our contributions to the modeling of the term structure of interest rates in 
presenee of a liquidity factor. 
We also differ from the reeent literature using a redueed-form approach 
that model a convenienee yield in interest rate markets (Duffie and Singleton 
(1997) ). A one-factor model of the convenienee yield cannot match the pat-
tern of on-the-run premia across maturities. Moreover, the link between the 
premium and the age of a bond cannot be captured in a frictionless arbitrage-
free model. Still, Grinblatt (2001) argues that the convenienee yields of V.S. 
Treasury bills can explain the V.S. Dollar swap spread. Recently, Liu et al. 
(2006) and Fedlhütter and Lando (2007) evaluate the relative importanee of 
credit and liquidity risks in swap spreads. Other empirical investigations are 
related to our work . .lump risk (Tauchen and Zhou (2006)) or the debt-gdp 
ratio (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-.lorgensen (2007)) have been proposed to 
explain the non-default component of corporate spreads. Finally, Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) and Amihud (2002) provide evidence of a liquidity risk 
factor in expected stock returns. 
The link between interest rates and aggregate liquidity is supported else-
where in the theoretical literature. Svensson (1985) uses a cash-in-advanee 
constraint in a monetary economy. Bansal and Coleman (1996) allow gov-
ernment bonds to back checkable accounts and redueed transaction costs in 
a monetary economy. Luttmer (1996) investigates asset pricing in economies 
with frictions and shows that with transaction costs (bid-ask spreads) there is 
in generallittle evidenee against the consumption-based power utility model 
with low risk-aversion parameters. Holmstr6m and Tirole (1998) introduce a 
link between the liquidity demand of financially constrained firms and asset 
priees. Acharya and Pedersen (2004) propose a liquidity-adjusted CAPM 
model where transaction costs are time-varying. Alternatively, Vayanos 
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(2004) takes transactions costs as fixed but introduces the risk of having 
to liquidate a portfolio. Lagos (2006) extends the search friction argument 
to multiple assets: in a decentralized exchange, agents with uncertain future 
hedging demand prefer assets with lower search costs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as foUows. The next section presents 
the model and its state-space representation. Section II describes the data 
and Section III introduces the estimation method based on the UKF. We 
report estimation results for models with and without liquidity in Section IV. 
Section V evaluates the information content of liquidity for excess returns 
and interest rate spreads while Section VI identifies economic determinants 
of liquidity. Section VIII concludes. 
1 A Term Structure Model With Liquidity 
We base our model on the Arbitrage-Free Extended Nelson-Siegel [AFENS] 
model introduced in CDR. This model belongs to the affine family (Duffie 
and Kan (1996)). The latent state variables relevant for the evolution of in-
terest rates are grouped within a vector Ft of dimension k = 3. Its dynamics 
under the risk-neutral measure Q is described by the stochastic differential 
equation 
('1.1 ) 
where dWt is a standard Brownian motion process. Combined with the 
assumption that the short rate is affine in aU three factors, the model then 
leads to the usual affine solution for discount bond yields. 
In this context, CDR show that if the short rate is defined as Tt 
Fl,t + F2,t and if the mean-revers ion matrix KQ is restricted to 
(1.2) 
then the absence of arbitrage opportunity implies the discount yield function, 
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with loadings given by 
b1(m) = 1, 
b2 (m) = C -eX!i -mÀ)) , 
b3 (m) = C -eX!i-mÀ) -exp(-mÀ))' (1.4) 
where m ~ 0 is the length of time until maturity (see Appendix C for the 
a(m) term). 
These loadings are consistent with the static Nelson-Siegel representation 
of forward rates (Nelson and Siegel (1987), NS hereafter). Their shapes 
across maturities lead to the usual interpretations of factors in terms of 
level, slope and curvature. Moreover, the NS representation is parsimonious 
and imposes a smooth shape to the forward rate curve. Empirically, this 
approach is robust to over-fitting and delivers performance in line with, or 
better than, other methods for pricing out-of-sample bonds in the cross-
section of maturities9 . Conversely, its smooth shape is useful to identify 
deviations of observed yields from an idealized curve. 
A dynamic extension of the NS model, the Extended Nelson-Siegel model 
[ENS], was first proposed by Diebold and Li (2006) and Diebold et al. (2006). 
Diebold and Li (2006) document large improvements in long-horizon interest 
rate forecasting. They argue that the ENS model performs better than the 
best essentially affine model of Duffee (2002) and point toward the model's 
parsimony to explain its successes. A persistent concern, though, was that 
the ENS model does not enforce the absence of arbitrage. This is precisely 
'the contribution_oLCDR. They derive the class of continuous-time arbitrage-
free affine dynamic term structure models with loadings that correspond 
to the NS representation. Intuitively, an AFENS model corresponds to a 
~="o~n~ic=a=l...:a:::ffi=ne::..:;m=-o=-:d~e~l-.::i::n-.::D=-a~i=--a=n=-d=-=S::in~g~l~et~o~n~( 2:::.:0::..:0::..:0~)_w _ _ h~e::.:r~e~t:.:.h:.::e...:l::-o=ad=in:::g~s::..:h=a~p:..:es 
have been restricted through over-identifying assumptions on the Rarameters 
governing the risk-neutral dynamics of latent factors. CDR compare the ENS J 
and AFENS models and show that implementing these restrictions improves 
forecasting performances further. 
Interestingly, CDR show that we are free to choose the drift and variance 
9See Bliss (1997) and Anderson et al. (1996) for an evaluation of yield curve estimation 
methods. 
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term for the dynamies under the physieal measure 
(1.5) 
and we impose that E is lower triangular and that K P is diagonal10 . We 
can then cast the model within a discretized state-space representation. The 
state equation becomes 
(1.6) 
where the innovation Et is standard Gaussian, the autoregressive matrix tP is 
(1.7) 
and the covariance matrix r can computed from 
(1.8) 
Finally, we define a ~w latent state variable, Lt, that will be driving the 
liquidity premium. lts transition equation is 
(Lt - 1 - 1 1 L) = <p (Lt-l - L) + 0' Et, (1.9) 
where the innovation Ef is standard Gaussian and uncorrelated with Et. 
Typieally, term structure models are not estimated from observed priees. 
Rather, coupon bond prices are converted to forward rates the 
strap method. This is convenient as affine term structure modeis deliver 
~ that are linear in state variables. Is is also thought to be in-
nocuous beeause bootstrapped forward rates aehieve near-exaet pricing of 
the original sam pIe of bonds. Unfortunately, this extreme fit means that 
a naive application of the bootstrap pushes any liquidity effects and other 
priee idiosyncracies into forward rates. Fama and Bliss (1987) handie this 
sensitivity to over-fitting by excluding bonds with "large" priee differenees 
relative to their neighbors. 11 This approaeh is eertainly justified for many 
lOFormally, the assumption on E is required for identification purposes. In practice) 
the presence of the off-diagonal elements in the K P matrix does not change our results. 
Moreover, CDR show that allowing for an unrestricted matrix K P deteriorates out-of-
sample performance. 
I1The CRSP data set of zero coupon yields is based on the approach proposed by Fama 
and Bliss. See also the CRSP documentation for a description of this procedure. BrieHy, 
a first filter includes a quote if its yield to maturity falls within a range of 20 basis points 
ç7 
r 1 
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of the questions addressed in the literature, butit removes any evidenee of 
large liquidity effects. Moreover, the FB data se~ foc uses on discount bond 
priees at annual maturity intervals. This smooths away evidenee of sm ail 
liquidity effects remaining in the data and passed through to forward rates. 
These effects would be apparent from reversais in the forward rate function 
at short maturity interval. Consider three quotes for bonds with suceessive 
maturities Ml < M2 < M3. A relatively expensive quote at maturity M2 
induees a relatively small forward rate from Ml to M2. However, the follow-
ing normal quote with maturity M3 requires a relatively large forward rate 
from M 2 to M3. This is needed to compensate the previous low rate and 
to achieve exact pricing as required by the bootstrap. However, the reversai 
cancels itself as we sum intra-period forward rates to compute annual rates. 
Instead of using smoothed data, we proceed from observed coupon bonds 
with maturity, say, M and with coupons at maturities m = ml, ... , M. The 
priee, Dt(m), of a discount bond with maturity m, used to priee intermediate 
payoffs, is given by 
Dt(m) = exp (-m(a(m) + b(mf Ft}) m 2:: 0, 
which follows directly from equation (1.3) but where we use vector notation 
for factors Ft and factor loadings b(m). In a frictionless economy, the ab-
sence of arbitrage implies that the priee of a coupon bond equals the sum of 
discounted coupons and principal. That is, the frictionless price is 
\. 
M 
P*(Ft, Zt) = L Dt(m) x Ct(m), (1.10) 
where Zt includes (deterministic) characteristics relevant for pricing a bond. 
In this case, it includes the maturity M and the schedule of future coupons 
and principal payments, Ct(m). 
However, with a short-sale constraint on government bonds and a col-
lateral constraint in the repo market, Luttmer (1996) shows that the set of 
stochastic discount factors consistent with the absence of arbitrage satisfies 
from one of the moving averages on the 3 longer or the 3 shorter maturity instruments or 
if its yield to maturity falls between the two moving averages. When computing averages, 
precedence is given to bills when available and this is explicitly designed to exclude the 
impact of liquidity on notes and bonds with maturity of less than one year. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1991) document that yield differences between notes and adjacent bills is 43 
basis point on average, a figure much larger than the 20 basis point cutoff. The second 
filter excludes observations that cause reversais of 20 basis points in the bootstrapped 
discount yield function. The impact of these filters has not been studied in the literature. 
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P ;::: P*. These constraints match the institutional features of the Treasury 
market. An investor cannot issue new bonds to establish a short position. 
Instead, she must borrow the bond on the repo market through a collat-
eralized loan. Then, we model the priee, P(Ft, Lt, Zt), of a coupon bond 
with characteristics Zt as the sum of discounted coupons to which we add a 
liquidity term, ? 
Here Zt also includes the age of the bond. Note that the liquidity term 
should be positive to be consistent with a Luttmer (1996). 
That the on-the-run premium is related to the short-sale constraint on 
government bonds and the collateral constraint in the repo market is justified 
by the results of Vayanos and Weill (2006) (see also Duffie (1996)). They 
show that the combinat ion of these constraints with search frictions on the 
repo market induces differences in funding costs that favor recently issued 
bonds. Intuitively, the repo market provides the required heterogeneity be-
tween assets with identical payoffs. An investor cannot choose which bond 
to deliver to unwind a repo position; she must find and deliver the same 
security she had originally borrowed. Because of search frictions, then, in-
vestors are better off in the aggregate if they coordinate around one security 
to reduce search costs. In practice, the repo rate is lower for this special is-
sue to provide an incentive for bond holders to bring their bonds to the repo 
market. Typically, recently issued bonds benefit from these lower financing 
costs, leading to the on-the-run premium. Moreover, these bonds offer lower 
transaction costs adding to the wedge between asset priees (Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986)). Empirically, both channels seem to be at work although 
the effect of lower transaction costs appears weaker than the effect of lower 
funding rates. 12 
Grouping observations together, and adding an error term, we obtain our 
measurement equation 
(1.11) 
where Ct is the (N x M max ) payoffs matrix obtained from stacking the N 
12 Amihud and Mendelson (1991) and Goldreich et al. (2005) consider transaction costs. 
Jordan and Jordan (1997), Krishnamurthy (2002) and Cheria et al. (2004) consider funding 
costs. See also, Buraschi and Menini (2002) for the German bonds market. 
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row vectors of individual bond payoffs and M max is the longest maturity 
group in the sample. Shorter payoff vectors are completed with zeros. Simi-
larly, «(Lt , Zt) is a N x 1 vector obtained by staking the individualliquidity 
premium. Dt is a (Mmax xl) vector of discount bond priees and the measure-
ment error, Vt, is a (Nx 1) gaussian white noise uncorrelated with innovations 
in state variables. The matrix n is ass,umed diagonal and its elements are a 
linear function of maturity, 
which reduce substantially the dimension of the estimation problem, How-
ever, leaving the diagonal elements of n unrestricted does not affect our 
results13. 
Our specification of the liquidity premium is based on a latent factor 
common to aH bonds but with loadings that vary with maturity and age. 
The premium is given by 
(1.12) 
where aget is the age, in years, of the bond at time t. The parameter 
f3M controls the average on-the-run premium at each fixed maturity M. 
Warga (1992) document the impact of age and maturity on .the average 
premium. We estimate f3 for a fixed set of maturities and the shape of f3 is 
unrestricted between these maturities. 14 Next, the parameter fi, controls the 
on-the-run premium's decay with age, The graduai decay of the premium 
with age has been documented by Goldreich et al. (2005). For instance, 
immediately following its issuance (Le.: age = 0), the loading on the liquidity 
factor is f3M x 1. Taking fi, = 0.5, the loading decreases by half within 
any maturity group after a little more than 4 months following issuance : 
«(Lt , 4) ;::::: ~((Lt, 0)). While the specification above reflects our priors about 
the impact of age and maturity, the scale parameters are left unrestricted at 
estimation and we allow for a continuum of shapes for the decay of liquidity. 
However, we fix f310 = 1 to identify the level of the liquidity factor with the 
average premium of a just-issued 1Q-year bond relative to a very old bond 
may be due to the fact that the level factor explains most of yields variability. 
Its impact on bond priees is linear in duration and duration is approximately linear in 
maturity, at least for maturities up to 10 years. Bid-ask spreads inerease with maturity 
and may also eontribute to an inerease in measurement errors with maturity. 
140pportunities of arbitrage may arise if {3 follows a step process aeross maturities. We 
thank an anonymous referee for this remark. 
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with the same maturity and coupons. 
Equation (1.11) shows that omitting the liquidity term will push the 
impact of liquidity into pricing errors, possibly leading to biased estimators 
and large filtering errors. Alternatively, adding a liquidity term amounts to 
filtering a latent factor present in pricing errors. However, Equation (1.11) 
shows that this factor captures that part of pricing errors correlated with 
bond ages. Our maintained hypothesis is that any such positive factor can 
be interpreted as a liquidity effect. Clearly, the impact of age on the priee 
of a bond can hardly be rationalized in a frictionless economy. 
Intuitively, our specification delivers a discount rate function consistent 
with off-the-run valuation but Je mains silent on the linkage with the equi-
librium stochastic discount factor. A~al specification of the liquid~ 
premium raises important challenges. The on-the-run premium is a real ar-
"-
bitrage opportunity unless we explicitly consider the costs of shorting the 
more expensive bond or, alternatively, the benefits accruing to the bond-
holder from a lower repo rate. These features are absent from the current 
crop of term structure models with the notable exeeption of Cheria et al. 
(2004) who allow for a convenienee yield, due to lower repo rates accruing 
to holders of an on-the-run issue. Clearly, theory suggests that using repo 
rates may improve the identification of the premium. Unfortunately, this 
would restrict our analysis to a much shorter sam pIe where repo data are 
readily available. In any case, a joint model of the term structure of repo 
rates and of government yields may still not be free of arbitrage unless we 
also model the convenienee yield of holding short-term government securi-
ties. This follows from the observation that a Treasury bill typically offers 
a lower yield than a repo contract with the same maturity. Moreover, the 
stochastic properties of repo rates are not well known, as well as the form of 
their relationships with bond yields. This is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Our strategy bypasses these challenging considerations but still uncovers the 
key role funding liquidity. We now turn to a description of the data. 
II Data 
We use end-of-month priees of U.S. Treasury securities from the CRSP data 
set. Our sample covers the period from January 1986 to Deeember 2008. 
However, we estimate the model both with and without 2008 data. Before 
1986, interest income had a favorable tax treatment compared to capital 
gains and investors favored high-coupon bonds. The resulting tax premium 
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and the on-the-run prerniurn cannot be disentangled in the earlier period. 
When interest rates are rising, reeently issued bonds had relatively high 
coupons and were priced at a prerniurn both for their liquidity and for their 
truc benefits. Green and 0degaard (1997) document that the high-coupon 
truc prerniurn rnostly disappeared when the asyrnrnetric treatrnent of interest 
incorne and capital gains was elirninated following the 1986 tax reforrn. 
The CRSP data set15 provides quotes on aU outstanding U.S. Treasury 
securities. Vve filter unreliable observations and construct bins around rna-
turities of 3, 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 60, 84 and 120 rnonths.16 Then, at 
each date, and for each bin, we choose a pair of securities to identify the 
on-the-run prerniurn. First, we want to pick the on-the-run security if any 
is available. Unfortunately, on-the-run bonds are not directly identified in 
the CRSP database. Instead, we use tirne since issuance as a proxy and pick 
the rnost recently issued security in each rnaturity bin. Second, we choose 
the security that rnost closely matches the bin's rnaturity (e.g. 3 rnonths, 
6 rnonths, ... ). Note that pinning off-the-run securities at fixed rnaturities 
ensures a stable coverage of the terrn structure of interest rates. AIso, by 
construction, securities within each pair have the sarne credit quality and 
very close tirnes to rnaturity. Vve do not match coupon rates but coupon 
differences within pairs are low in practice. 
The rnost important aspect of our sam pie is that whenever a security 
trades at prerniurn' relative to its pair cornpanion, any large price difference 
cannot be rationalized frorn srnaU coupon or rnaturity differences under the 
no-arbitrage restriction. On the other hand, priee differenees cornrnon across 
rnaturities and correlated with age will be attributed to liquidity. Note that 
the rnost recent issue for a given bin and date is not always an on-the-run 
security. This rnay be due to the absence of new issuance in sorne rnaturity 
bins throughout the whole sarnple (e.g. 18 rnonths to rnaturity) or within 
sorne sub-periods (e.g. 84 rnonths to rnaturity). Alternatively, the on-the-
run bond rnay be a few rnonths old, due to the quarterly issuanee pattern 
observed in sorne rnaturity categories. In any case, this introduees variability 
in age differences which, in turn, identifies how the liquidity prerniurn varies 
with age. 
We now investigate sorne features of our sarnple of 265 x 22 = 5830 ob-
servations. The first two colurnns of Table 1 present rneans and standard de-
viations of age for each liquidity-rnaturity category. The average off-the-run 
15See Elton and Green (1998) and Piazzesi (2005) for discussion of the CRSP data set. 
16See Apppendix A for more details on data filter. 
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security is always older than the corresponding on-the-run security. Typi-
cally, the off-the-run security has been in circulation for more than a year. 
ln contrast, the on-the-run security is typically a few months old and only 
a few weeks old in the 6 and 24-month categories. A relatively low average 
age for the reeent issues indicates a regular issuanee pattern. On the other 
hand, the relatively high standard deviations in the 36 and 84-month cate-
gories reftect the decision by the U.S. Treasury to stop the issuanee cycles 
at these maturities. 
[Table 1 about here.] 
Next, Table 1 presents means and standard deviations of duration17 . Av-
erage duration is almost linear in maturity. As expected, duration is similar 
within pairs implying that averages of cash ftow maturities are very close.' Fi-
nally, the last columns of Table 1 show that the term structure of coupons is 
upward sloping on average and the high standard deviations indicate impor-
tant variations across the sample. This is in part due to the general decline 
of interest rates. Nonetheless, coupon rate difJerences within pairs are small 
on average. To summarize our strategy, differenees in duration and coupon 
rates are kept small within each pair but differenees of ages are highlighted 
so that we can identify any effect of liquidity on priees that is linked to age. 
III Estimation Methodology 
Equations (1.6), (1.9) and (1.11) can be summarized as a state-spaee system 
(Xt - X) = 1>X(Xt-l - X) + ~Xft 
Pt = \lI(Xt , Ct, Zt) + nZlt , (1.13) 
where X t == [Ft LtV and \li is the (non-linear) mapping of cash ftows Ct, 
bond characteristics, Zt, and current states, Xt, into priees, Pt. 
Estimation of this system is challenging because we do not know the 
joint density of factors and priees. Various strategies to deal with non-linear 
state-spaee systems have been proposed in the filtering literature: the Ex-
tended Kalman Filter (EKF), the Particle Filter (PF) and more reeently 
the Unseented Kalman Filter18 (UKF). The UKF is based on a method 
17 Duration is the relevant measure to compare maturities of bonds with different 
coupons. 
18See Julier et al. (1995), Julier and Uhlmann (1996) and Wan and der Merwe (2001) for 
a textbook treatment. Another popular approach bypasses filtering altogether. It assumes 
that sorne priees are observed without errors and obtains factors by inverting the pricing 
equation. In our context, the choice of maturities and liquidity types that are not affected 
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for calculating statistics of a random variable which undergoes a nonlinear 
transformation. It starts with a well-chosen set of points with given sam-
ple mean and covariance. The nonlinear function is then applied to each 
point and moments are computed from transformed points. This approach 
has a Monte Carlo fiavor but the sample is drawn according to a specific 
deterministic algorithm. It delivers second-order accuracy with no increase 
in computing costs relative to the EKF. Moreover, analytical derivatives are 
not required. The UKF has been introduced in the term structure literature 
by Leippold and Wu (2003) and in the foreign exchange literature by Bakshi 
et al. (2005). Recently, Christoffersen et al. (2007) compared the EKF and 
the UKF for the estimation of tenn structure models. They conclude that 
the UKF improves filtering results and substantially reduces estimation bias. 
To set up notation, we state the standard Kalman filter algorithm as 
applied to our model. We then explain how the unscented approximation 
helps overcome the challenge posed by a non-linear state-space system. First, 
consider the case where W is linear in X and where state variables and bond 
prices are jointly Gaussian. In this case, the Kalman recursion provides 
optimal estimates of current state variables given past and current prices. 
The recursion works off estimates of state variables and their associated MSE 
from the previous step, 
Xt+ll t == E [Xt+lISStl , 
Qt+llt == E [(Xt+l1t - Xt+l)(Xt+llt - Xt+lf] , (1.14) 
where SSt belongs to the natural filtration generated by bond prices. The 
associated predicted bond prices, and MSE, are given by 
Ft+ll t == E [Pt+lISStl 
= w(Xt+ll t ' et+l, Zt+l), (1.15) 
Rt+llt == E [(Ft+llt - lht}(Ft+l1t - Pt+lf] 
, T ' , 
= w(Xt+l1t ' et+l, Zt+l) Qt+llt w(Xt+l1t , et+l, Zt+l) + D, (1.16) 
using the linearity of W. The next step compares predicted to observed bond 
by measurement errors is not innocuous and impacts estimates of the liquidity factor. 
prices and update state variables and their MSE, 
where 
Xt+1lt+1 = Xt+1lt + Kt+1(Pt+1 - Pt+1lt), 
Qt+1lt+1 = Qt+1lt + Kltl (Rt+1lt)-1 K t+1, 
K t+1 == E [(.Xt+1l t - X t+1)(Pt+1lt - Pt+1f] , 
= Qt+1ltw(Xt+1lt, et+1, Zt+1), 
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(l.17) 
(l.18) 
(l.19) 
measures co-movements between pricing and filtering errors. Finally, the 
transition equation gives us a condition al forecast of X t+2 , 
Xt+2lt+1 = <I> X Xt+1lt+1, 
Qt+2It+1 = <I>I-Qt+1lt+1 <I> x + ~x ~I-. 
(l.20) 
(l.21) 
The recursion delivers series Alt-I and Rtl t- I for t = 1,··· , T. Treating 
XIIO as a parameter, and setting R Ilo equal to the unconditional variance of 
measurement errors, the sample log-likelihood is 
T T 
L(B) = Ll(Pt;B) = L [log <p(A+1lt, Rt+1lt)] , 
t=1 t=1 
(l.22) 
where <PC·) is the multivariate Gaussian density. 
However, because w(·) is not linear, equations (l.15) and (l.16) do not 
correspond to the conditional expectation of prices and the associated MSE. 
Also, (l.19) does not correspond to the conditional covariance between pric-
ing and filtering errors. Still, the updating equations (l.17) and (l.18) remain 
justified as optimal linear projections. Then, we can recover the Kalman 
recursion provided we obtain approximations of the relevant conditional mo-
ments. This is precisely what the unscented transformation achieves, using a 
small deterministic sample from the conditional distribution of factors while 
maintaining a higher order approximation than linearizationl9 . We can then 
use the likelihood given in (l.22), but in a QML context. Using standard 
results, we have ê :::::: N(Bo, T- I Ç2) where ê is the QML estimator of Bo and 
the covariance matrix is 
(l.23) 
19See Appendix B. 
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where (H and (op are the alternative representations of the information 
matrix, in the Gaussian case. These can be consistently estimated via their 
sam pie counterparts. We have 
/ = _T-1 [cP L(Ô)] 
..,H fj()fj()' (1.24) 
and 
(1.25) 
Finally, the model implies sorne restrictions on the parameter space. In 
particular, 1J1 and diagonal elements of <I> must lie in (-1,1) while '" and ). 
must remain positive. In practice, large values of '" or ). lead to numerical 
difficulties and are excluded. Final!y, we maintain the second covariance 
contour of state variables inside the parameter space associated with positive 
interest rates. The filtering algorithm often fails outside this parameter 
space. None of these constraints binds around the optimum and estimates 
remain unchanged when the constraints are relaxed. 
IV Estimation Results 
We first estimate a restricted version of our model, excluding liquidity. Fil-
tered factors and parameter estimates are consistent with results obtained by 
CDR from zero-coupon bonds. More interestingly, the on-the-run premium 
reveals itself in the residuals from the benchmark mode!. This provides a 
direct justification for linking the premium with the age and maturity of 
each bond. We then estimate the unrestricted liquidity mode!. The nul! of 
no liquidity is easily rejected and the liquidity factor captures systematic dif-
ferences between on-the-run and off-the-run bonds. Final!y, estimates imply 
that the on-the-run premium increases with maturity but decreases with the 
age of a bond. 
A Estimation Without Liquidity 
Estimation20 of the benchmark model put the curvature parameter at ~ = 
0.6786 when time periods are measured in years. The standard error is 0.0305 
and 0.0044 when using the QMLE and MLE covariance matrix, respectively. 
20 Estimation is implemented in MATLAB via the fmincon routine with the medium-
scale (active-set) algorithm. Different starting values were used. For standard errors 
computations, we obtain the final Hessian update (BFGS formula) and each observation 
gradient is obtained through a centered finite difference approximation evaluated at the 
optimum. 
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This estimate pins the maximum curvature loading at a maturity close to 30 
months. 
[Table II about here.] 
Figure 1.1 displays the time series of the liquidity (Panel (a)) and the 
term structure (Panel (b)) factors. Estimates for the transition equation are 
given in Table lIa. The results imply average short and long term discount 
rates of 3.73% and 5.45%, respectively. The levei factor is very persistent, 
perhaps a unit root. This standard result in part reflects the graduaI decline 
of interest rates in our sample. The slope factor is slightly less persistent and 
exhibits the usual association with business cycles. Its sign changes before 
the recessions of 1990 and 2001. The siope of the term structure is aiso 
inverted starting in 2006, during the so-called "conundrum" episode. Finally, 
the curvature factor is closely related to the slope factor. 
Standard deviations of pricing errors are given by 
a(Mn) = 0.0229 + 0.0284 x Mn, 
(0.017, 0.0012) (0.021, 0.0006) 
with QMLE and MLE standard errors for each parameter. This implies 
standard deviations of %0.05 and $0.31 dollars for maturities of 1 and 10 
years, respectively. Using durations of 1 and 7 years, this translates into 
yield errors of 5.1 and 4.4 bps. Table IlIa gives more information on the 
fit of the benchmark model. Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSE) increase 
from $0.047 and $0.046 for 3-month on-the-run and off-the-run securities, 
respectively, to $0.35 and $0.39 at lO-year maturity. As discussed above, the· 
monotonous increase of RMSE with maturity reflects the higher sensitivity 
of longer maturity bonds to interest rates. It may also be due to higher 
uneertainty surrounding the true priees, as signaled by wider bid-ask spreads. 
In addition, for most maturities, the RMSE is larger for on-the-run bonds. 
For the entire sample, the RMSE is $0.188. 
Notwithstanding differences between estimation approaches, our results 
are consistent with CDR. Estimating using coupon bonds or using boot-
strapped data provides similar pictures of the underlying term structure of 
interest rates. Also, the approximation introdueed when dealing with non-
linearities is innocuous. However, preliminary estimation of forward rate 
curves smooths away any effect of liquidity. In contrast, our sam pIe com-
prises on-the-run and off-the-run bonds. Any systematic priee differences 
not due to cash flow differenees will be revealed in the pricing errors. 
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[Table III about here. J 
Table IlIa confirms that Mean Pricing Errors (MPE) are systematically 
higher for on-the-run securities. On-the-run residuals are systematically 
higher than off-the-run residuals. For a recent 12-month T-Bill, the average 
difference is close to $0.08, controlling for cash flow differences. Similarly, 
a recently issued 5-year bond is $0.25 more expensive on average than a 
similar but older issue.21 To get a clearer picture of the link between age 
and priee differences, consider Figure 1.4. The top panels plot residual dif-
ferences within the 12-month and 48-month categories. The bottom panels 
plot the ages of each bond in these categories. Panel (c) shows that the U.S. 
Treasury stopped regular issuance of the 12-month Notes in 2000. The liq-
uidity premium was generally positive until then but stopped when issuance 
eeased.· Afterwards, each pair is made of old 2-year Notes, and evidence of a 
premium disappears from the residuals. Panel (d) shows that there has been 
regular issuance of 4-year bonds early in the sample. As expected, the dif-
ference between residuals is generally positive whenever there is a significant 
age difference between the two issues. 1foreover, in each case, on-the-run 
(Le. low age) bonds appear overprieed compared to off-the-run (i.e. high 
age) bonds. This correspondence between issuance patterns and systematic 
pricing errors can be observed in each maturity category. The premium 
increases with maturity but decreases with age. 
Bonds with 24 months to maturity seem to carry a smaller liquidity 
premium than what would be expected given the regular monthly issuanee 
for this category. Note that a formai test rejects the nul! hypothesis of zero-
mean residual differences. Interestingly, Jordan and Jordan (1997) could not 
find evidence of a liquidity or specialness effect at that maturity22. A smaller 
priee premium for 2-year Notes is intriguing and we can only conjecture as 
to its causes. Recall that the magnitude of the premium depends on the 
benefits of higher liquidity, both in terms of lower transaction costs and 
lower repo rates. However, it also depends on the expected length of time a 
bond will offer these benefits. Results in Jordan and Jordan (1997) suggests 
that 2-year Notes remain "special" for shorter periods of time (see Table l, 
p.2057). Similarly, Goldreich et al. (2005) find that the on-the-run premium 
on 2-year Notes goes to zero faster than other maturities,' on average. This is 
21Note that the price impact of Iiquidity increases with rnaturity. This is consistent 
with the results of Amihud and Mendelson (1991). 
22See .Jordan and Jordan (1997) p. 2061: "With the exception of the 2-year notes 1 ... 1, 
the average price differences in Table II are noticeably larger when the issue examined is 
on special." 
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consistent with its short issuance cycle. Alternatively, holders of long-term 
bonds may re-allocate funds from their now short maturity bonds into newly 
issued longer term securities.If the two-year mark serves as a focus point 
for buyers and sellers, this may cause a larger volume of transactions around 
this key maturity, increasing the liquidity value of surrounding assets. 
B Estimation With Liquidity 
Estimation of the unrestricted modelleads to a substantial increase of the 
log-likelihood. The benchmark model is nested with 15 parameter restric-
tions and the improvement in likelihood is such that the LR test-statistic 
leads to a p-value that is essentially zero23 . The estimate for the curva-
ture parameter is now ~ = 0.7304 with QMLE and MLE standard errors of 
0.0857 and 0.0043. Results for the transition equations are given in Table 
IIb. These imply average short and long term discount rates of 4.09% and 
5.76% respectively. Interestingly, the yield curve level is higher once we ac-
count for the liquidity premium. Intuitively, the off-the-run yield curve is 
higher than an otherwise unadjusted estimate wou Id suggest. The standard 
deviations of measurement errors are given by 
0.0227+ 0.0251 x Mn, 
(0.016,0.001) (0.0021,0.0006) 
with QMLE and MLE standard errors for each parameter in parenthesis. 
Then, standard deviations are $0.048 and $0.274 for bonds with one and ten 
years to maturity, respectively. Using durations of 1 and 7, this translates 
into standard deviations of 4.8 and 3.9 bps when measured in yields. Overall, 
parameter estimates and latent factors are relatively unchanged compared 
to the benchmark model. 
We estimate the decay parameter at K, = 1.89 with QMLE and MLE 
standard errors of 1.23 and 0.45 respectively. Estimates of (3 are given in 
Table IV. Note that the level of the liquidity premium increases with matu-
rity.24 The pattern accords with the observations made from residuals of the 
model without liquidity.~ Moreover, Table IlIa shows that the model elimi-
nates most of the systematic differences between on-the-run and off-the-run 
bonds. There is still sorne evidence of a systematic difference in the lO-year 
category where the average error decreases from $0.31 to $0.26. We conclude 
23The benchmark model reached a maximum at 1998.6 while the liquidity model reached 
a maximum at 3482.6. 
24The estimated average level is lower in the 10-year group relative to the 5-year and 
7-year group. This is due to the lower average age of bonds in this groups. 
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that part of the variations in the lO-year on-the-run premium is not common 
with variations in other maturity groups. Finally, Table IlIb shows RMSE 
improvements for almost aU maturities while the overaU sam pIe RMSE de-
creases from $0.188 to $0.151. . 
[Table IV about here.] 
Figure 1.5 draw the residual differences within the 12-month and 60-
month category, respectively. This is another way to see that the model re-
moves systematic differences between residuals. Overall, the evidence points 
toward a large common factor driving the liquidity premium of on-the-run 
U.S. Treasury securities. We interpret this liquidity factor as a measure of 
the value of funding liquidity to investors. The results below show that its 
variations also explain a substantial share of the risk premia observed in 
different interest rate markets. 
V Liquidity And Bond Risk Premia 
In this section, we present evidence that variations in the value of fund-
ing liquidity, as measured from a cross-section of on-the-run premia, share 
a corn mon components with variations of risk premia in other interest rate 
markets. In other words, conditions prevailing on the funding ma~ket in-
duce an aggregate risk factor that affects each of these markets. Of course, 
an increase in the liquidity factor necessarily leads to lower excess returns 
for on-the-run bonds. We show here that it also leads to lower risk premia 
for off-the-run bonds as well as higher risk premia on LIB OR loans, swap 
contracts and corporate bonds. Thus, although the payoffs of these assets 
are not directly related to the higher liquidity of on-the-run securities, their 
risk premium and, hence, their price, is affected by a corn mon liquidity fac-
tor. To summarize, exposure to liquidity risk in the U.S. Treasury funding 
market carries a substantial price of risk in the cross-section of bond returns. 
The impact across assets is similar to the often cited "flight-to-liquidity" phe-
nomenon but remains pervasive in normal market conditions. This common-
ality across liquidity premia accords with a substantial theoreticalliterature 
supporting the existence of an economy-wide liquidity premium (Svensson 
(1985), Bansal and Coleman (1996), Holmtrom and Tirole (1998, 2001), 
Acharya and Pedersen (2004), Vayanos (2004), Lagos (2006), Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2008), Krishnamurthy and He (2008).). The following section 
presents our results.25 
25 Ali the results below are robust to choice of the off-the-run yield curve used to 
compute excess returns or spreads. Unless otherwise stated we use off-the-run yields 
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A Off- The-Run U.S. Treasury Bonds 
We first document the negative relationship between liquidity and ex-
pected excess returns on off-the-run bonds. This is the return, over a given 
investment horizon, from holding a long maturity bond, in excess of the 
risk-free rate for that horizon. Figure 1.3a displays annual excess returns 
on a 2-year off-the-run bond along with the liquidity factor. The negative 
relationship is visually apparent throughout the sample but note the sharp 
variations around the crash of October 1987, the Mexican Peso crisis late 
in 1994, around the LTCM crisis in August 1998 and until the end of the 
millennium. At first,this tight link between on-the-run premia and returns 
from off-the-run Treasury bonds may be surprising. Recall that on-the-run 
bonds trade at a premium due to their anticipated transaction costs and 
funding advantages on the cash and repo markets. However, off-the-run 
bonds can be readily converted into cash via the repo market. This is es-
pecially true relative to other asset classes. In that sense, seasoned bonds 
are close substitutes to on-the-run bonds. Then, the risk premium of aIl 
Treasury bonds decreases in periods of high demand for the relative funding 
liquidity of on-the-run bonds. Longstaff (2004) documents price differences 
between off-the-run U.S Treasury bonds and Refcorp bonds26 with similar 
cash fiows. He argues that discounts on Refcorp bond are due to " ... the 
liquidity of Treasury bonds, especially in unsettled markets.". 
[Table V about here.] 
We test this hypothesis through predictive regressions of off-the-run bond 
excess returns on the liquidity factor. We use the off-the-run curve from the 
model to compute excess returns and include term structure factors to control 
for the information content of forward rates (Fama and Bliss (1987), Camp-
bell and Shiller (1991), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a)). The term structure 
factors spans forward rates but do not suffer from· their near-collinearity. 
Table V presents the results. We consider (annualized) excess returns from 
holding off-the-run bonds with maturities of 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10 years and for 
investment horizons of 1, 3, 6, 12, and 24 months. First, Panel (a) presents 
from the Svensson, Nelson and Siegel method (Gurkaynak et al. (2006)) available 
at (http:j jwww.federalreserve.govjpubsjfedsj2007). Vsing model-implied zero-coupon 
yields does not affect the results. Also, for ease of interpretation, we standardize each 
regressor by subtracting its mean and dividing by its standard deviation. For each risk 
premium regression, the constant corresponds to an estimate of the average risk premium 
and the coefficient on the liquidity factor measures the impact on expected returns, in 
basis points, of a one-standard deviation shock to liquidity. 
26Refcorp is an agency of the V.S. government. Its liabilities have their principals backed 
with V.S. Treasury bonds and coupons explicitly guaranteed by the V.S. Treasury. 
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average risk premia. These range from 153 to 471 bps at one-morith horizon 
and from 69 to 358 bps at annual horizon. These large excess returns are 
consistent with an average positive term structure slope and with a period 
of declining interest rates. Panel (b) presents estimates of the liquidity co-
efficients. The results are conclusive. Estimates are negative and significant 
at all horizons and maturities. Moreover, the impact of liquidity on excess 
returns is economically significant. At a one-month horizon a one-standard 
deviation shock to our measure of funding liquidity lowers expected excess 
returns obtained from off-the-run bonds by 187 and 571 bps for maturities 
of two and ten years respectively. At this horizon, R2 statistics range from 
7.34% to 4.23% (see Panel (c)). Regressions based on excess returns at an 
annual horizon correspond to the cased studied by Cochrane and Piazzesi 
(2005a) who document the substantial predictability of US Treasury excess 
returns from forward rates. The impact of funding liquidity is substantial. A 
one-standard deviation shock decreases expected excess returns by 103 basis 
points at 2-year maturity and by as much as 358 basis points at lO-year ma-
turity. At this horizon, R2 are substantially higher, ranging from 43% and 
50%. Of course, these coefficients of variation pertain to the joint explana-
tory power of all regressors. Panel (c) also presents, in bracket, the R2 of 
the same regressions but excluding the liquidity factor. The liquidity factor 
accounts for more or less half of the predictive power of the regressions. 
The regressions ab ove used excess returns and term structure factors 
computed from the term structure model. One concern is that model mis-
specification leads to estimates of term structure factors that do not correctly 
capture the information content of forward rates or that it induces spurious 
correlations between excess returns and liquidity. As a robustness check 
against both possibilities, we re-examine the predictability regressions but 
using excess returns and forward rates available from the CRSP zero-coupon 
yield data set. From this alternative data set, we compute annual excess 
returns on zero-coupon bonds with maturity from 2 to 5 years. As regres-
sors, we include annual forward rates from CRSP at horizon from 1 to 5 
years along with the liquidity factor from the model. Table VIa presents the 
results. Estimates of the liquidity coefficients are very close to our previous 
results (see Table Vb) and highly significant. We conclude that the pre-
dictability power of the liquidity factor is robust to how we compute excess 
returns and forward rates. 
[Table VI about here.] 
Furthermore, this alternative set of returns allows to check whether the 
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AFENS model captures important aspects of observed excess returns. Ta-
ble Vlb provides results for the regressions of CRSP excess returns on CRSP 
forward rates, excluding the liquidity factor. This ls a replication of the un-
constrained regressions in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a) but for our shorter 
sample period. This exercise confirms their stylized predictability results in 
this sam pIe. That is, the predictive power of forward rates is substantial 
and we recover a tent-shaped pattern of coefficients across maturities. Next, 
Table VIc provides results of a similar regressions with CRSP forward rates 
but using excess returns computed from the model. Comparing the last two 
panels, we see that average excess returns, forward rate coefficients, as weIl 
as R 2 sare similar across data sets. This is striking given that excess returns 
were recovered using very different approaches. The AFENS model captures 
the stylized facts of bond risk premia, which is an important measure of 
success for term structure models. 27 
The evidence shows that variations of funding liquidity value induce vari-
ations in the liquidity premium of Treasury bonds. Empirically, off-the-run 
US Treasury bonds are viewed as liquid substitutes to their recently issued 
counterparts and provide a hedge against fluctuations in funding liquidity. 
Note that this link between conditions on the funding market and the risk 
premium on a Treasury bond can hardly be attributed ta traditional ex-
planations of bond risk premia such as inflation risk or interest rate risk. 
Instead, we argue that frictions in the financial intermediation sector affect 
the Treasury market. The following section considers the impact of funding 
liquidity on LIBOR rates. 
B LIBOR Loans 
In this section, we link variations of the liquidity factor with variations 
in the risk compensation from money market loans. We consider the returns 
obtained from rolling over a lending position in the London inter-bank market 
at the LIBOR rate and fun ding this position at a fixed rate. This measures 
the reward of providing liquidity in the inter-bank market. In contrast with 
the government bond market, higher valuation of funding liquidity predicts 
higher excess returns. Figure 1.3b highlights the positive correlation between 
27Fama (1984b) originally identified this modeling challenge but see also Dai and Single-
ton (2002). Other stylized facts are documented in Fama (1976), (1984a), and(1984b), as 
weil as Startz (1982) for maturities below 1 year. See also Shiller (1979), Fama and Bliss 
(1987), Campbell and Shiller (1991). Our conclusions hold if we use Campbell and Shiller 
(1991) as a benchmark. We also conclude that the empirical facts highlighted by Cochrane 
and Piazzesi (2005a) are not an artefact of the bootstrap method. See the discussion in 
Dai et al. (2004) and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005b). 
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liquidity and rolling excess returns. Again, note the spikes in 1987, 1994, in 
1998 and around the end of the millennium. 
Thus, interbank loans are poor substitutes to U.S. Treasury securities 
in time of funding stress. The reward for providing funds in the inter-bank 
market is higher when the relative value of on-the-run bonds increases. Thus, 
the spread of a LIBOR rate ab ove the Treasury yield reflects the opportunity 
costs, in terms of future liquidity, of an interbank loan compared to the 
liquidity of a Treasury bonds on the repo or the cash markets. Indeed, in 
order to convert a loan back to cash, a bank must enter into a new bilateral 
contract to borrow money. The search costs of this transaction depend on 
the number of willing counterparties in the market and it may be difficult at 
critical times to convert a LIBOR position back to cash.28 
As in the previous section, we test this hypothesis formally through pre-
dictive regressions of excess rolling returns on the liquidity factor. Again, we 
use term structure factors to control for the information content of forward 
rates. We consider investment horizons of 1, 3, 6, 12 and 24 months and 
rolling investments in LIBOR loans with 1,3,6 and 12 months to maturity. 
The LIB OR data is available from the web site of the BBA and we use a 
sample from .January 1987 to December 2007. Table VII presents the results. 
For each loan maturity, the average excess returns is around 25 bps for the 
shortest horizon. Returns then decrease with longer horizon and become 
negative at the longest horizons. This reflects the average positive slope of 
the term structure. In practice, funding rolling short-term investments at 
a fixed rate does not produce positive returns on average. Still, the impact 
of liquidity is unambiguously positive for all horizons and maturities with 
t-statistics above 5 in most cases. 
Interestingly, the impact of the liquidity increases with the horizon. A 
one-standard deviation shock to the value of liquidity increases returns on a 
rolling investment in one-month LIBOR loans by 16 and 90 bps at horizons 3 
and 24 months, respectively. Results are similar for other maturities. In fact, 
the impact is sufficiently large that returns are positive on average, and the 
risk premium is higher than the slope of the term structure. This reflects the 
persistence of the liquidity premium. The R2 from these regressions range 
from 30% to 50%. Moreover, the contribution of the liquidity factor to the 
predictability of LIBOR returns is substantial, generally doubling the R2 , 
or more. In the case of annual excess rolling returns from 3-month loans, 
28Note that this does not preclude that part of the LIB OR spread is due to the higher 
default risk of the average issuer compared to the V.S. government. 
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the predictive power increases from 10.8% to 43.2% when we include the 
liquidity factor. 
An alternative indicator of ex-ante returns from investment in the inter-
bank market is the simple spread of LIBOR rates above risk-free zero-coupon 
yields. As an alternative test, we compute LIBOR spreads on loans with 
maturities of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months and consider regressions of these spreads 
on the liquidity and term structure factors. Panel (c) shows the positive 
relationship between liquidity and the 12-month LIBOR spread. Table VIlla 
presents results from the regressions. A one-standard deviation shock to 
liquidity is associated with concurrent increases of 16, 12, 8 and 6 bps for 
loans with maturity of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months, respectively. 
C Swap Spreads 
The impact of funding liquidity extends to the swap market. This section 
documents the link between the liquidity factor and the spread of swap rates 
above the off-the-run curve. To the extent that swap rates are determined 
by anticipations of future LIBOR rates, results from the previous section 
suggest that swap spreads increase with the liquidity factor. Moreover, vari-
ations in funding liquidity may affect the swap market directly sinee the 
same intermediaries operate in the Treasury and the swap markets. We do 
not distinguish between these alternative channels here. 
[Table VIII about here.] 
We obtain a sample of swap rates from DataStream, starting in April 
1987 and up to Deeember 2007. We focus on swaps with maturities of 2, 
5, 7 and 10 years and compute their spreads above the yield to maturity of 
the corresponding off-the-run par coupon bond. Figure 1.3d compares the 
liquidity factor with the 5-year swap spread. The positive relationship is 
apparent. Table VIIlb shows the results from regressions of swap spreads 
on the liquidity and term structure factors. First, the average spread rises 
with maturity, from 44 to 53 bps, and extends the pattern of LIBOR risk 
premia. Next, estimates of the liquidity coefficients imply that, controlling 
for term structure factors, a one-standard deviation shock to liquidity raises 
swap spreads from 5 to 7 basis points across maturities. The estimates are 
significant, both statically and economically, given the higher priee sensitiv-
ities of swap to change in yields. For a 5-year swap with duration of 4.5, say, 
the priee impact of a 6 basis point change is $0.27 while the priee impact of 
the 6.3 bps rate change for a l-year LIBOR loand is $0.063.29 Finally, the 
29We do not use returns on swap investment to measure expected returns. Swap in-
vestment requires zero initial investment. Determining the proper capital-at-risk to use 
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explanatory power of liquidity is high and increases with maturity. 
Interestingly, funding liquidity affects swap spreads and LIB OR spreads 
similarly. This suggests that anticipations of liquidity compensation in the 
interbank loan market, rather than liquidity risk, is the main driver behind 
the aggregate liquidity component of swap risk premium. This supports 
previous literature (Grinblatt (2001), Duffie and Singleton (1997), Liu et al. 
(2006) and Fedlhütter and Lando (2007)) pointing toward LIBOR liquidity 
premium as an important driver of swap spreads. However, we show that the 
liqu'idity risk underlying a substantial part of that premium is not specifie 
to the LIBOR market but reflects risks faced by intermediaries in funding 
markets. 
D Corpomte Spreads 
The impact of funding liquidity extends to the corporate bond market. 
This section measures the impact of the liquidity factor on the risk premium 
offered by corporate bonds. Empirically, we find that the impact of liquidity 
has a "flight-to-quality" pattern across credit ratings. Following an increase 
of the liquidity factor, excess returns decrease for the higher ratings but 
increase for the lower ratings. Our results are consistent with the evidence 
that default risk cannot rationalize corporate spreads. Collin-Dufresne et al. 
(2001) find that most of the variations of non-default corporate spreads are 
driven by a single latent factor. We formally link this factor with funding 
risk. Our evidence is also consistent with the differential impact of liquidity 
across ratings found by Ericsson and Renault (2006). However, while they 
relate bond spreads to bond-specifie measures of liquidity, we document the 
impact of an aggregate factor in the compensation for illiquidity. 
Our analysis begins with Merril! Lynch corporate bond indices. We con-
sider end-of-month data from December 1988 to December 2007 on 5 indices 
with credit ratings of AAA, AA, A, BBB and High Yield !HY] ratings (i.e. 
HY Master II index), respectively. In a complementary exercise, below, we 
use a sam pie of NAIC transaction data.3D As in earlier sections, we measure 
the impact of liquidity on corporate bonds through predictive excess returns 
regressions. For each index, and each month, we compute returns in excess 
of the off-the-rim zero coupon yield for investment horizons of 1, 3, 6, 12 
and 24 months. We th en project returns on the liquidity and term structure 
in returns computation is somewhat arbitrary. It should be clear from Figure 1.3d that 
receiving fixed, and being exposed to short-term LIBOR fluctuations, will provide greater 
compensation when the liquidity premium is elevated. 
30We thank Jan Ericsson for providing the NAIC transaction data and control variables. 
See Ericsson and Renault (2006) for a discussion of this data set. 
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factors. Again, term structure factors are included to control for the infor-
mation content of the yield curve. The first Panel of Table IX presents the 
results. 
First, as expected, average excess returns are higher for lower ratings. 
Next, estimates of the liquidity coefficients show that the impact of a rising 
liquidity factor is negative for the higher ratings and becomes positive for 
lower ratings. A one-standard deviation shock to the liquidity factor leads 
to decreases in excess returns for AAA, AA and A ratings but to increases in 
excess returns for BBB and HY ratings. Excess returns decrease by 2.27% 
for AAA index but increase by 2.38% for the HY index. For comparison, the 
impact on Treasury bonds with 7 and 10 years to maturity was -4.52% and 
-5.42%. Thus, on average, high quality bonds were considered substitutes, 
albeit imperfect, to V.S. Treasuries as a hedge against variations in funding 
conditions. On the other hand, lower-rated bonds were exposed to funding 
market shocks. 
The differential impact of liquidity on excess returns across ratings sug-
gests a fiight-to-liquidity pattern. We consider an alternative sample, based 
on individual bond transaction data from the NAIC. While this sample covers 
a shorter period, from February 1996 until December 2001, the sample com-
prises actual transaction data and provides a better coverage of the rating 
spectrum. Once restricted to end-of-month observations, the sample includes 
2,171 transactions over 71 months. To preserve parsimony, we group ratings 
in five categories.:.n We consider regression of NAIC corporate spreads on the 
liquidity and term structure factors but we also include the control variables 
used by Ericsson and Renault (2006). These are the VIX index, the returns 
on the S&P500 index, a measure of market-wide default risk premium and an 
on-the-run dummy signalling whether that particular bond was on-the-run 
at the time of the transaction. Control variables also include the level and 
the slope of the term structure of interest rates.:n . 
The panel regressions of credit spreads for bond i at date tare given by 
where Lt is the liquidity factor and I(Gi = j) is an indicator fun ct ion equal 
31 Group 1 includes ratings from AAA to A+, group 2 includes ratings A and A-, group 
3 includes ratings BBB+, BBB and BBB-, group 4 includes ratings CCC+, CCC and 
CCC- while group 5 includes the remaining ratings down to C-
32We do not include individual bond fixed-effects as our sample is small relative to the 
number (998) of securities. 
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to one if the credit rating of bond i belongs in group j = 1, ... ,5. Control 
variables are grouped in the vector Xt+h' Table IXb presents the results. 
The flight-to-quality pattern clearly emerges from the results. For the high-
est rating category, an increase in liquidity value of one standard deviation 
decreases spreads by 31 and 20 basis points in groups 1 and 2 respectively. 
The effect is sm aller and statistically undistinguishable from zero for group 
3. Coefficients then become positive implying increases in spreads of 25 and 
26 basis points for groups 4 and 5, respectively. This is an average effect 
through time and across ratings within each group.33 
The results obtained from spreads computed from Merrill Lynch indices 
and spreads computed from NAIC transactions differ. While results from 
Merrill Lynch were inconclusive, estimates of liquidity coefficients obtained 
from NAIC data confirm that a shock to funding liquidity leads to lower 
corporate spreads in the highest rating groups but higher corporate spreads 
in the lowest rating groups. Two important differences between samples may 
explain the results. First, the composition of the index is different from the 
composition of NAIC transaction data. The impact of liquidity on corporate 
spreads may not be homogenous across issues. For example, the maturity 
or the age of a bond, the industry of the issuer and security-specific option 
features may introduce heterogeneity. Second, Merrill Lynch indices coyer a 
much longer time span. The pattern of liquidity premia across the quality 
spectrum may be time-varying. 
E Discussion 
Focusing on the corn mon component of on-the-run premia filters out local 
or idiosyncratic demand and supply effects on Treasury bond prices. The 
results above show that this measure of funding liquidity is an aggregate 
risk factor affecting money market instruments and fixed-income securities. 
These assets carry a significant, time-varying and common liquidity pre-
mium. That is, when the value of the most-easily funded collateral rises 
relative to other securities, we observe variations in risk premia for off-the-
run U. S. government bonds, eurodollar loans, swap contracts, and corporate 
bonds. Empirically, the impact of aggregate liquidity on asset pricing ap-
pears strongly during crisis and the pattern is suggestive of a flight-to-quality 
behavior. Nevertheless, its impact is pervasive even in normal times. 
33We do not report other coefficients. Briefly, the coefficient on the level factor is 
negative and significant. Ali other coefficients are insignificant but these results are are 
not directly comparable with Ericsson and Renault (2006) due to differences of models 
and sample frequencies. 
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Note that these r~gressions assumed a stable relationship between risk 
premium and funding liquidity. One important alternative is that the sign 
and the size of the impact of funding conditions itself depend on the intensity 
of the funding shock, as suggested by the recent experience. In particular, 
while corporate bonds with high ratings may be substitutes to Treasury 
bonds in good times, they experience large risk premium increases in funding 
crisis. We leave this for further research but note that this may explain the 
weak statistical evidence above in the case of corporate bonds. In any case, 
the main result of this section is that a substantial fraction of the risk premia 
is linked to variations in funding liquidity. 
Jointly, the evidence is hard to reconcHe with theories based on variations 
of default probability, inflation or interest rates and their associated risk pre-
mia. Instead, we link risk premium variations with conditions in the funding 
markets. This supports the theoreticalliterature that emphasizes the role of 
borrowing constraints faced by financial intermediaries (Gromb and Vayanos 
(2002), He and Krishnamurthy (2007)) and, in particular, that highlights the 
role of funding markets in financial intermediation (Brunnermeier and Ped-
ersen (2008)). Different securities serve, in part, and to varying degrees, to 
fulfill investors' uncertain future needs for cash and their risk premium de-
pend on the ability of intermediaries to provide immediacy in each market. 
In this context, it is interesting that the liquidity premium of government 
bonds appears to decrease when funding liquidity become scarce. This con-
fers a special status to government obligations, and possibly to high-quality 
corporate bonds, as a hedge against variations in funding liquidity. We leave 
for further research the cause of this special attribute of government bonds. 
The next section identifies candidate determinants of liquidity valuation and 
characterizes aggregate liquidity in terms of known economic indicators. 
VI Determinants Of Liquidity Value 
The liquidity factor aggregates very diverse economic information. The value 
of liquidity services on the funding market depends on investors' demand for 
immediacy on markets where intermediaries are active. Next, funding costs 
will also vary with the capital position and the access to capital (present and 
future) of financial intermediaries that obtain leverage through secured loans. 
Finally, conditions on the funding market are affected by the availability of 
funds and, thus, by the relative tightness of monetary policy. In this section, 
we find that the value of funding liquidity, measured by the on-the-run factor, 
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varies with changes in monetary aggregates and in bank reserves. AIso, the 
value of funding liquidity increases with aggregate wealth and aggregate 
uncertainty as measured by valuation ratios and option-implied volatilityof 
the SP500 stock index. Finally, the on-the-mn premium rises when recently 
issued bonds offers relatively lower bid-ask spreads34 . 
A Macroeconomie Variables 
Ludvigson and Ng (2009) [LN hereafter] summarize 132 US macroeco-
nomic series into 8 principal components. They then explore parsimoniously 
the predictive content of this large information set for bond returns. Their 
main result is that that a "rea!" and an "inflation" factor35 have substantial 
predictive power for bond excess returns beyond the information content 
of forward rates. They also find that a "financial" factor is significant but 
that much of its information content is subsumed in the Cochrane-Piazzesi 
measure of bond risk premium. 
Table X displays results from a regression of liquidity on macroeconomic 
factors (Regression A) from LN.36 This shows that the funding liquidity fac-
tor shares tight linkages with the macroeconomy. Macroeconomie factors 
with significant coefficients are FI, F2 and F4, the "rea!", "financial" and 
"inflation" factors of LN that also predict bond risk premium. In addition, 
factors F5, F6, and F7 are also significant. As we discuss below, F6, and 
F7 can be interpreted as "monetary conditions" factors and F5 is a "hous-
ing activity" factor. Finally, the R2 ls 58% and individual coefficients have 
similar magnitude. 
[Table X about here.] 
The "financial" factor relates to different interest rate spreads, which is 
consistent with the evidence above that the liquidity factor is related to risk 
premia across markets.37 The F6 and F7 factors share a similar and ex-
tremely interesting Interpretation: these are "monetary conditions" factors. 
34We al80 considered the Pastor-Stambaugh measure of aggregate stock market liquidity 
and found no relationship. 
35Ludvigson and Ng (2009) use univariate regressions of individual series on each princi-
pal component to characterize its information content. For example, the "real" factor was 
labeled as such because it has high explanatory power for real quantities (e.g. Industrial 
Production). 
36 A significant link between liquidity and one of the principal components of LN does not 
necessarily requite that this component predicts bond excess returns. The liquidity factor 
is endogenous and its loadings on the underlying macroeconomic variables is unlikely to 
be linear nor constant through time. 
37LN found that the information content of the "financial" factor for excess returns is 
subsumed in the CP factor. Recall from Section A that the information content of the 
funding liquidity factor is not subsumed by the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor. 
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Both have highest explanatory power for the rate of change in reserves and 
non-borrowed reserves of depository institutions. Next, factor F6 has most 
information for the rate of change of the monetary base and the Ml mea-
sure of money stock and sorne information from the PCE indices. Beyond 
bank reserves, factor F7 is most informative for the spreads of commercial 
paper and three-month Treasury bills above the Federal Reserve funds rate. 
This suggests an important channel between monetary policy and the in-
termediation mechanism and, ultimately, with variations in the valuation 
of marketwide liquidity. These results are consistent with Longstaff (2004), 
who establishes a link between variations of RefCorp spreads and measures 
of flows into money market mutual funds, Longstaff et al. (2005), who docu-
ment a similar link for the non-default component of corporate spreads and, 
finally, Chordia et al. (2005), who document that money flows and monetary 
surprises affect measures of bond market liquidity. 
We find that the liquidity factor is also related to the "real", "inflation" 
factors, indicating that sorne of the predictability of macro factors for bond 
risk premium could be measured in funding markets. This may also result 
from the impact of the Fed's actions on funding markets. The F5 is a "hous-
ing activity" factor and is also significant. It contains information on housing 
st arts and new building permits. Nonetheless, its significance appears to be 
limited to the early part of the sample and it is not robust to the inclusion 
of bid-ask spreads information (see below). Finally, the "real" and "inflation" 
factors are not robust to the inclusion of stock index implied volatility. 
B Transaction Costs Variables 
Coupon bond quotes from the CRSP data set include bid and ask prices. 
At each point in time, we consider the entire cross-section of bonds and com-
pute the difference between the median and the minimum bid-ask spreads. 
This measures the difference in transaction costs between the most liquid 
bond and a typical bond. Table X presents the results from a regression of 
liquidity on this measure of relative transaction costs. The coefficient is pos-
itive and significant. The liquidity factor increases when the median bid-ask 
spread moves further away from the minimum spread. That is, on-the-run 
bonds become more expensive when they offer relatively lower transaction 
costs. The explanatory power of bid-ask information is substantial, as mea-
sured by an R2 of 37.7%. However, there is a sharp structural break in this 
relationship. Most of the explanatory power and all of the statistical evi-
den ce is driven by observations preceding 1990 as made clear by Figure 1.7a. 
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The first break in this pro cess coincides with the advent of the GovPX plat-
form while the second break, around 1999, matches the introduction of the 
eSpeed electtonic trading platform. Although transaction costs contribute 
to the on-the-run premium, the lack of variability since these breaks implies 
a lesser role in the variations of liquidity on Treasury markets. 
C Aggregate Uncertainty 
The valuation of li qui dit y should increase with higher aggregate uncer-
tainty. We use implied volatility from options on the S&P 500 stock index as 
proxy for'aggregate uncertainty. The S&P500 index comprises a large share 
of aggregate wealth and its implied volatility can be interpreted as a forward 
looking indicator of wealth volatility. The sam pIe comprises monthly obser-
vations of the CBOE VOX index from .January 1986 until the end of 2007. 
Table X presents results from a regression of liquidity on aggregate uncer-
tainty (Regression C). The R2 is 7.9% and the coefficients is positive but 
the evidence is statistically weak. Figure 1. 7b shows the measures of volatil-
ity and funding liquidity until the end of 2008. Clearly, peaks in volatility 
are often associated with rises in liquidity valuation. The weak statistical 
evidence is due to the period around 2002 where very low funding liquidity 
value was not matched with a proportional decrease of implied volatility. 
In any case, the coefficient estimate suggests that a one-standard deviation 
shock to implied volatility raises the liquidity factor by 0.052. 
D Combining Regressors 
Finally, Table X reports the results from a regression combining all the 
economic information considered above (Regression D). The coefficient on 
the relative bid-ask spread decreases but remains significant. On the other 
hand, the information from the VIX measure is subsumed in other regres-
sors. Its coefficient changes sign and becomes insignificant. In particular, 
the VIX measure is positively correlated with the stock market factor and 
this factor's coefficient doubles. Next, the inflation, real and housing activ-
ity factor become insignificant. However, the "monetary conditions" factors 
also remain significant when conditioning on transaction costs and aggregate 
uncertainty information. 
Overall the evidence points toward two broad channels in the determi-
nation of the value of funding liquidity. First, similar to the model of Krish-
namurthyand He (2008), aggregate uncertainty and aggregate wealth affect 
the intermediaries' ability to provide liquidity. Second, the Fed implements 
its monetary policy primarily through the funding market. To some extent, 
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it also support to the stability of the financial system through that channel. 
Then, these policies, through their impact on funding conditions directly 
impact risk premium in other markets. 
VII The Events Of 2008 
We repeat the estimation of the model including data from 2008. Figure 1.7 
presents the liquidity (Panel1.8a) and the term structure (Panel1.8b )factors. 
The latter shows a sharp increase in the cross-section of on-the-run premium. 
In fact, this large shock increases the volatility of the liquidity factor substan-
tially. Looking at Figure 1.7b and 1.7a we see that this spike was associated 
with a large increase in the SP500 implied volatility but, interestingly, the 
spread between the minimum and median bid-ask spread remained stable. 
This supports our interpretation that the liquidity factor finds its roots in 
the funding market. 
Adding 2008 only increases the measured impact of the common funding 
liquidity factor on bond risk premia. Each of the regression above leads to 
higher estimate for the liquidity coefficient. An interesting case, though, 
is the behavior of corporate bond spreads. Clearly corporate bond spreads 
increased sharply over that period, indicating an increase in expected returns. 
What is interesting is that this was the case for any ratings. Figure 1.8 
compares the liquidity factor with the spread of the AAA and BBB Merrill 
Lynch index. In the sample excluding 2008, the estimated average impact a 
shock to funding liquidity was negative for AAA bonds and positive for BBB. 
The large and positively correlated shock in 2008 reverses this conclusion 
for AAA bonds. But note that AAA spreads and the liquidity factor were 
also positively correlated in 1998. This confirms our conjecture that the 
behavior of high-rating bonds is not stable and depends on the nature or 
the size of the shock to funding liquidity. Note that this does not affect 
our conclusion that corporate bond liquidity premium shares a component 
with other risk premium due to funding risk. Instead, it suggests that the 
relationship exhibits regimes through time. 
VIII Conclusion 
We augment the Arbitrage Free Extended Nelson-Siegel term structure model 
of Christensen et al. (2007) by allowing for a liquidity factor driving the on-
the-run premium. Estimation of the model proceeds directly from coupon 
bond priees using a non-linear filter. We identify from a panel of Treasury 
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bonds a common liquidity factor driving on-the-run premia at different ma-
turities. Its effect increases with maturity and decreases with the age of a 
bond. 
This liquidity factors measures the value of the lower funding and trans-
action costs of on-the-run bonds. It predicts a substantial share of the risk 
premium on off-the-run bonds. It also predicts LIBOR spreads, swap spreads 
and corporate bond spreads. The pattern across interest rate markets and 
credit ratings is consistent with accounts of flight-to-liquidity events. How-
ever, the effect is pervasive in normal times. The evidence points toward 
the importance of funding liquidity for the intermediation mechanism and, 
hence, for asset pricing. Our results arerobust to changes in data set and to 
the inclusion of term structure information. 
The liquidity factor varies with transaction costs on the secondary bond 
market. More importantly, we find that the value of liquidity is related to 
narrow measures monetary aggregates and measures of bank reserves. 1 t also 
varies with measures of stock market valuations and aggregate uncertainty. 
The ability of intermediaries to meet the demand for immediacy depends, in 
part, on funding conditions and induces a large common liquidity premium in 
key interest rate markets. In particular, our results suggest that the behavior 
of the Fed is a key determinants of the liquidity premium. It remains to be 
seen if the impact of aggregate liquidity extends to the risk premium for 
stocks. In this context, the measure of funding liquidity proposed here can 
be used as real-time measure of liquidity premia. 
IX Appendix 
A Data 
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We use end-of-month prices of U.S. Treasury securities from the CRSP 
data set. We exclude callable bonds, flower bonds and other bonds with 
tax privileges, issues with no publicly outstanding securities, bonds and bills 
with less than 2 months to maturity and observations with either bid or ask 
prices missing. Our sample covers the period from January 1986 to December 
2008. We also exclude the following suspicious quotes. 
CRSP ID 
#19920815.107250 
#19950331.203870 
#19980528.400000 
#20011130.205870 
#20041031.202120 
#20070731.203870 
#20080531.204870 
Date 
August 31st 1987 
December 30th 
May 30th 1998 
October 31th 
November 29th 2002 
May 31"t 2006 
November 30th 2007 
CRSP ID #20040304.400000 has a maturity date preceding its issuance 
date, as dated by the U.S. Treasury. Finally, CRSP ID #20130815.204250 
is never special and is excluded. 
B Unscented Kalman Pilter 
The UKF is based on an approximation to any non-linear transformation 
of a probability distribution. It has been introduced in Julier et al. (1995) 
and Julier and Uhlmann (1996) (see Wan and der Merwe (2001) for textbook 
treatment) and was first imported in finance by Leippold and Wu (2003). 
Given Xt+JIt a time-t forecast of state variable for period t + 1, and its 
associated MSE Qt+1lt the unscented filter selects a set of Sigma points in 
the distribution of X t+1lt such that 
x = L w(i)x(i) = Xt+llt 
i 
Julier et al. (1995) proposed the following set of Sigma points, 
i=O 
i = 1, ... ,K 
i = K + 1, ... ,2K 
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with weights 
i=O 
1, ... ,K 
i = K +1, ... ,2K 
where is the i-th row or column of the matrix square root. 
(i) 
Julier and Uhlmann (1996) use a Taylor expansion to evaluate the approxi-
mation's accuracy. The expansion of y g(x) around x is 
jj E[g(x+Llx)] 
g(x) + E [DAX(9) + D~~(9) + D~;?) + ... ] 
where the D~x(g) operator evaluates the total differential of g(-) when per-
turbed by Llx, and evaluated at X. A useful representation of this operator 
in our context is 
D~,:(g) = ~ (~ Llx .~) i g(X)1 
z! t! L....t J 8xj 
J=1 x=x 
Different approximation strategies for jj will differ by either the number of 
terms used in the expansion or the set of perturbations Llx. If the distribu-
tion of Llx is symmetric, all odd-ordered terms are zero. Moreover, we can 
re-write the second terms as a function of the covariance matrix Pxx of Llx, 
Linearisation leads to the approximation Y/in = g(x) while the unscented 
approximation is exact up to the third-order term and the cr-points have 
the correct covariance matrix by construction. In the Gaussian case, Julier 
and Ulhmann (1996) show that same-variable fourth moments agree as weil 
and that aU other moments are lower than the true moments of Llx. Then, 
approximation errors of higher order terms are necessarily smaUer for the 
UKF than for the EKF. U sing a similar argument, but for approximation 
of the MSE, Julier and Uhlmann (1996) show that linearisation and the 
unscented transformation agree with the Taylor expansion up to the second-
order term and that approximation errors in higher-order terms are smaller 
for the UKF. 
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. C Arbitrage-Free Yield Adjustment Term 
Christensen et al. (2007) show that the constant, a(m) is given by 
m2 [1 1 - e-m>. 1 _ e-2m>.] 
a(m) = -aî1 6 - (a~l + a~2) 2),2 - m),3 + 4m),3 
- (a~l + a~2 + a~3) 
[ 
1 e-m>. me-2m>' 3e-2m>' 2(1 - e-m>.) 5(1 _ e-2m>.)] 
x 2),2 + ~ - 4), 4),2 - m),3 + 8m),3 
[
m e-m>. 1- e-m>.] 
- (alla21) 2), + ---:>:2 - m),3 
[
3e-m >. m me-m >.] 
- (alla31) ----:\2 + -2), + ), 
- (a21 a31 + a22a32) 
[ 
1 e-m>. e-2m>' 3(1 - e-m>.) 3(1 - e-2m>.)] 
x ),2 + ---:>:2 -~ - m),3 + 4m),3 . 
Table r: Summary statistics of bond characteristics 
We present summary statistics of age (in months), duration (in months) and coupon (in %) for each maturity and liquidity category. New refers to the 
on-the-run security and Old refers"to the off-the-run security (see text for details). In each case, the first column gives the sample mean and the second 
column gives the sample standard deviations. Coupon statistics are not reported for maturity categories of 12 months and less as T-bills do not pay 
coupons. End-of-month data from CRSP (1985:12-2007:12). 
Age Duration Coupon 
Maturity Old New Old New Old New 
3 12.01 9.31 1.64 0.09 3.01 0.03 4.38 0.09 
6 16.93 6.27 0.12 0.11 6.00 0.10 5.90 0.11 
9 14.45 6.05 4.42 4.88 8.89 0.11 10.00 0.40 
12 13.11 5.78 2.51 3.90 111.77 0.23 12.14 1.08 
18 28.29 11.92 - 6.74 0.62 17.14 0.50 16.81 0.59 7.12 2.81 6.84 3.06 
24 22.90 13.45 0.33 0.52 22.56 0.59 22.68 0.72 7.11 2.82 6.74 3.13 
36 24.64 10.17 4.61 6.74 32.56 1.42 32.75 2.63 7.49 2.96 7.10 2.82 
48 18.42 9.57 4.42 3.00 41.95 2.30 44.17 4.40 7.38 3.03 7.25 2.86 
60 29.06 21.58 2.29 3.85 50.41 3.09 51.36 3.02 7.72 2.80 7.13 2.90 
84 34.41 8.61 12.51 11.82 65.85 5.04 68.71 8.45 7.74 2.56 7.55 2.63 
120 14.91 18.59 4.02 7.56 84.43 8.34 85.55 9.16 7.15 2.24 7.44 2.71 
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Table II: Parameter estimates of transition equations. 
Panel (a) presents estimation results for the AFENS model without liquidity. Panel (b) 
presents estimation results for the AFENS model with liquidity. For each parameter, 
the first standard error (in parenthesis) is computed from the QMLE covariance matrix 
(see Equation 1.23) while the second is computed from the outer product of scores (see 
Equation 1.25). End-of-month data from CRSP (1985:12-2007:12). 
(a) 
F K I: (x102 ) 
0.0545 0.169 0.68 
Level (0.0136) (0.177) (0.42) 
(0.0093) (0.069) (0.03) 
-0.0172 0.182 0.76 0.84 
Slope (0.0277) (0.088) (0.75) (0.46) 
(0.013) (0.071) (0.06) (0.04) 
-0.0128 0.891 -0.14 0.41 2.31 
Curvature (0.0061) (0.860) (1.86) (1.64) (0.66) 
(0.0045) (0.283) (0.15) (0.17) (0.13) 
(b) 
F K I: (x102 ) 
0.0576 0.198 0.85 
Level (0.0165) (0.165) (0.86) 
(0.0154) (0.098) (0.02) 
-0.0167 0.222 -0.81 0.85 
Slope (0.0092) (0.293) (0.85) (0.44) 
(0.0165) (0.145) (0.06) (0.05) 
-0.0189 0.887 0.57 0.25 2.27 
Curvature (0.0057) (1.414) (0.82) (1.91) (1.66) 
(0.0088) (0.325) (0.13) (0.20) (0.12) 
L <Pl al 
0.32 0.955 0.06 
Liquidity (0.42) (0.034) (0.066) 
(0.09) (0.021) (0.011) 
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Table III: Mean Pricing Errors and Root Mean Squared Pricing Errors 
Panel (a) presents MPE and Panel (b) presents RMSPE from AFENS models with and 
without liquidity. The columns correspond to liquidity category where New refers to 
on-the-run issues and Old refers to off-the-run issues. End-of-month data from CRSP 
(1985: 12-2007: 12). 
(a) Mean Pricing Errors 
Mean Pricing Errors 
Benchmark Model Liquidity Model 
Maturity Old New Old New 
3 0.015 0.026 0.003 -0.002 
6 -0.002 0.02 0.018 -0.011 
9 -0.031 0.026 -0.012 0.008 
12 -0.041 0.037 -0.023 0.016 
18 -0.064 -0.061 0.002 -0.001 
24 -0.028 4e-5 0.007 -0.005 
36 0.005 0.069 0.014 -0.012 
48 -0.008 0.079 -0.019 -0.003 
60 0.006 0.25 0.013 0.023 
84 -0.167 -0.041 0.035 -0.015 
120 -0.239 0.07 -0.157 0.107 
Ail -0.058 0.043 -0.011 0.010 
(b) Root Mean Squared Errors 
Root Mean Squared Pricing Errors 
Benchmark Model Liquidity Model 
Maturity Old New Old New 
3 0.047 0.046 0.04 0.021 
6 0.035 0.041 0.038 0.023 
9 0.054 0.062 0.038 0.036 
12 0.072 0.078 0.057 0.049 
18 0.092 0.09 0.04 0.034 
24 0.063 0.085 0.056 0.062 
36 0.102 0.139 0.101 0.072 
48 0.171 0.183 0.161 0.088 
60 0.226 0.318 0.217 0.108 
84 0.327 0.298 0.235 0.176 
120 0.353 0.394 0.285 0.308 
Ail 0.177 0.197 0.145 0.089 
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Table IV: On-the-run Premium 
Each line corresponds to a maturity category (months). The first two columns provide the 
average of residual differences in each category for the AFENS model with and without 
maturity, respectively. The last three col~mns display estimates of the liquidity level, /3, 
followed by standard errors (in parenthesis). The first standard error is computed from the 
QMLE covariance matrix (see Equation 1.23) while the second is computed from the outer 
product of scores. (see Equation 1.24). End-of-month data from CRSP (1985:12-2008:12). 
S 
Maturity Re idual Differences (3 Standard Error 
Bencllmark Liquidity QMLE MLE 
3 0.0111 -0.0053 0.2642 0.0304 0.0232 
6 0.0221 -0.0295 0.2837 0.0326 0.0273 
9 0.0566 0.0202 0.3158 0.0370 0.0331 
12 0.0783 0.0396 0.3026 0.0362 0.0335 
18 0.0025 -0.0036 0.0428 0.0248 0.0352 
24 0.028 -0.0117 0.2005 0.0320 0.0350 
36 0.0644 -0.026 0.5325 0.0739 0.0842 
48 0.0892 0.0165 0.7446 0.0945 0.0880 
60 0.2477 0.0102 1.227 0.1369 0.1197 
84 0.125 . -0.0509 1.2174 0.1026 0.0978 
120 0.3106 0.264 
Table V: Results from off-the-run excess returns regressions 
Results from predictive regression, 
(m) (m) ,,(ml L j3(m)T F. (m) 
XT t + h = ah + h t + h t + €(t+h)' 
the liquidity, Lt, and term structure factors, Ft, from the AFENS model where xT;~2 is the excess returns at horizon h (months) on a bond of maturity 
m (years). Regressors are demeaned and divided by its standard deviation. Panel (a) contains estimates of a and Panel (b) contains estimates of" with 
t-statistics based on Newey-West standard errors (h+3 lags) in parenthesis. Panel (c) presents R 2 of including or excluding [in bracketsJ the liquidity 
factor. End-of-month data from CRSP (1985:12-2007:12). 
(a) Average risk premia 
Bond Maturity 
Horizon 2 3 4 5 7 10 
1 1.53 (7.07) 2.09 (lLl7) 2.59 (15.00) 3.03 (18.53) 3.80 (24.86) 4.71 (33.49) 
3 1.36 (4.17) 1.90 (6.64) 2.39 (8.89) 2.83 (10.89) 3.57 (14.36) 4.44 (18.90) 
6 LlO (2.67) 1.63 (4.38) 2.10 (5.89) 2.51 (7.22) 3.21 (9.53) 3.99 (12.53) 
12 0.69 (1.37) 1.21 (2.59) 1.66 (3.62) 2.07 (4.50) 2.78 (6.03) 3.58 (8.07) 
24 0.00 (0.00) 0.61 (0.96) 1.11 (1.67) 1.56 (2.20) 2.34 (2.94) 3.26 (3.78) 
(b) Liquidity Coefficients 
Bond Maturity 
Horizon 2 3 4 5 7 10 
1 -1.39 (-2.49) -2.27 (-2.53) -3.01 (-2.47) -3.61 (-2.39) -4.52 (-2.27) -5.42 (-2.07) 
3 -1.35 (-3.28) -2.12 (-3.14) -2.74 (-2.97) -3.23 (-2.84) -3.98 (-2.64) -4.70 (-2.34) 
6 -1.25 (-4.67) -2.00 (-4.51) -2.59 (-4.29) -3.07 (-4.09) -3.84 (-3.75) -4.69 (-3.26) 
12 -0.85 (-5.47) -1.63 (-5.63) -2.24 (-5.63) -2.73 (-5.57) -3.44 (-5.18) -4.08 (-4.15) 
24 0.00 (0.00) -0.53 (-3.24) -0.91 (-3.23) -Ll7 (-3.27) -1.51 (-3.29) -1.75 (-2.91) 
(c) R 2 
Bond Maturity 
Horizon 2 3 4 5 7 10 
1 4.74 [2.28] 4.65 [2.02J 4.51 [1.95] 4.34 [1.93] 4.03 [1.92] 3.55 [1.89] 
3 13.56 [6.84] 13.33 [6.83] 13.07 [7.03] 12.78 [7.18] 12.07 [7.17] 10.52 [6.57] 
6 24.23 [10.34] 24.50 [11.21] 24.57 [12.26] 24.61 [13.11] 24.44 [14.10] 22.92 [14.02] ..,.. 0:> 
12 35.36 [11.23] 37.71 [12.66] 39.24 [14.96] 40.32 [17.20] 41.46 [21.00] 40.54 [24.42] 
24 0.00 [0.00] 35.53 [16.92] 31.91 [13.91] 29.46 [11.92] 26.56 [10.32] 25.82 [12.69] 
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Table VI: Off-the-run excess returns and funding liquidity 
Results from the regressions, 
(m) (m) ;:(m)L (3(m)T f (m) xrt+12 = Ct + u t + t + €(t+12)' 
where xr;:;~ is the annual excess returns on a bond with maturity m (years), Lt is 
the liquidity factor and ft is a vector of annual forward rates ftCh ) from 1 to 5 years. 
Regressors are demeaned and divided by their standard deviations. Panel (a) presents 
results using returns and forward rates directly from CRSP data but with the liquidity 
factor from the mode!. Panel (b) excludes the liquidity factor. Panel (c) exclu des the 
liquidity factor and uses excess returns from the mode!. Newey-West t-statistics (in 
parenthesis) with 15 lags. End-of-month data from CRSP (1985:12-2007:12). 
(a) Excess returns and forward rates from Fama-Bliss data with the liquidity factor 
Maturity est f?) ft(2) /3) t fPI) ft(5) Lt R 2 
2 0.72 0.29 -1.31 1.88 0.93 -0.95 -0.78 41.65 
(3.49) (0.49) (-1.18) (1.50) (1.04) (-1.60) (-5.97) 
3 1.31 0.15 -2.26 4.32 0.76 -1.49 -1.55 41.66 
(3.41) (0.14) (-1.13) ( 1.89) (0.48) (-1.27) (-5.93) 
4 1.79 -0.51 -1.74 4.58 1.53 -1.85 . -2.18 42.82 
(3.53) (-0.35) (-0.66) (1.51) (0.75) (-1.13) (-6.07) 
5 1.98 -1.51 -0.24 4.57 0.36 -0.81 -2.66 40.87 
(3.23) (-0.84) (-0.07) (1.24) (0.15) (-0.39) (-5.83) 
(b) Excess returns and forward rates from Fama-Bliss data 
Maturity est ft(Jj fP) /3) t ft(4) ft(5) Lt R 2 
2 0.72 -0.43 -1.34 2.66 0.99 -1.53 21.04 
(2.95) (-0.57) (-1.06) (1.50) (0.95) (-2.13) 
3 1.31 -1.27 -2.33 5.86 0.88 -2.64 19.29 
(2.87) (-0.87) (-1.04) (1.77) (0.46) (-1.86) 
4 1.79 -2.52 -1.83 6.74 1.70 -3.46 19.86 
(2.95) (-1.26) (-0.62) (1.51) (0.67) (-1.76) 
5 1.98 -3.96 -0.35 7.20 0.56 -2.79 18.27 
(2.71) (-1.65) (-0.10) (1.35) (0.19) (-1.14) 
(c) Excess returns from the model and forward rates from Fama-Bliss data 
Maturity est fP) fP) f t(3) li) ft(5) Lt R 2 
2 0.66 -0.13 -1.91 2.97 0.93 -1.51 2T.Ti) 
(2.71) (-0.17) (-1.53) (1.69) (0.91) (-2.09) 
3 1.27 -1.15 -2.04 4.97 1.19 -2.43 18.19 
(2.82) (-0.79) ( -0.90) ( 1.50) (0.63) (-1.73) 
4 1.74 -2.46 -1.26 6.09 1.18 -2.92 17.22 
(2.83) (-1.24) (-0.41) (1.34) (0.46) (-1.47) 
5 2.09 -3.86 0.00 6.62 1.06 -3.12 17.15 
(2.80) (-1.61) (0.00) ( 1.20) (0.34) (-1.26) 
Table VII: LIBOR rolling excess returns and funding liquidity 
Results from the regressions, 
(m) (m) 8(m) L f3(m)T F. (m) XTt + h = ah + h t + h t + E(t+h)' 
where XT;:'~ is the returns at time t + h (months) on rolling investment in loans with maturity m (months), Lt is the liquidity factor and Ft is the vector 
of term structure factor. Each regressor is demeaned and divided by its standard deviation for interpretation. Panel (a) contains estimates of average 
returns. Panel (b) contains estimates of 8~m). Newey-West t-statistics (h+3Iags) in parenthesis. Panel (c) presents R 2 from the regressions including and 
excluding [in brackets] the liquidity factor. End-of-month data from CRSP (1985:12-2007:12). 
(a) Average Excess Returns 
Loan Maturity 
Horizon 3 6 12 
1 0.277 (0.347) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
3 0.183 (0.248) 0.265 (0.245) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
6 0.062 (0.322) 0.144 . (0.264) 0.239 (0.165) 0.000 (0.000) 
12 -0.153 (0.615) -0.070 (0.560) 0.029 (0.439) 0.253 (0.151) 
24 -0.537 (1.120) -0.453 (1.079) -0.351 (0.985) -0.120 (0.743) 
(b) Liquidity Coefficients 
Loan Maturity 
Horizon 3 6 12 
1 0.184 (7.837) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
3 0.162 (7.853) 0.149 (6.364) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
6 0.193 (6.139) 0.173 (6.985) 0.101 (5.699) 0.000 (0.000) 
12 0.360 (5.700) 0.340 (6.364) 0.277 (7.329) 0.076 (3.695) 
24 0.732 (5.578) 0.715 (5.909) 0.664 (6.395) 0.526 (7.366) 
(c) R2 
Loan Maturity 
Horizon 1 3 6 12 
1 46.4 [28.0] 0.0 [0.0] 0.0 [0.0] 0.0 [0.0] 
3 44.7 [16.8] 50.6 [26.5] 0.0 [0.0] 0.0 [0.0] 
""" 6 24.7 [1.4] 30.7 [2.9] 44.8 [20.4] 0.0 [0.0] 00 
12 29.2 [7.1] 30.3 [6.6] 32.3 [6.7] 35.2 [18.6] , 
24 38.8 [12.3] 38.9 [11.7] 39.4 [11.2] 41.2 [10.1] 
Table VIII: LIB OR and swap spreads and funding liquidity 
Results from regressions, 
sprd;m) = a(m) + ,,(ml Lt + fj(m)T Ft + E~0)' 
where sprd;m) is the spread at time t and for maturity m (months), Lt is the liquidity factor and Ft is the vector of term structure factor. Spreads 
are computed above the off-the-run U.S. Treasury yield curve and we use par yields to compute swap spreads. Each regressors is demeaned and 
divided by its standard deviation. Panel (a) presents results for LIBOR spreads. Panel (b) presents results for swap spreads. Newey-West t-statistics (3 
lags) in parenthesis. Finally, R2 from regressions including and excluding [in brackets] the liquidity factor. End-of-month data from CRSP (1985:12-2007:12). 
Avg Spread 
,,~) 
Avg. Spread 
,,~) 
0.423 
0.183 
58.4 
0.384 
0.094 
37.8 
1 month 
(0.027) 
(6.463) 
[44.9] 
24 
(0.016) 
(4.556) 
[35.41 
(a) LIBOR Spreads 
3 months 
0.422 (0.023) 
0.153 (5.939) 
59.4 [47.8] 
(b) Swap Spreads 
60 
0.483 (0.018) 
0.104 (4.525) 
38.0 [34.2] 
6 months 12 months 
0.406 (0.019) 0.429 (0.019) 
0.106 (5.166) 0.080 (4.410) 
53.2 [42.2] 53.9 [37.7] 
84 120 
0.477 (0.019) 0.432 (0.020) 
0.107 (4.395) 0.095 (3.917) 
45.5 [38.6] 51.7 [38.5] 
Table IX: Corporate bond excess returns and funding liquidity 
Results from the regressions 
(r) dr)L (3(r)T D (r) 
Yt = Q" + u" t +" rt + E(H">' 
where Yt is either a spread, sprd',;', observed a time t for rating r or an excess retums, xrt;>" over an horizon h (months) on an investment the Corporate 
index with rating r, L, is the liquidity factor and Ft is the vedor of term structure factor. See Equation 1.26 for the spread panel specification. Panel (b) 
presents results for corporate spreads. Panel (a» presents results for excess returns. Individual 'corporate bond yields are obtained from NAIC. Corporate 
bond returns are computed using Merrill Lynch indices obtained from B1oomberg. Spreads and excess returns are computed above the Treasury off-the-run 
yield curve. Each regressor is demeaned and divided by its standard deviation for interpretation. Newey-West t-statistics in parenthesis and R2 from 
regressions including and excluding [in brackets[ the Iiquidity factor. Results from Merrill Lynch indices cover the entire sample. Results from NAIC 
corporate bond yields ·is monthly from February 1996 until December 2001. 
(a) Merrill Lynch Indices Excess Returns 
3.130 (15.291) 3.162 (15.618) 
-1.626 (-1.341) -1.154 (-0.913) 
(b) NAIC Corporate Spreads 
(c) Merrill Lynch Spread Indices 
Table X: Macroeconomie determinants 
Results from regressions of the liquidity factor on selected economic variables. BA is the difference between the minimum and the median bid-ask spreads 
across bonds on any given date. V XO is the implied volatility from S&P500 cali options. FI to F8 are principal components of macroeconomic series 
from Ludvigson and Ng (2009). Newey-West standard errors (3 lags) are included in parenthesis. End-of-month data (1986:01-2004:12). 
Regressors . 
Model cst BA VXO FI F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 R2 
-A- 0.36 0.046 0.091 -0.001 0.051 0.050 -0.035 0.037 -0.030 ~ 
(16.7) (2.13) (5.73) (-0.06) (2.51) (3.14) (-2.34) (2.28) (-1.84) 
B 0.34 0.114 37.7 
(17.5) (5.35) 
C 0.34 0.052 7.9 
(13.4) (1.91) 
D 0.36 0.076 -0.087 0.218 0.075 0.004 0.023 0.021 -0.030 0.031 -0.059 55.5 
(19.9) (4.13) (0.43) (1.40) (4.50) (0.37) (1.45) (1.35) (-2.10) (2.29) (4.90) 
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Figure 1.1: Liquidity and Term structure factors 
Factors from the AFENS model with liquidity. Panel (a) displays the 
liquidity factor. The scale is in dollar. Panel (b) displays the term structure 
factors. The scale is in percentage. End-of-month data from CRSP 
(1985: 12-2007: 12). 
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Figure 1.2: Excess returns and funding liquidity 
The liquidity factor and the risk premium in different markets. Panel (a) 
displays annual excess returns on 2-year off-the-run D.S. Treasury bonds. 
Panel (b) displays annual excess rolling returns on a 12-month LIBOR 
loan. Panel (d) displays the spread of the 1-year LIBOR rate above the 
off-the-run 1-year zero yield. Panel (d) displays the spread of the 5-year 
swap rate. Excess returns are computed above the off-the-run Treasury 
risk-free rate. End-of-month data from CRSP (1985:12-2007:12) . 
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Figure 1.3: Corporate spread and funding liquidity 
The liquidity factor with corporate bond spreads for different ratings. 
Panel (a) compares with the spreads of Merrill Lynch indices for high 
quality bonds: AAA, AA and A ratings. Panel (b) compares with the 
spread of Merrill Lynch BBB and High Yield corporate bond indices. 
Spreads are computed ab ove the off-the-run lO-year Treasury par yield. 
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Figure 1.4: Residual Differences - Benchmark Model 
Comparison of residual differences and ages for the benchmark AFENS 
model without liquidity. Panel (a) presents differences between the residuals 
(dollars) of the on-the-run and off-the-run bonds in the 12-month category. 
Panel (b) presents the residuals 48-month category. Panel (c) and (d) 
displays years from issuance for the more recent and the seasoned bonds in 
the 12-month and the 48-month category, respectively. End-of-month data 
from CRSP (1985:12-2007:12). 
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Figure 1.5: Residual differences - Liquidity Model 
Comparison of residual differences for the AFENS model with liquidity. 
Panel (a) present differences between residuals (dollars) of on-the-run and 
off~the-run bonds in the 12-month category. Panel (b) presents differences 
between residuals (dollars) in the 48-month category. End-of-month data 
from CRSP (1985:12-2007:12). 
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Figure 1.6: Determinants of Liquidity 
Panel (a) traces the liquidity factor and the difference between the median 
and the minimum bid-ask spread at each observation date. Panel (b) 
traces the liquidity factor and implied volatility from S&P 500 caU options. 
The liquidity factor is obtained from the AFENS model with liquidity. 
End-of-month data from CRSP (1985:12-2008:12) 
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Figure 1.7: Liquidity and Term structure factors including 2008 Data 
Factors from the AFENS model with liquidity. Panel (a) displays the 
liquidity factor. The sc ale i8 in dollar. Panel (b) displays the term structure 
factors. The 8cale i8 in percentage. End-of-month data from CRSP 
(1985: 12-2008:12). 
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Figure 1.8: Corporate spread and funding liquidity including 2008 data 
The liquidity factor with corporate bond spreads for different ratings. 
Panel (a) compares with the spreads of Merrill Lynch index for AAA bonds. 
Panel (b) compares with the spread of Merrill BBB corporate bond index. 
Spreads are computed above the off-the-run 10-year Treasury par yield. 
End-of-month data from CRSP and Merrill Lynch (1988:12-2008:12). 
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Abstract 
Priees of Federal funds futures contracts are widely used to measure antici-
pations of monetary policy in the V.S. but a time-varying risk premium blurs 
their information content. This paper proposes a joint no-arbitrage model 
of the Federal Reserve policy function, of Federal funds rate futures and of 
LIBOR rates. The policy function follows a pure step proeess and has a 
Taylor rule interpretation. It is driven by the current policy rate, a macro 
factor, which captures the state of the economy as perceived by the mone-
tary authority, and a liquidity factor, which captures deviations between the 
risk premium implicit in LIBOR and futures rates, respectively. The model 
extracts the expectation component common to both markets and offers real-
time measures of policy anticipations. Empirically, combining LIB OR and 
futures rates leads to substantial improvements of policy rate forecasts at 
horizons up to one year. In practiee, the second factor is the most important 
predictor of risk premium variations and, hence, an important contributor 
to forecasts of future Fed funds rate. 1 interpret deviations between futures 
and LIBOR rates as the reflection of forward-Iooking hedging activities. 
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1 Introduction 
Priees of Federal funds futures are widely used to measure anticipations of 
future monetary policy in the US. Indeed, futures-based forecasts are unbi-
ased predictors of future Target rates at short horizons (Hamilton (2009)). 
However, the presence of a time-varying and counter-cyclical risk premium 
blurs market anticipations at horizons beyond 2 months (Rudebusch (2006), 
Piazzesi and Swanson (2006)). This paper proposes a joint no-arbitrage 
model of the Federal Reserve [the Fed] monetary policy response function, 
of Federal funds [Fed funds] futures rates and of the term structure of London 
.Interbank Offered Rates [LIBOR]. The Target for the overnight Fed funds 
rate follows a step pro cess with jumps occurring upon FOMe meetings and 
where state variables drive the conditional distribution of jumps. This is a 
discrete-time analog to Piazzesi (2005) but extended to futures markets and 
allowing for a different liquidity premium in LIBOR and futures markets. 
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it combines interest 
rates with information from futures priees to achieve a sharper decomposition 
of rates into policy expectations and a risk premium. LIBOR and futures 
rates provide non-overlapping information on the future path of the Target 
ratel, even in a risk-neutral world. Moreover, as discussed below, their risk 
premia differ. This provides further· identification of the corn mon expectation 
component in LIBOR and futures rates. Empirically, 1 estimate the model at 
the daily frequency and find that mod~l-implied forecasts significantly out-
perform the common regression-based approach. Moreover, model-implied 
forecasts can be extended beyond the the maturity of the longest available 
futures contract. 
Second, the model measures the risk premium specifie to each market. 
Fed funds futures require no exchange of principal and have daily margin re-
quirements that mitigate credit exposures. In contrast, LIB OR loans carry 
substantial default risk since they are fully funded and uncollateralized. 
Needless to say, participation in the LIBOR market is limited .. Further-
more, investments in LIBOR loans cannot be reversed as easily, especially in 
periods of turmoil. Then, LIBOR rates include a compensation for liquidity 
and credit risk. 1 introduce a liquidity factor2 which captures variations in 
lThe Fed target the overnight Fed funds rate. The effective overnight rate is a weighted 
average of rates on brokered unsecured loans between large banks. The LIBOR rates pro-
vide the natural term structure associated with the overnight market as they corresponds 
to the rates at which large bank are prepared to lend to each other on the London Eu-
roDollar market. 
2Hereafter, 1 refer to this factor as a liquidity factor and the risk premia specifie to 
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the relative compensation for liquidity and credit risk between these markets. 
Empirically, this factor is the most important predictor of futures exeess re-
turns and, ultimately, leads to significantly improved policy rate forecasts. 1 
interpret these small but informative deviations between futures and LIBOR 
rates as liquidity pressures in the futures market revealing the information of 
market participants hedging their interest rate exposures (e.g. banks). This 
supports similar results obtained by Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) who link 
excess returns to variations of commercial banks' open interest. 
The paper is also a contribution to the literature on the measurement of 
monetary shocks (see Christiano et al. (1998)). The recursi ve identification 
scheme of structural VAR is hard to justify wh en including financial data: 
can we tell whether interest rates react to policy or whether the reverse hold? 
A more sensible approach is to consider monetary policy actions and inter-
est rates as jointly determined. This is precisely what an integrated model 
of policy and the term structure delivers .. The model provides closed-form 
densities of policy changes at any horizon and the no-arbitrage restrictions 
ensure that forecasts at different horizons are consistent with each other. As 
noted by Hamilton and Jordà (2002), changes in monetary policy anticipa-
tions contain a size and a timing component. A decision by the FOMC that 
does not accord with expectations built in market priees can be interpreted 
as a surprise in timing, a surprise in size, or both. 
Related lite rature 
This paper is closely related to Piazzesi (2005) but differs in sorne key 
dimensions. Using information from the futures market provides better iden-
tification of the expectation and risk premium components of interest rates. 
Moreover, combining assets and allowing for different risk compensations 
uncover an important forward-Iooking component. Finally, the asymmet-
ric policy function introduees variations in the higher-order moments of the 
Target rate and, henee, further variations in the risk premium. Hamilton 
and Jordà (2002) also exploit the discrete nature of Target rate changes but 
do not impose no-arbitrage restrictions. They model the probability of a 
change as a conditional hazard model while the size of a change follows an 
ordered response model. Hamilton and Jordà èonclude that current interest 
rate spreads are essential to model the hazard rate at short horizons. How-
ever, predictions of the policy rate at longer horizons are difficult because 
LIBOR loans as a liquidity premium. This is in part for simplicity but also because the 
results below suggests that in this sample, variations in the spread are mainly due to the 
price impact of hedging activities. See below for further discussion. 
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spreads are themselves difficult to predict. In contrast, a joint model of the 
policy rule and of the term structure can use current priee information to 
forecast consistently at all horizons. 
Krueger and Kuttner (1996) were first to consider predictions of future 
monetary policy based on futures contracts. Since, Gurkaynak et al. (2007) 
have shown that Fed funds futures and eurodollar futures outperform other 
market instruments when forecasting future U .S. policy rates. Hamilton 
(2009) finds very litt le predictability of priee changes for near-term futures 
contracts. He concludes that daily changes in futures priees accurately re-
flect changes in market's expectations of future monetary policy. In contrast, 
the evidence presented here suggests that part of these changes may be at-
tributable to the priee impact of hedging demand. This is consistent with 
Piazzesi and Swanson (2006). They documented that variations of banks' 
open interests in the futures market are closely related to excess returns 
on futures contracts. Moreover, Piazzesi and Swanson show that macroeco-
nomic indicators, su ch as a recession dummy and changes in non-farm payroll 
employment are important predictors of futures excess returns. Hence, fu-
tures priees include a significant, time-varying and pro-cyclical risk premium 
(see also Sack (2004)). This implies that the bias in Target rate forecasts 
tends to increase as we enter a recession, precisely at a time when the central 
bank is likely to cut interest rates. While measures of employment and eco-
nomic activity are available only at low frequencies, the forecasts presented 
here can be updated daily to provide risk-adjusted measures of future policy 
anticipations. 
Kuttner (2001) uses futures to measure unanticipated Target changes and 
document the link with interest rate changes at different maturities. This 
contrasts with the usual result that total Target changes have a weak impact 
on the term structure. Similarly, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) use futures 
to document the impact of unanticipated policy actions on stock priees. 
Recently, Rudebusch (2006) uses futures at longer horizons to argue that 
monetary policy in the U .S. do es not follow a partial adjustment rule but, 
instead, adjusts the Target rapidly following the arrival of new information. 
In all cases, the conclusion relies on the implicit assumption that variations 
of the risk premium are unimportant. Alternatively, Cochrane and Piazzesi 
(2002) measure policy shocks from unanticipated changes in the Target Fed 
funds rate. 
The Federal funds market is covered by a large literature.3 Hamilton 
3See Hamilton (1996) and Stigum (2004) for detailed discussion of the Fed funds mar-
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(1996) introduces a mixed-normal ARCH model of the Fed funds rate that 
highlights the importance of jumps, of time-varying volatility (see also Das 
(2002)).4 .lumps are more likely on Wednesday and on Thursday and on 
days of FOMC meetings. The former transitory day-of-the-week effects are 
related to microstructure of the Fed funds market while the latter FOMC 
meeting jumps are persistent. Johannes (2004) provides conclusive evidence 
that these persistent jumps affect the evolution of other short-term rates. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the 
model and the state variables. l also derive the associated (affine) conditional 
multivariate Laplace transform. Next, Section III introduces the stochastic 
discount factor and shows that the Laplace transform remains within the 
same family under the risk-neutral measure. This leads to closed-form solu-
tions for risk-free interest rates, LIBOR rates and futures rates. Section IV 
summarizes the data and the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimator while 
Section V presents the estimation results. In particular, l use the unscented 
Kalman filter to handle non-linearities in futures prices. Section VI evaluates 
the forecasting implications of the model, relative to the usual regression-
based approach. AIso, l measure the information content of the liquidity 
and of the macroeconomic factor for excess returns on futures. Section VII 
concludes. 
II Model 
A Short Rate Dynamics 
The overnight Fed funds rate is the main policy tool used by the Federal 
Reserve to reach its long-term objectives. Figure 2.1 draw the Ta,rget rate. 
Since 1994, the FOMC, which determines the Target overnight rate, has 
announced each change publicly and has initiated almost all of its policy 
changes following a scheduled meeting. Due to this operating procedure, the 
path of the Target Fed funds rate, Tt, traces a step function through time.5 
This suggests the following representation of the policy rule' 
ket. 
4 Also, the Fed funds rate tends to decrease over the 2-week reserve maintenance period 
before a surge on settlement day (i.e. it is not a martingale over the reserve maintenance 
period) and this surge is accompanied by a sharp rise in volatility on the settlement day. 
This pattern of volatility over the maintenance period has been confirmed in more recent 
data by Barolini et al. (2002). 
5This has not been always the case. The uncertainty associated with the Fed's policy 
caused continuo us variations of the overnight rate as new economic information arrived. 
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Figure 2.1: Target Federal Funds Rate (1994-2007) 
2 
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t+l 
rt+l = ro + Ll L ( n,/ ni) 
i=l 
= rt + Ll ( nf+l - nt+l) , (2.1) 
for t ~ 0 and where Ll = 0.25% is the fixed increment. Conditional on time-t 
information, nf+l and nt+l are independent Poisson random variables with 
jump intensities 
.xf+l =.x +.xr (X;+l 
.xf+l =.x -.xr (X;+l 
X) 
X) , (2.2) 
respeetively, on scheduled FOMC meeting days. A small number of poliey 
actions oceurred following unscheduled meetings. l allow for the arrivaI of 
these rare events but with constant intensities >'0 and >.g. 
B State Variables 
When deciding on the course of the Target rate, the committee knows 
the previous Target, 'rt-l, and its spread with the effectivé overnight rate. 
The committee also observes a wealth of macroeconomic and financial infor-
effective (i.e. market) Fed funds rate is published by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System (see statistical release R.15). The effective rate is an average 
of brokered transactions weighted by the arnount of overnight funds traded. 
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mation captured by a first latent variable, Zt. Conditional on the occurrence 
of a FOMC meeting, the distribution of a Target rate change is driven by 
the distance of each state variable relative to its long-term mean. 
In the following, estimation is based on observations of LIBOR and Fed 
funds futures rates. In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the Fed funds 
futures rates is related to the path of futures Fed funds rates as 
F(t, n) = Et [Mt,t+TnD;;l. I: (rt+i + St+i)] 
.=Tn-Dn 
where Mt,t+Tn is the Stochastic Discount Factor [SDF7] , Tn is the number 
of days until the end of the reference month and Dn is the number of days in 
that month. Similarly, the priee of risk-free zero coupon bond with maturity 
mis given by 
Finally, l introduce a liquidity factor that further discounts LIBOR loans. 
The priee of a LIBOR loan with maturity m is 
where lt captures the spread between Fed funds futures and LIBOR rates 
unexplained by anticipations of futures policy rates and the associated risk 
premium. Then, the information set of the FOMC previous to any policy 
decision is summarized by the vector Xt+l of state variables, 
(2.3) 
where the time-subscript on the Target rate differs. For private agents, 
following a policy announcement, if any, the vector of state variables, X t , is 
(2.4) 
The spread between Target and effective rates, St, is included in the state 
variable for the pur pose of computing futures priees. However, in the follow-
ing l assume that ÀU,8 = Àd,8 = 0 and, thus, that the Fed does not consider 
the current spread in its evaluation of the appropriate policy stance. The 
next section describes the dynamics of the remaining state variables. Their 
7The SDF and the associated risk-neutral probability measure are discussed below. 
interpretation will be discussed below. 
C State Dynamics 
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The state variables driving the policy function in Equation (2.1) and 
(2.2) follow standard autoregressive processes. First, the spread, St, of the 
effective overnight rate above the Target rate follows a pro cess with jumps 
that captures its leptokurtic distribution, 
(2.5) 
where El '" N(O,l). The jump term follows a compound Poisson distribu-
tion with number of jumps nl+l '" P(>\s) and jump size Jt+l '" N(vs,w;), 
conditionally on the number of jumps. These random variables are mutually 
i.i.d .. Next, the latent factors, Zt and lb follow 
Zt+l = f.tz + cPzZt + (J"zE: 
lt+l = f.tl + cPllt + (J"IE~ 
where Et and E~ are mutually i.i.d. standard gaussian shocks. 
D Conditional Laplace Transform 
(2.6) 
(2.7) 
Conditionally on X;, Target rate changes have a Skellam distribution. 
This corresponds to the distribution of the difference of two Poisson pro cesses 
for which the density and characteristic functions are known explicitly (Skel-
lam (1946)). Then, the conditional distribution of the state vector, X t , can 
be characterized through its conditional multivariate Laplace transform, 
T(u,Xt+l) == Et [exp (uTXt+dJ 
= exp (A(It+l' u) + B(It+l, uf X t) (2.8) 
where u belongs to JR4 and It is an indicator function equal to 1 if an FOMC 
meeting is scheduled at t + 1 and 0 otherwise.8 Coefficients A(·) and B(·) 
are given in Appendix A. 
E Discussion 
Modeling the Target rate as a two-sided step process is motivated by 
the data. However, information about the underlying economic state vari-
ables arrives following smooth autoregressive processes. This information is 
summarized by the conditional intensities of "up" and "down" jumps that 
8This model belong to the class of discrete-time compound autoregressive (CAR) pro-
cesses introduced by Oarolles et al. (2002). 
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drive the distribution of future Target changes. This specification allows for 
time-variation of all conditional moments of the Target rate. In fact, the 
relationship between the jump intensities and condition al moments of Tar-
get changes provides interesting interpretations. The first three conditional 
moments of Target changes are 
Edrt+l - rt] = 
Vardrt+l - rt] = 
skewdrt+l - rt] = 
First, in the stationary state where each state variable is equal to its uncon-
ditional mean, the distribution of Target rate changes is symmetric around 
zero with variance 2À~2. Next, consider the conditional expectation of a pol-
icy change. It has an interpretation similar to a Taylor rule. The expected 
change depends on the deviations of each state variable from its long-run 
mean. Suppose that high values of the macro factor, Zt, are associated with 
higher than average inflation or employment. Then, given the Fed's man-
date, we expect interest rates to ri se when the macro factor, Zt, is above its 
long-run average, and, conversely, to decrease when it is below its long-run 
average. That is, Àu + Àd should be positive. But note that parameters of 
this Taylor rule, Àu and Àd, cannot be identified separately using the condi-
tional mean equation only. However, the variance and skewness of the policy 
rate depend on the difference Àu - Àd' These higher-order moments are time-
varying whenever the policy rule is asymmetric and Àu =1- Àd' In the case 
where policy is more aggressive in recessions (i.e. À~,z > À~) the variance 
of policy changes decreases when conditions deteriorate and its distribution 
is skewed toward the left. Then, estimating a linear symmetric policy rule 
when the true policy rule is asymmetric is likely to produce cyclical forecast 
errors. But conditional moments are difficult to estimate in practice and the 
asymmetry of the policy rule is hard to measure. Extending the model to 
include asset prices provides identification of these parameters. 
Before we proceed to complete the model note that sorne restrictions are 
necessary to ensure the stationarity of the Fed funds rate. Intuitively, the 
intensity of an "up" change in the Target rate must decrease and the intensity 
of a "down" change must increase when the Target rate increases relative to 
its long-term average, Tt. In other words, if Àu,r and Àd,r are negative then 
the policy function induces reversion of the Target rate toward its long-term 
average, T. 1 also assume that St, Zt and lt are stationary and that cPs, cPz 
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and CPt belong to the unit interval (-1,1). 
III Asset Pricing 
This section provides a pricing kernel and completes the specification of the 
asset pricing model. 1 derive the conditional dynamics un der the risk-neutral 
measure and compute explicit priees of futures and LIBOR rates. 
A Stochastic Discount Factor 
ln the standard endowment economy, obtaining a pricing kernel from first 
principles requires the specification of preferences over consumption paths 
and a stochastic proeess for endowment. 1 choose instead to use the following 
exponential-affine specification of the stochastic discount factor [SDF1, Mt+l' 
where 5t is a vector of priees of risk. 
Allowing for time-varying priees of risk is motivated by empirical evi-
denee. Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) document the counter-cyclical varia-
tions in the risk premium of Fed funds futures. 9 Note that the model allows 
for two sources of risk premium variations. First, the risk premium may 
vary with the priees of risk. Second, the risk premium may vary with the 
volatility and higher-order moments of Target changes. This is so even if 
the priee of risk is constant. Intuitively, the SDF is of the same form as 
the SDF of economies with power utilities. In this case the risk premium 
depends on the varianee, skewness and excess kurtosis of future Target rates 
(see e.g. Polimenis (2006)). Then, to the extent that interest rate risk is 
prieed, variations in the higher moments of the policy rate lead to variations 
of the interest rate risk premium. 
Following Duffee (2002), the priee of risk vector is affine in the state 
vector 
(2.10) 
where 50 is a K x 1 vector and 51 is K x K matrix. This representation is con-
sistent with absence of arbitrage since we have Et [Mt+ll = exp (-rt - St), 
the priee today for a dollar received tomorrow in the Federal funds market. 
This paper focuses on variations of the risk premium at the business cycle 
frequency, which is captured by variations in Zt. Then, 1 only allow the priee 
9But variations of the risk premium appear minimal for the short est maturities. See 
Hamilton (2009). 
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of risk of Zt to vary through time. That is, 
(2.11) 
with 
(2.12) 
B The Priee Genemting Function 
Asset priees can be derived from the price of the payoff exp (uT X t+m ) for 
sorne maturity m. This is a generating system of the set of all payoffs (Duffie 
et al. (2000) and Gourieroux et al. (2002)). In particular, the safe payoff is 
obtained when u = O. Assuming that no arbitrage opportunity exists, the 
discounted value of the generating payoff is the priee generating function, 
r( u, t, m) = Et [Mt,t+m exp (uT X t+m)] 
= Et [Mt+lr(u, t + 1, m -1)], 
where 1 define Mt,t+i == Mt+l ... Mt+i'lO Consider first the case m = 1 which 
delivers the conditional Laplaee Transform under the risk-neutral probability 
r(u, t, 1) = TQ(u,Xt+d = Et [Mt,t+l exp (uTXt+l)] 
= exp (AQ(It+l, u) + BQ(It+l, uf X t ) , 
with coefficients given in Appendix B. The conditional distribution of the 
state vector is the same under the risk-neutral measure but with risk-adjusted 
parameters. In particular, the Target rate is Skellam under both measures. 
Extending to longer maturity m > 1, the priee generating function has the 
following exponential-affine solution 
r(u, t, m) = exp (eo(u, t, m) + e(u, t, mf X t ) , 
where coefficients satisfy (see appendix B), 
eo(u, t, m) = eo(u, t + 1, m - 1) + AQ(It+l, e(u, t + 1, m - 1))) 
e(u, t, m) = BQ(It+l, e(u, t + 1, m - 1)), 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
with initial conditions eo(u,t,O) = 0 and e(u,t,O) = u given by r(u,t,O) = 
10 Also, Mt.Hl = MHl and by convention Mt,t = Mt=l. 
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exp (uT X t ). 
C Computing Recursions 
The recursions in Equation 2.14 have a time and a maturity dimension 
because the FOMC meeting schedule changes over time. That is, al! future 
meetings closer by one day every day. At first, it would seem that a 
different recursion must be computed to match each (t, m) pair, implying a 
dramatic increase in computing costs. Fortunately, there is a way around 
this. The key is to note that future meeting dates are known in advance 
and, therefore, that coefficients A(·) and B(-) are not stochastic. Then, for a 
given date, and for given parameter values, we can compute coefficients for 
the price of an asset maturing on this date but for past observation dates 11 
since the recursions are increasing in m but decreasing in t. As an example, 
consider the priee, at some date t + h, of an asset maturing on that day. Its 
price is exp(uTXt+h), and the coefficients, co(u,t + h,O) and c(u,t + h,O) 
correspond to the initial values in the recursions. Next, consider the priee of 
that asset on the previous day. Its maturity is now one and the coefficients, 
coCu, t + h 1,1) and c(u, t + h -1,1), are given directly from the recursions 
above. We can then work our way back until we reach t, the first date in the 
sample where an asset matures at time-t + h. Finally, varying the maturity 
date, t, provides us with ail the needed coefficients12 . 
D Risk-Free Discount Bonds 
The priee at time-t of a risk-free discount bond with maturity m is easily 
obtained by setting u = 0, that is 
DT!(t,m):= Et [Mt,t+ml 
= r(O,t,m) 
= exp ((fr/ (t, m) +~! (t, m)T X t ) 
where d~! (t, m) := Co (0, t, m) and dT! (t, h) c(O, t, m) for m ~ O. 
(2.15) 
11 Another approach that reduces computing cost is to assume a constant time interval 
between meetings beyond the nearest schedule meeting date, as in Piazzesi (2005). How-
ever, the use of Fed funds futures contracts make this approximation problematic as it 
may place some future meetings in the wrong month, implying severe mispricing of the 
corresponding futures contracts. 
12This implies that some recursions must be started for some date t + h beyond the end 
of the sample. Coefficients are discarded as we proceed backward in time until we reach 
the last observation date of the sample. 
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E LIBOR Loans 
LIBOR loans are short-term unsecured inter-bank loans. Like risk-free 
rates, LIBOR rates reftect anticipations of future Target rates and a compen-
sation to lenders for the uncertainty surrounding future rates. However, as 
discussed above, 1 allow for a further term that drives a difference between 
the term premium implicit in LIB OR rates and futures rates. The priee, 
DI(t, m), of a LIBOR loan with maturity mis, 
D1(t,m) Et [Mt,t+mexp (-~ li) 1 
exp (d&(t, m) + dL(t, m)T X t ) , (2.16) 
with coefficients in the Appendix. The interpretation of lt is straight-
forward. It represents the extra yield, relative to the risk-free asset, required 
by investors to hold LIBOR loans. This extra component may be due to 
barriers to entry, capital constraints of liquidity providers and arbitrageur, 
or counterparty default risk. Ultimately, these frictions due to market power, 
illiquidity or default risk prohibit arbitrageurs from exploiting (risk-adjusted) 
differences across market priees. This redueed-form approach borrows from 
Grinblatt (1995) and Duffie and Singleton (1997) but my focus is on the 
identification of poHcy anticipations and 1 do not try to distinguish between 
the liquidity and the credit components of LIBOR spreads. 
F Federal f'unds Futures 
A futures contract delivers, at the end of a given referenee month, the 
difference between the contracted futures rate and the average overnight 
Fed funds rate realized during that referenee month, ft. With no 1088 of 
generality, 1 standardize the notional of the contract to 1. The time-t priee, 
pet, n), of a Fed funds futures contract for the referenee month n is 
pet, n) = 100 - F(t, n) x 3600, 
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where the Futures rate13 F(t, n), is the discounted expectation of the monthly 
average of overnight rates, 
F(t, n) = Et [Mt,t+T;;D;;l_ t rt+i] 
t-Tn-Dn 
Tn 
= D;;l L Et [Mt,t+T*rt+i] 
i=Tn-Dn 
Tn 
= D;;l L f(t, i, T~), 
i=Tn-Dn 
(2.17) 
where Tn is the number of days until the end of the reference month and 
Dn is the number of days in that month. In practice, due to weekends or 
holidays, the settlement date, t + T;;, may not coincide with the last day 
of the month, t + Tn . In the following, 1 simplify the presentation and set 
T* =T. 
Equation (2.17) shows that we need only consider a single day in the 
reference month. 1 define the rate, at time-t, of a singleton futures contract, 
f(t, h, T), for the reference day t + h and settling at date t + T as 
f(t, h, T) =.Et [Mt,t+Trt+h] , 
=:: Et [Mt,t+Texp(urt+h)] 1 ,O:S; h:S; T, 
vU u=o 
(2.18) 
(2.19) 
which can be computed explicitly from the price generating function (see 
Appendix B). The singleton futures ~ate is 
f( t, h, T) = exp (d~f (t + h, T - h) + Co (u * , t, h)) + c (u * , t, h f X t) 
x [c~(u*,t,h)Cr+XrC'(u*,t,h)Cr], (2.20) 
where u* = d(t + h,T - h) and Cr = [11 0 of. The coefficients c~(-) and 
c' (.) satisfy recursions that can be obtained as the derivatives with respect 
to u of Equation (2.14). That is, 
c~(u, t, h) = c~(u, t + 1, h - 1) + A'Q(It+l' c(u, t + 1, h - l))c' (u, t + 1, h - 1) 
c' (u, t, h) = B'Q(It+l' c(u, t + 1, h -l))c' (u, t + 1, h -1), (2.21) 
where the derivatives of the Laplace transform coefficients are taken with 
13In practice we observe P(t,n). The Futures rate is computed as F(t,n) = (100 -
P(t,n))/3600. l use the 30/360 convention throughout. 
81 
respect to the second argument and given in the appendix. The initial con-
ditions can be obtained by noting that J( t, 0, T) = DT f (t, T)rt which implies 
that c~(u*,t,O) = 0 and c'(u*,t,O) = l for any t. 
IV Data and Method 
A Data 
l construct a sample of daily Target and effective overnight Fed funds 
rates from January Ist, 1994 to the end of July 2007. The Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York publishes overnight Fed funds rates on its web site. 
l inc1ude LIBOR rates at monthly maturities of 1 to 12 months and Fed 
funds futures rates for monthly horizons of 1 to 6 months available from 
Datastream. Futures contracts at horizons beyond 6 months exhibit low liq-
uidity for most of the sample and are exc1uded. In this sample, Target rate 
changes were announced public1y by the FOMe following each meeting and 
each Target change was a mu~tiple of 25 basis points [bps]. Finally, l exc1ude 
the period following July 2007. Since then behavior of LIB OR and futures 
rates are qualitatively different this change is left for further research. 
B Summary Statistics 
The properties of LIBOR and futures rates show that these assets of-
fer different compensations for risk. Table B presents summary statistics 
for LIBOR rates, LIBOR forward rates and futures rates across maturities. 
Panel (a) shows that the average term structure of LIBOR rates is upward 
sloping, from 4.32% to 4.70%, revealing a positive average term premium. 
The term structure of LIBOR volatilities is almost flat, ranging from 1. 76% to 
1.78%, but with slight hump-shape at maturity of 5 months. Next, Panel (b) 
presents statistics of LIBOR forward rates. These forward rates are more 
comparable to futures rates since they cover the same future time period. 
The average term structure of forward rates is steeper, from 4.32% to 5.07% 
and the hump shape in volatilities is more pronounced. Panel (c) c1early 
shows that futures rates are on average, lower, less volatile and exhibit a 
flatter term structure than forward LIBOR rates. 
Figure 2.2 compares the time series of forward LIB OR rates and futures 
rates at maturities of 2, 4 and 6 months. Again, forward rates are higher 
than futures rates. However, while variations in the levels of forward and 
futures rates seem to agree about the future behavior of the Target rate, their 
difference exhibits variations through time. Table B and Figure 2.2 show 
that futures and LIBOR rates carry different risk premia. This highlights 
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the potential of using both markets to identify their common expectation 
component. 
C State-Space Representation 
The joint conditional likelihood is available in closed form but two of 
the state variables are unobserved. 1 formulate the estimation problem as 
a state-space system and use a Kalman-based algorithm to evaluate the 
likelihood function and obtain filtering estimates of the latent factors. The 
state transition equation is given by Equations 2.1, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7. The 
measurement vector is obtained by stacking -LIBOR rates and futures rates. 
The (non-linear) measurement can then be written as 
(2.22) 
where pricing errors, ti,t, are i.i.d. mean zero gaussian random variables with 
standard deviation Wi. The non-linearity cornes from the pricing equation 
for futures. The overall measurement equation stacks the yield vector, yt 
with the rate and the effective spread. The extended measurement 
vector is then ft [Tt St ytf· 
Because futures rates are non-linear, the Kalman filter is not. applica-
ble. Moreover, the optimal fil ter is not available in closed form. 1 use the 
Unscented Kalman Filter [UKF], which is based on a recent method for cal-
culating statistics of a random variable which undergoes a nonlinear trans-
formation (see Appendix E). This approach has a Monte Carlo flavor but 
the sample is drawn according to a deterministic algorithm. It reduces the 
computational burden considerably, relative to simulation-based methods, 
but provides greater accuracy than linearization. The UKF has been used 
recently in the term structure literature by Leippold and Wu (2003) and 
Fontaine and Garcia (2008). AIso, Christoffersen et al. (2007) show that the 
UKF improves filtering and estimation performance in the context of a term 
structure model of swap rates. 
Table 1: Means (/-l) and standard deviations (a) of LIBOR rates and forward LIB OR rates for maturities from 1 to 12 months as 
well as futures rates for horizons of 1 to 6 months. Data from 01:01:1994 to 31:07:1996. 
JlLib 
aLib 
JlFor 
aFor 
1 
4.32 
1.76 
1 
4.32 
1.76 
2 
4.37 
1.77 
2 
4.41 
1.78 
JlFut 
aFut 
3 
4.41 
1.78 
3 
4.49 
1.80 
1 
4.18 
1.74 
4 
4.44 
1.78 
4 
4.53 
1.80 
(a) LIBOR Rates 
5 
4.47 
1.78 
6 
4.50 
1.78 
7 8 
4.54 4.57 
1.78 1.78 
(b) Forward Rates 
5 
4.61 
1.80 
6 
4.66 
1.80 
7 
4.73 
1.79 
(c) Futures Rates 
2 
4.21 
1.75 
3 
4.25 
1.75 
4 
4.28 
1.76 
8 
4.79 
1.79 
9 
4.60 
1.78 
9 
4.84 
1.79 
5 
4.33 
1.76 
10 
4.63 
1.77 
10 
4.95 
1.78 
6 
4.37 
1.75 
11 12 
4.67 4.70 
1.77 1.77 
11 12 
5.01 5.07 
1.77 1.74 
84 
D Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
Given the filtering procedure, a Quasi-Maximum Likelihood IQMLI esti-
mator is feasible. The joint log-likelihood is given by 
T 
L(O;Y) = Llog (i (ftlft-l;O)) 
t=l 
T 
= L log (!(rt+1 - rtIX;+1lt)!(St+1lsd!(YtIXt+llt)) 
t=l 
where ail model parameters are grouped in the vector 0. 14 The following 
constraints were imposed on the parameter space. First, 1 impose >'r,u ::;; 0 
and >'r,d ::;; 0 to ensure stationarity of the Target rate process. Similarly, ~8' 
~z and ~l must remain within the unit circle. AIso, the jump component of 
the effective rate is well-defined only if >'J,8 2: O. 1 also impose that >'z,d 2: 0 
and >'z,u 2: 0 because their signs cannot be identified separately from the 
sign of Zt. 
More importantly, >'f and >'f must remain non-negative so that the dis-
. tribution of Target jumps remains weil defined. These constraints cannot 
be easily imposed on the parameter space as they can only be checked re-
cursively as we filter the state variables. In practice 1 impose that >.~ 
max (0, >'~). This leaves the state variables unrestricted but cons trains the 
policy function. The restriction is reasonable. As >'i approaches zero, the 
probability distribution of the corresponding jump nf approaches the triv-
ial distribution with a unit mass at zero. When it reaches zero, the policy 
function becomes one-sided and can then be summarized as a Poisson dis-
tribution. 
The constrained QML estimàtor is givèn by 
âQML = argmax L(O; Y) 
() 
S.t. 0 E S 
where S ç JRK and we have â rv N(Oo, T- 1D) for sorne true parameter value, 
00 , in the interior of the parameter space. Finally, as in Piazzesi (2005), >'0 
and >,g are poorly estimated because of the lack of policy changes outside 
of scheduled FOMe meetings. 1 calibrate them so that the distribution of 
set !(xJ!xo) = !(xI) and use the unconditional mean' and covariance to initiate the 
Kalman recursion. Estimation is carried out using the active-set algorithm from the IMSL 
Fortran optimization library. 
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policy moves is symmetric outside of scheduled FOMe meetings, that the 
probability of a 50 basis points move matches its empirical probability (i.e. 
3 occurences) and, finally, that the variance of Target changes matches the 
sam pIe variance. Results are robust to the choice of calibration strategy. 
V Estimation Results 
This section reports estimation results. The key conclusions are the fol-
lowing. First, the model provides a good fit of LIB OR and futures rates. 
Second, parameter estimates indicate that the policy rule is not symmet-
ric. In particular, the policy function exhibits mean-reversion but the Fed's 
mean-reverting behavior is st ronger when the interest rate is below its long-
run average than when it is above. Also, filtering results show that the 
macroeconomic factor leads business cycle fluctuations in Target rates and 
aggregates forward-looking information about monetary policy. Finally, the 
liquidity factor increases in periods where financial markets were tense, reach-
ing peaks in the summer of 1998, and around the turn of the millennium. 
Still, the liquidity and macro factors exhibit rich co-movement patterns. 
Their sam pIe paths exhibit numerous cases where the two factors display 
sharp changes but of opposite signs. In practice, this allows futures rates to 
lead LIB OR rates and suggests that the spread between futures and LIBOR 
rates contains forward-looking information. 
Parameter values are reported in Table II. Panel (a) displays estimated 
values for the parameters driving the Target rate change intensities. Panel (b) 
display price of risk parameters. Panel (c) displays estimated values for pa-
rameters driving the dynamics of the spread, the macroeconomic factor and 
of the liquidity factor. Both latent factors are very persistent, but this is 
not surprising given the daily observation frequency and the persistence of 
interest rates. Finally, Panel (d) displays estimated standard deviations of 
pricing error at each maturity for LIBOR and futures rates. 
A Policy Function 
The estimated policy function is asymmetric. In our sample, which coyer 
much of the Greespan 's era, the Fed exhibited a stronger tendency to rai se in-
terest rates when the Target rate was relatively low then to decrease it when 
it was relatively high. Similarly, it showed a st ronger tendency to raise rates 
as economic conditions, as measured by Zt, improved, then to decrease rates 
when conditions deteriorated. Moreover, the observed asymmetry induces 
substantial variations in the (conditional) variance of Target changes. In par-
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ticular, variance is high and skewness is negative when economic conditions 
are below their long-term averages, and the reverse is true when economic 
conditions are relatively good. Together, the estimates suggest that the Fed 
acted more rapidly, and that the uneertainty surrounding future policy was 
lower, when it faeed improving economic conditions. This has important 
implications for the interpretation of existing, symmetric, Taylor-rule esti-
mates. In particular, forecasts based on linear symmetric rules will exhibit 
cyclical performanee variations. 15 
B Risk Premium 
The priees of policy rate risk is positive. That low interest rates are asso-
ciated with bad states of the world is likely to be caused by the endogenous 
response of the Fed to economic conditions. The priee of liquidity risk is also 
positive. Then, the difference between the risk compensations implicit in 
futures and LIBOR rates co-vary positively with economic conditions. This 
is a first indication that, in this sam pie, variations in lt are linked to the 
relative illiquidity of the LIB OR market. Indeed, it seems unlikely that its 
priee of risk would be positive if lt was a measure of the default risk for the 
average LIBOR market participant.16 
Also, the average priee of macro risk is positive. Not surprisingly, lower 
values of Zt are also associated to bad states of the world. While positive on 
average, the priee of macro risk varies through time. It is lower when the pol-
icy rate is relatively high and, presumably, the Fed has room to lower interest 
rates in the advent of a worsening economic outlook. Also, ail else constant, 
the priee of macro risk decreases when the liquidity factor is high, and that 
futures rates are relatively low compared to LIBOR rates. This is consis-
tent with an increase of lt being a signal of improving economic conditions. 
Together with a positive price of risk for the liquidity factor, this suggests 
that these transitory deviations between LIBOR and futures rates, gener-
ally thought as unimportant, in fact incorporate important forward-looki'ng 
information. This will be confirmed in the forecasting exerCÎses below. 
15The asymmetry in the conditional mean may be due to the asymmetric response of 
the economy to monetary policy. See Garcia and Schaller (1999). Also, the conditional 
variance of future policy changes may be due to an asymmetric pattern of economic 
uncertainty. In any case, forecasts based on linear symmetric homoscedastic rule will be 
affected. 
16 As mentioned before, this does not preclude that variations in default risk also affect 
LIBOR rates. What the results suggest is that variations in the wedge between LIBOR 
and futures risk premium were primarily caused, ultimately, by their relative illiquidity 
in this sample. Clearly, the credit component is an important factor in the recent credit 
crunch. 
Table II: QML parameter estimates 
Parameter estimates for the joint Target, LIBOR and futures model from a daily sample eovering .January 1994 to .July 2007. Panel (a) displays parameter 
estimates of the poliey funetion. Panel (b) displays priee of risk parameters. Panel (e) displays parameters of the state variable dynamies and Panel (d) 
displays measurement error standard deviation parameters. In eaeh case, standard errors based on the Hessian of the likelihood funetion evaluated at the 
maximum is provided in parenthesis. The estimate for>. is 0.1669 and its standard error is (0.034). 
Months 
LIBOR 
Futures 
St 
Zt 
1 
3.01 
(0.0037) 
1.22 
(0.0015) 
(a) Parameter of Target Rate Intensities 
r 
-1.067 X 104 
(1.91 X 102 ) 
-2.101 X 103 
(8.56 X 102) 
r 
6.694 X 104 
(1.99 X 103 ) 
-2.187 X 10-2 
(6.64 X 10-4 ) 
3.176 x 10 7 
o 
0.2851 
0.9978 
(2.82 x 10-4 ) 
0.9921 
(3.19 x 10-4 ) 
o 
3.556 X 10-8 
(1.49 x 10-1°) 
s z 
8.759 x 10 2 
(1.27 x 10-3 ) 
4.837 X 10-2 
(3.86 x 10-3 ) 
(b) Priee of risk parameters 
s 
-4.679 X 102 
(7.12 X 101) 
o 
o 
(e) State Dynamies Parameters 
a 
z 
3.491 x 10 
(1.27 x 10-3 ) 
1.437 X 10-2 
(1.99 X 10-4 ) 
4.409 x 10 6 3.223 x 10 8 
0.3765 
(1.79 x 10°3) 
2.133 X 10-7 
(3.54 x 10-9 ) 
(d) Standard Deviations of Measurement Errors (x 10-6 ) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2.01 1.58 1.09 0.71 0.37 0.25 0.25 
1.339 X 105 
(1.47 X 104 ) 
2.753 X 105 
(5.88 X 103) 
v 
7.400 x 10 6 
9 10 
0.31 0.25 
8.354 X 103 
(7.43 X 102 ) 
-6.459 X 104 
(2.74 X 102 ) 
w 
0.260 
11 
0.15 
(0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0093) (0.0057) (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0040) 
1.46 1.84 2.30 2.61 2.69 
(0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0033) 
12 
0.29 
(0.0048) 00 
-..j 
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C LIBOR rate loadings 
Figure 2.3 displays the loadings of LIBOR rates on each factor for ma-
turities from 1 day to 1 year. Not surprisingly, parameter estimates imply 
that the current policy rate is a level factor. A rising Target rate lifts aU 
LIBOR rates but the impact is slightly less for the longest rates due to 
mean-reversion. Next, both the liquidity and the macroeconomic factors 
carry positive loadings. That is, LIBOR rates rise whenever the state of 
economy improves or the liquidity factor rises. The macroeconomic factor 
(Panel (c)) is a slope factor with no impact at the shortest maturity (except 
on FOMC meeting dates) but quickly rising with maturity. In contrast, the 
liquidity factor's loading is one, by construction, at a maturity of one day. 
It reaches a maximum at around 3.5 ata maturity of 180 days and slowly 
decreases afterwards. (Panel (d)). FinaUy, the spread between the Target 
and the Effective rate only affects yields for maturities up to a few days (see 
Panel (b)). This reflects the spread 's highly transitory nature and should 
not come as a surprise given the effort of the Fed to meet any expected 
deviations from the Target with open market operations. 
D State· Variables 
Figure 2.4 displays the filtered time series of state variables. Panel (a) 
shows the path of the Target rate between 1994 and July 2007. Panel (b) 
shows deviations of the Effective rate from Target. More interesting is the 
path of the macroeconomic factor (Panel (c)), which shows that this factor 
leads variations of the policy rate. This reflects the forward-looking informa-
tion contained in the term structure of LIBOR and futures rates. As market 
participants anticipate changes in future economic activity and, hence, a 
tighter or looser policy, current interest rates fluctuate. These changes are 
captured, in part, by the macro factor. 
Panel (d) displays the path of the liquidity factor. This factor captures 
deviations between (risk-adjusted) expectations of Target rates implicit in 
LIB OR rates relative to those implicit in futures rates. EmpiricaUy, the liq-
uidity factor exhibits peaks in periods of tension on financial markets: the 
Mexican Peso crisis in 1994, the failure of LTCM in 1998 and fears of the 
Millennium bug. Moreover, the liquidity factor is not unrelated to economic 
conditions. Figure 2.5 compares the liquidity and the macro factors. These 
appear to be positively related at the business cycle frequency. In this sam-
ple, the contemporaneous correlation of the liquidity factor with the Target 
rate and the macro factor are 0.42 and 0.38, respectively. However, there 
89 
are multiple occurrences of negative co-movements at a higher frequency. In 
many cases, a rapid change in the macro factor is associated with a rapid 
but opposite change of the liquidity factor. Intuitively, when anticipations of 
economic conditions change, as revealed by interest rates, the macro factor 
changes in the same direction (i.e. its loadings are positive). However, the 
liquidity factor reveals that the spread between futures and LIBOR rates 
decreases. That is, futures rates increase faster than LIBOR rates when 
conditions are improving, and decrease faster when conditions are deterio-
rating and the impact is larger at maturities around 6 months (see LIBOR 
loadings). In other words, the futures market leads the LIBOR market. 
Note that this is consistent with a positive price of risk for the liquidity fac-
tor. Again, the evidence suggests that the liquidity factor reflects important 
forward-Iooking information. 
E Pricing Errors 
The standard deviations of measurement errors are low, between 0.5 and 
10 bps, annually. Mean Pricing Errors [MPE] and Root Mean Squared Pric-
ing Errors [RMSPE] for LIBOR and futures are reported in Panels (a) and 
(b) of Table III, respectively. Results are reported in bps (annualized). Av-
erage pricing errors do not indicate any significant bias, averaging less than 
1 bps except for the shortest LIBOR maturities. LIBOR RMSPE decrease 
with maturities from 6.28 bps at 1 month to below 0.5 bps for the longest 
maturites. In contrast, futures RMSPE increase with maturity, from 2.56 to 
6.18 bps. These are low, by any standard. 
VI Forecasting Policy and Excess Returns 
Estimates of the structural model completely characterize the distribution 
of Target rates at any future date via the conditional Laplace transform. 
Empirically, the model improves on OLS-based forecasts commonly used in 
practice. Moreover, the improvements increase with the forecast horizon. In 
fact, 1 obtain reliable forecasts at horizons up to 12 months. This raises the 
question as to what factors are the most informative in these forecasts. We 
know from theory that forecasts based on asset prices rely on the ability to 
predict excess returns. Therefore, the forecasting results above indicate that 
the model provides better forecasts of the risk premium. In the following, 1 
measure the relative ability of each factor to explain the risk premium on fed 
funds futures. As expected, the macroeconomic factor and the Target rate 
predict variations of the excess returns. However, the liquidity factor is the 
Table III: Mean Pricing Errors [MPE] and Root Mean Squared Pricing Errors [RMSPE] using QML estimates. The sample ranges 
from January 1994 to July 2007. Results are reported in basis points (annualized), for LIBOR rates and futures rates at maturities 
of 1 to 12 months and 1 to 6 months, respectively. 
(a) Mean Pricing Errors 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
LIBOR -3.17 -1.56 -0.29 -0.11 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.00 -0.23 -0.07 0.04 0.00 
Futures 0.28 0.25 -0.06 -0.31 -0.57 -0.76 
(b) Root Mean Square Pricing Errors 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
LIBOR 6.28 4.18 3.28 2.23 1.43 0.72 0.44 0.46 0.61 0.48 0.22 0.54 
Futures 2.56 3.24 4.15 5.21 5.92 6.18 
CD 
o 
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most significant predictor of excess returns. 1 argue that transitory deviations 
between LIBOR and futures rates, although due to their relative illiquidity, 
reflect demand pressure from participants seeking to hedge exposures to 
future interest rates. 
A Forecasting Target Rate 
Forecasting Function 
ln this section, we are interested in forecasting future monthly effective 
fed funds rate averages, ft,n. First consider the following forecasting fun ct ion 
for the overnight rate at any future date t + h, 
where 1 use the fact that the information set at time-t can be summarized 
by the filtered state variables, x = kt. Using the the multi-horizon Laplace 
transform, we have 
(2.23) 
with coefficients aU and b(·) given in Appendix D. Then, the time-t forecast 
of rt,n is also linear, 
Wr(x, n) == Edrt,n], 
= D;;l L ar+8 (It+1, h) + br+8 (It+1, hf x, (2.24) 
- T 
= a(It+1,n) +b(It+1,n) x. (2.25) 
Benchmark Model 
As a benchmark of forecasting performances, 1 use regressions of rt,n 
on current futures rates (Krueger and Kuttner (1996)). Gurkaynak et al. 
(2007) show that using futures delivers the best market-based forecasts of 
future policy rates. The forecasting regressions 1 consider are 
- TS + (3TS ,T, (X' h) + h,TS Tt,h =ah h ""r t, Et 
rt,h =a~LS + (3fLS F(t, h) + E~,oLS 
rth =a~ + (3; kt + E~'X , 
for each horizon h where kt is the filtered estimates and where F(t, h) is 
the futures contract for the corresponding months. The first regression uses 
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forecasts from the model. The second regression uses futures rates, and the 
last regression uses filtered state variables in an unrestricted way. 1 include 
this case to see whether the specifie combination of state variables imposed 
by Equation 2.23 uses ail the information included in the state variables. The 
regressions are estimated with daily data for reference months up to 6 months 
ahead in the case of futures-based regressions and up to 12 months ahead 
in the case of model-based regressions. In the former case, this implies 184 
horizons, and as many regressions, while the latter case implies 360 horizons. 
Forecasting Results 
The R2 and RMSE obtained from these regressions measure the forecast-
ing performance. Figure 2.7a presents the R2 and Figure 2.7b the Root Mean 
Squared Error [RMSE] in bps (annualized). Forecast errors are typically low 
at an horizon of 1 month or less, with R2 very close to 1.17 This strong re-
suit is standard. One-month ahead forecasts of the Target rate are accurate 
when the information set includes the corresponding futures contract. Fore-
casting performances then deteriorate slowly as we consider longer horizons. 
The R2 of futures-based forecasts decrease to 92% and 78% at 3-month and 
6-month horizons, respectively. The corresponding RMSE are 49 bps and 80 
bps. This deterioration is halved when we used model-based forecasts. The 
R 2 from model-based regressions are still 98% at an horizon of 3 months and 
92% at an horizon of 6 months. The corresponding RMSE are 23 bps and 47 
bps. Moreover, the model extends beyond the longest available contract. At 
an horizon of one year, model-based forecasts achieve an R2 and RMSE of 
65% and 85 bps, similar to futures-based forecasts at the shorter six month 
horizon. 
Strictly speaking, under the null of the model, Equation 2.23 implies that 
f3rs = 1 and ars = O. This wou Id imply that the model accurately captures / 
the average level and the variations of the risk premium. Figure 2.8a displays 
coefficient estimates at each horizon. These are close to their theoretical 
values at each horizon. One year ahead, we have â close to 0.25 and and /J 
close to 0.92. In fact, at these horizons the estimates are not significantly 
different from 0 and 1, respectively. Panel 2.8b displays the t-statistics of 
these tests, at each horizon. The tests reject the null only for intermediate 
17For a one-month forecast horizon, the RMSE is close to 1 bps and 12 bps when using 
model and futures-based forecasts, respectively. The relative performance of the model 
at this horizon is due to the implicit adjustment for the remaining number of days. At a 
1-day horizon, unadjusted forecasts based on futures are extremely volatile. See Hamilton 
(2008) for a treatment of the adjustment for the number of days to maturity of the current 
month contract. 
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maturities. However, the discrepancies are not economically large, and the 
statistical evidence disappears at horizons beyond 6 months. The model 
meets this stringent test with sorne success. This is a strong and novel result, 
at these horizons the model provides unbiased forecasts of future monetary 
policy. Finally, Figure 2.6 includes the R2 and RMSE from the unrestricted 
regressions. The results suggest that minor improvements can be achieved 
at horizons beyond 6 months. 
B Forecasting Excess Returns 
The model's ability to improve forecasting performances is tightly linked 
to its ability to predict the risk premium. The realized returns, from entering 
a futures position today until settlement date is the difference between the 
current futures rate and the realized monthly average effective rate. That is, 
Xrt,n fr: ft,n' Take expectations and re-arrange to get 
Et [ft,n] = Fr' - Et [xrt,n] , 
which shows that improvement in forecasting performance, relative to simple 
futures-based forecasts, must come from the ability to predict excess returns. 
Then, the forecasting results suggest that the information content of the 
macroeconomic and liquidity factors is significant. A simple way to evaluate 
the relative contribution of each state variable is through the following excess 
returns regressions, 
(2.26) 
Excess returns from futures contract positions are computed each day, for' 
the 1 to 6-month ahead contract. Results from the regressions are presented 
in bps (annualized) in Table IV. In-sample, excess returns averaged between 
0.66 bps for the one-month contract and up to 15.6 bps for the 6-month 
contract. Predictability is small at short horizons with R2 slightly below 1% 
and 6% for the current month and the month-ahead contract, rèspectively. 
However, predictability then rises substantially reaching 12%, 17%,25% and 
27% for the 3, 4, 5 and 6-month ahèad contracts. Target rate coefficients 
are al! positive and ail significant but for the first month. This implies that 
periods when the policy rate is high are associated with higher risk premium 
on futures contracts. A one-standard deviation shock to the Target rate 
leads, on average, to increases in risk premium of 7 and 19 bps in 3-month 
and the 6-month contracts, respectively. Next, coefficients on the macroe-
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conomic factor are negative at aU horizons, but smaU and significant only 
for the intermediate maturities. More important is the information content 
of the liquidity factor. When futures rates are relatively lower than LIB OR 
rates, and lt increases, the risk premia on futures contract also decrease. A 
one-standard deviation shock to the liquidity factor is associated with a re-
duction of 6 and 24 basis points for the 3-month and the 6-month contracts, 
respectively, on average. This effect is large and statistically significant. 
Table IV: Excess Returns Regressions 
Results from regressions of futures excess returns on state variables obtained 
from the model, 
Regressors are centered around zero and normalized by their standard devia-
tion and excess returns are in basis points (annualized). Coefficient estimates 
provide the change in expected excess returns due to a change of one stan-
dard deviation in one of the state variables. 1 include t-statistics based on 
Newey-West standard errors (30 lags) below each estimate and R2 at the 
bottom of each column. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
a 0.615 2.674 5.194 8.294 12.098 16.369 
(2.217) (3.631) (3.956) (4.220) ( 4.616) (4.882) 
fJr 0.430 3.158 6.959 11.109 15.427 19.478 
(0.767) (2.002) (2.632) (2.835) (2.835) (2.735) 
fJ. -0.019 0.257 -0.043 0.335 -0.129 -0.027 
( -0.094) (1.227) (-0.108) (0.534) ( -0.176) (-0.032) 
fJz 0.187 -0.866 -1.757 -2.089 -0.755 0.889 
(0.277) (-0.466) ( -0.630) (-0.517) ( -0.135) (0.122) 
fJl -0.143 -2.135 -5.573 -10.385 -17.595 -24.285 
( -0.398) (-2.261) ( -3.318) ( -4.111) ( -5.326) (-5.849) 
R2 [0.7] [5.7] [12.0] [17.5] [24.8] [27.5] 
C Discussion 
The results above shed light on the interpretation of the liquidity factor. 
This factor affects model-implied forecasts via three different channels. First, 
the liquidity factor affects the risk premium associated with Target rate risk 
through its impact on higher moments of future Target rates. We have that 
).d,l < ).u,l and this implies that the variance of Target rate changes increases, 
and skewness is pu shed to the right when the liquidity factor decreases. The 
impact on the risk premium will depends on the relative impact of lt on the 
conditional variance and skewness of Target changes. Second, the liquidity 
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factor affects the price of risk of the macro factor directly. Since JI 1 < 0 the , 
price of macro risk decreases when the liquidity factor increases. Third, the 
liquidity factor allows for a wedge between the risk compensation of LIBOR 
and futures rates. An increase in the liquidity factor may be caused by 
an increase of LIBOR rates or a decrease of futures rates. The latter case 
induces lower excess returns on futures following a shock to the liquidity 
factor. These last two channels imply negative liquidity coefficients in excess 
return regressions. 
Empirically, increases in the liquidity factor predicts lower excess returns 
on futures contracts and conditioning for the forward-looking information 
contained in the liquidity premium is key to improve forecasting perfor-
mances. In other word, when the liquidity factor increases, futures rates 
tend to be lower on average relative to LIB OR rates and relative to future 
realized monthly average. This suggests that the information content of the 
liquidity factor should be interpreted in terms of futures rates relative to 
LIBOR rates. A likely explanation is that hedging demand put pressures on 
the intermediation mechanisms of futures markets and causes transitory de-
viations of futures rate to compensate liquidity providers for their services. 
While 1 assumed that only the LIBOR market suffered from illiquidity, it 
is likely that both markets are affected by intermediation frictions, but to 
different degrees. That shocks to .hedging demand are revealed in futures 
markets suggests that they are more liquid, less costly, or that participation 
is less limited, than LIBOR markets. This complements the evidence pro-
vided in Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) who showed that excess returns on 
futures varies with banks' hedging demand in anticipation of policy changes. 
Finally, note that the lack of a perfectly liquid interest rate contract and 
of measures of the frictions interest rate markets imply that we cannot iden-
tify the liquidity component in each market separately. However, we can 
measure their difference. This is precisely what estimates of lT achieve given 
the assumption of a zero liquidity component in futures markets. In par-
ticular, the liquidity component identified here cannot be directly measured 
from the spread between LIBOR and futures rates. 
VII Conclusion 
This papers provides a joint model of the monetary policy response function, 
of LIBOR rates and of Fed funds futures rates. Combined with no-arbitrage 
restrictions, this provides better identification of the price of risk parameters 
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and delivers significant improvements in policy rate forecasts. Moreover, and 
perhaps unexpectedly, allowing for transitory deviations between these two 
markets captures forward-looking information about the future path of the 
policy rate. Demand for immediacy pressures the intermediation mechanism 
of futures markets. Note that this liquidity premium is hard to disentangle 
from other components of futures rates without a joint model. In any case, 
the evidence leads to the important conclusion that liquidity premium in 
interest rate markets are relevant to macroeconomic researchers. 
VIII A ppendix 
A Conditional Laplace Transfmm 
Skellam Distribution 
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The dynamics of state variables is summarized by Equations 2.1,2.5,2.6 
and 2.7. Although the process for rt is novel, the conditional multivariate 
Laplace Transform of the state variables is exponential affine. Conditional 
on the past, changes in the Target rate follow a Skellam distribution (Skellam 
(1946), Johnson et aL (1997)). This distribution is characterized as the dif-
ference between two independent Poisson random variables. Both its Laplace 
transform and its density are known in closed-form. Consider two univariate 
Poisson variables N 1 and N2 with parameters >'1 and >'2, respectively. The 
Laplace Transform of their difference Z == N 1 - N2 is 
while its probability mass function is 
( >. )Z/2 f(Z = z) = exp( -(>'1 + >'2)) >.: Iz (2V>'1>'2) , 
where Ik (y) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind. In our context, 
the coefficients of the conditional Laplace transform vary through time be-
cause of the evolution of the underlying state variables and because of the 
(deterministic) variation in the FOMC meeting schedule. Hence, computa-
tion of the transform depends on the occurrence of a FOMC meeting in the 
next period and the two cases must treated separately. 
No FOMe Meeting 
1 first consider the case where no meeting is scheduled to occur. Then, 
since the innovations driving the state vector, Xt, are independent, the con-
ditional transform is 
T(u,Xt+1IIt+1 = 0) == Et [exp (uT X t+1) IIt+1 = 0] 
= exp (A(It+1 = O,u) + B(It+l o,ufxt ) , 
where It is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if a meeting occurs at time-t 
and ° otherwise. The coefficients are given by 
A(It = 0, u) = >.g(eÂUr - 1) + >.g(e-ÂUr 1) 
1 ( 2 2 2 2 2 2) +~~+~~+~~+i~~+~~+~~ 
+ >'J,s (T{us• Ji+1) -1) 
_. T I T ( s ) 
-90{Ur )+u J.L+i u nu+>'J,s T(us,Jt+1)-1 
and 
where 1 defined 
B(It = 0, z) = [ur us4Js uz4Jz ut4Jtf 
= <I>u, 
J.L = [0 J.Ls J.Lz J.Ltl T 
<I> = diag([1 4Js 4Jz 4Jtf) 
n = diag ([0 17; 17; ulf), 
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go(x) = À~(ell.Ur - 1) + Àg(e-ll.ur - 1) and where diag is the usual operator 
from the vector space to the space of diagonal matrices. 
FOMe Meeting 
Computation of the multivariate conditional Laplace transform is slightly 
different when a FOMC meeting occurs in the following period. Conditional 
on the realization of 8t+1, Zt+1 and lt+1, we have 
T(u,Xt+1IIt+1 = 1) == Et [exp (uTX t+1) IIt+1 = 1] 
=Et [ESt+1 ,zt+l,tt+l [exp (uTX t+1) IIt+1 = 1]] 
= Et [exp (-G(ur f X + À(ell.ur + e-ll.ur - 2) + G(urf X;+1 + uT X;+1)] , 
where 
X;+1 = [Tt 8t+1 Zt+1 lt+1l 
G(y) = [gr (y) gr(Y) gz(y) gt(y)f, Y E R, 
and the functions 9k(Y), k = T, 8, Z, are defined as 
We then have that 
T(u,Xt+1IIt+1 = 1) = exp (A(It = l,u) +B(It = l,ufxt), 
with coefficients 
A(I, u) = - G( Ur f X + À(ell.ur - 1) + À(e-ll.ur - 1) + ks( Ur )J.Ls + kz( Ur )J.Lz + kt( Ur )J.Lt 
+ ~(ks(ur)2U; + kz(ur)2u; + kt(ur )2ul) 
+ ÀJ,s (T(ks(ur ), J{+1) - 1) 
T - T 1 T 
= - G(ur) X + h1(ur ) + (G(ur ) + u) J.L +"2 (G(ur ) + u) n (G(ur ) + u) 
+ÀJ,s (T(gs(ur) + US, J{+1) - 1) 
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and 
B(I, u) = [gr(ur) + Ur (gs(ur) + us)q;s (gz(ur) + uz)q;z (gl(Ur) + Ul)q;!lT 
=<1> (G(Ur) + U). 
Risk-Neutral Distribution 
It is easy to show using results from the previous sections that 
TQ(u, Xt+l) = Et [Mt,t+l exp (uT Xt+1)] 
= exp (AQ(It+l,u) + (BQ(It+l,u) - CrfXt) , 
with Cr = [1 1 0 oV and coefficients given by 
Q T 1 T A (O,u)=go(ur+JO,r)-gO(Jo,r)+u (1L+~JO)+2"u Ou 
+ ÀJ,s (T(us + Jo,s, Jt+l) - 7'(Jo,s, Jt+l)) 
AQ(I, u) =gl(Ur + JO,r) - gl(JO,r) - (G(ur + JO,r) - G(Jo,r)f X 
1 T 1 T 
- 2"G(Jo,r) OG(JO,r) + 2" (G(ur + JO,r) + u) 0 (G(ur + JO,r) + u) 
+ (G(ur + JO,r) + u)T (IL + OJo) 
+ÀJ,s (T(gs(ur + JO,r) + Jo,s + us, Jl+l) - T(gs(Jo,r) + Jo,s, Jt+l)) 
and 
BQ(O, u) = (<1> + OJI) u 
BQ(I, u) = (<1> + OJ l ) (G(ur + JO,r) - G(JO,r) + u). 
Note that the persistence of the factors is shifted whenever Jo =f. o. That 
is, the persistence under the risk-neutral measures will be shifted whenever 
interest rate risk is prieed even if the vector of priees of risk is constant (i.e. 
JI = 0). 
B Generating Funetion for Priees 
Consider the priee at time-t of the payoff exp( uT X t+m) at maturity m, 
f(u, t, m) = Et [Mt,t+m exp (uT Xt+m)] 
= EdMt+lf (u, t + 1, m - 1)]. 
Substituting the guess r(u, t, m) = exp (eo(u, t, m) + e(u, t, mf X t) gives 
r(u, t, m) =Et [Mt+l exp (eo(u, t + 1, m - 1) + e(u, t + 1, m - If Xt+I)] 
= exp (eo(u, t + 1, m -1) + AQ(It+l, e(u, t + 1, m - 1))) 
x exp ([BQ(It+l' e(u, t + 1, m - 1)) - Cr ( Xt) , 
which implies the following recursion that coefficients must solve: 
co(u, t, h) = co(u, t + 1, h -1) + AQ(It+1,c(u, t + 1, h -1)) 
c(u, t, h) = BQ(It+1'c(u, t + 1, h -1)) - Cr, 
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(2.27) 
(2.28) 
for 0 S h S m. Note that f(u, t, 0) = exp (uT Xt) implies co(u, t, 0) = 0 and 
c( u, t, 0) = u for arbitrary t 2: 1 and u. 
CAsset Priees 
Discount Bonds 
Of particular interest is the case u = O. This corresponds to the priee, 
D(t, m), of a risk-free discount bond with maturity m, 
Drf(t, m) == f(O, t, m) = EdMt,t+m] 
= exp (d~f (t, m) + drf (t, mf X t) , 
where d~f (t, m) == co(O, t, m) and drf (t, m) == c(O, t, m). 
LIBOR loan 
A LIBOR loan is an asset with unit payoff which is further discounted at 
the rate lt to offer compensation for illiquidity or counterpartyrisk. The priee 
of a LIBOR loan can also be obtained from the priee generating function by 
noting that 
DL(t,m) = Et [Mt,t+mexp (-}; lt+i) 1 
= Et [Mt~t+ml 
with M/+i = Mt+i exp( -lt+1)' 1 guess and verify that the solution is exponential-
affine, DL(t, m) = exp (dt(t, m) + é(t, m)T Xt) with solution 
dt(t, m) = dt(t + 1, m - 1) + AQ (It+1' é(t + 1, m - 1)) 
é(t,m) = BQ (It+1, é(t + 1,m -1)) - CL, 
where CL = [110 l]T. Finally, note that DL(t, 0) = 1 implies that dt(t, 0) = 
o and é(t, 0) = 0 for any t 2: 1. 
Singleton futures Priee 
A difficulty arises when computing a singleton futures rate because the 
referenee date t + m, at which the payoff is determined, is not generally the 
same than the settlement date t + T, at which the payment is made. That 
is, we have 
f(t, m, T) = EdMt,t+Trt+m] = 
= aa Et [Mt,Texp(urt+m)] 1 == aa ff(u,t,m,T)1 ' 
u u=o U u=o 
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where m STand uER. It seems at first that the priee generating function 
derived above will not help whenever m is different than T. However, we 
can use the law of iterated expectations and get 
r f( u, t, m, T) Et [Mt,t+m exp( uTt+m)Et+m [Mt+m,t+Tll 
= Et [A.-ft,t+mexp(uTt+m)D(t + m,T - m)] 
= Et [Mt,Hm exp (d~f (t + m, T - m) + [d'"f (t + m, T - m) + uCrV XHh)] 
exp(%f(t+m,T m))r(d'"f(t+m,T m)+uCr,t,m). 
We can then use the results above to obtain 
rf(u,t,m,T) exp(d~f(t+m,T m)) 
x exp (co (drf (t + m, T m) + uCr, t, m) + c(drf (t + m, T m) + uCr, t, m)T Xt ) . 
Taking the partial derivatives with respect to u and evaluating at u 0, the 
singleton futures rate is 
( rf T ) f(t,m,T) = exp do (t+m,T m)+co(u*,t,m)+c(u*,t,m) Xt 
x [c~ (u*, t,m) + X[ c' (u*, t, m)] Cr, 
where u* = drf(t+m, T -m). Note that u* is only a function of the reference 
date for the singleton futures, t + h, and the length of time between the 
reference date and the settlement date, which will not change as we vary t 
or m in the coefficient recursions. That is, for a given set of risk-free zero 
coupon coefficients, we can apply the same strategy as for simple interest 
rates to compute futures coefficients. The differentiated coefficients, c~ (.) 
and c' (.), can be computed by taking derivatives with respect to u on both 
sides of Equation (2.27). They must satisfy: 
, - ' 'Q co(u,t, h) - co(u, t + 1, h - 1) + A (It+1, c(u, t + 1, h 
"Q , 
c(u,t,h)=B (It+l,c(u,t+l,h 1))c(u,t+l,h 
1) + 8) c' (u, t + 1, h - 1) 
1) 
for any u, t and any h > O. Initial conditions for these differentiated re-
cursions can be found by differentiation of the corresponding initial condi-
tions or by nothing that we must have f(t, 0, T) D(t, T)Tt. This yields 
c~ (u, t, 0) = 0 and c' (u, t, 0) 1 d, where Id is the identity matrix. 
Finally, the derivatives of Laplace coefficients, AQ' (-) and BQ' (-) can be 
computed directly, 
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A'Q(l, U)l (ur + 81') - G(r) (ur + 8r )T X + G(r) (Ur + 8r)T (J.i + ~Ho) 
+ ÀsT (9s(7.Lr + 81') + Us + 88 , J!+l) (vs + (9s(Ur + 81') + Us + 8s)w;) 9~(Ur + 81')) 
+ L (9i(Ur + 8r)9~(Ur + 81')01) 
i=z,k,l 
'Q 2 2 A (1, uh =J.is + 8sCTs + (98(Ur + 80,1') + us) CTs 
+ ÀsT (9s(ur + 81') + Us + 8s, J!+1) (vs + (98 (Ur + 81') + Us + 8s )w;) 
A'Q(l, 'u)J =J.iz + 6z CT; + (gs(-u z + 60,1') + 'uz) CT; 
'Q 2 2 A (1, U)4 =J.it + 8t CTI + (9s(UI + 80,1') + Ut) CTI, 
B'Q(O, u) = [1> + n8l ], 
[
Li=r,S,Z,1 9~ (ur + 80,1') (<Pri + 80,irCTt) 
Li=rs z 19~(Us + 80,s)(<Psi + 80 ,is CTf) 
, ,t f 2 
Li=r,8,z,t9i(Uz + 80,z)(<pzi + 80,iz(ji) 
_,~,,,>.,,.,9~(-Ul + 80,1) (<Pli + 80,ilCTt) 
D Predictability Coefficients 
Multi-Horizon Laplace Transform 
The distribution of future state variables can be characterized explicitly 
from the multi-horizon conditional Laplace transform, 
for any U E RK and h ~ 1. This can be derived from the known one-horizon 
case, guessing an exponential affine solution and noting that 
Tx(u, t, h) [Tx(u, t + 1, h - 1)], 
=exp (A(It+l' z, h) + B(IHl' Z, hf Xt) , 
with coefficients given by 
A(lt, z, h + 1) =A(IHI. Z, h) + A(It, B(IHI. z, h» 
B(lt, z, h + 1) =B(lt, B(IHl, z, h», 
for any h ~ 1 with initial conditions A(IHl> z, 1) = A(IHI, z) and B(It+1, z, 1) = 
B(It+b z). 
Forecast Functions 
The forecast function for any linear combination, CT X t of the state vari-
ables can be derived at any horizon from the following partial derivative with 
respect to u, 
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where, as before, the derivatives of the multi-horizon coefficients can be 
obtained by differentiating their respective recursions. The derivatives of 
the Laplace Transform coefficients under the historical measure are given by 
1 T A (It = 1, u) = 
[~ 0 0 ~l ' B'(It = O,u) = 4Js 0 0 4Jz 0 0 4Jl 
[9;(u,.) + 1 0 0 ~l B'(It = l,u) = 9~(Ur)4Js 4Js 0 9x( Ur )4Jz 0 4Jz 9; (ur )4Jl 0 4Jr 
and, hence, the multi-horizon derivatives with respect to the second argu-
ment are 
A~(It+1, 0, h) =A~(It+2, 0, h - 1) + A~(It+1, B(It+2' 0, h - 1))B~(It+2, 0, h - 1)) 
B;(It+1, 0, h)) =B; (It+2 , B(It+2' 0, h - 1))B;(It+2, 0, h - 1)), 
with initial conditions A~(It+1, 0,1) = A~(It+1, 0) and B;(It+1, 0,1) = B;(It+1, 0). 
Target and Effective Forecast 
The forecast function for future Target and Effective overnight Fed funds 
rates can by computed by setting C = Cr = [1 0 0 OlT and C = Cr+s = 
[1 1 0 oV, respectively. We then have 
wAx, t, h) =E[rt+hIXt = xl 
=ar(It+1, h) + br (It+1 , hf Xt 
Wr+s(x, t, h) =E[rt+hIXt = xl 
=ar+s(It+1, h) + br+s(It+1, hf Xt· 
E Unscented Kalman Filter 
The UKF is based on an approximation to any non-linear transformation 
of a probability distribution. It has been introduced in Julier et al. (1995) 
and Julier and Uhlmann (1996) (see Wan and der Merwe (2001) for textbook 
treatment) and was first imported in finance by Leippold and Wu (2003). 
Given Xt+1lt a time-t forecast of state variable for period t + 1, and its 
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associated MSE Qt+1lt the unscented fil ter selects a set of Sigma points in 
the distribution of Xt+1lt such that 
.Julier et al. (1995) proposed the foUowing set of Sigma points, 
x(i) = { :+ (V~ LX)(i) 
5è - ( V l!,':(ü) L:x) (i-K) 
i=O 
i=l, ... ,K 
i = K + 1, ... ,2K 
with weights 
{ 
w(O) i = 0 
(i) _ l-w(O) . - 1 K 
w - 2K ~ - , ... , 
l-w(O) . 
----vr- ~ = K + 1, ... ,2K 
where ( J l!;:(o) L:x) (i) is the i-th row or column of the matrix square root. 
Julier and Uhlmann (1996) use a Taylor expansion to evaluate the approxi-
mation's accuracy. The expansion of y = g(x) around x is 
y = E [g(x + ~x)l 
= g(x) + E [D~x(9) + D~;/g) + D~~(9) + ... ] , 
where the Dhx(g) operator evaluates the total differential of g(.) when per-
turbed by ~x, and evaluated at X. A useful representation of this operator 
in our context is 
Different approximation strategies for y will differ by either the number of 
terms used in the expansion or the set of perturbations ~x. If the distribu-
tion of ~x is symmetric, aU odd-ordered terms are zero. Moreover, we can 
re-write the second terms as a function of the covariance matrix Pxx of ~x, -
y = g(x) + (V'T Pxx V') g(x) + E [D~~(9) + ... ] . 
Linearisation leads to the approximation Ylin = g(x) while the unscented 
approximation is exact up to the third-order term and the a-points have 
the correct covariance matrix by construction. In the Gaussian case, Julier 
and Uhlmann (1996) show that same-variable fourth moments agree as well 
and that an other moments are lower than the true moments of ~x. Then, 
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approximation errors of higher order terms are necessarily sm aller for the 
UKF than for the EKF. U sing a similar argument to the case of the ap-
proximation of the MSE, Julier and Uhlmann (1996) show that linearization 
and the unscented transformation agree with the Taylor expansion up to the 
second-order term and that approximation errors in higher-order terms are 
sm aller for the UKF. 
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Figure 2.2: Time series of forward rates and futures rates at maturities of 2, 
4 and 6 months. Forward rates are computed from LIBOR rates. 
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Figure 2.3: Libor rate factor loadings computed from the model. Pane12.4a 
presents loadings on the Target rate. Panel 2.4b presents loadings on the 
effective spread. Panel 2.4c presents loadings on the macro factor. Pane12.4d 
presents loadings on the liquidity factor. 
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Figure 2.4: Filtered state variables from QML estimation of the model in a a 
daily saIÙple of Target, effective, LIBOR and futures rates January 1994 to 
July 2007. Panel 2.5a displays the time series of the Target rate. Panel2.5b 
displays the time series of the effective spread. Panel 2.5c displays the time 
series of the macro factor. Panel 2.5d displays the time series of the liquidity 
factor. 
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Figure 2.5: Filtered time-series of the Liquidity and Macroeconomie and 
factors from the unrestricted model. Factors are reported with standardized 
units from Jan. lst 1994 to the end of July 2007. 
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Figure 2.6: R2 and RMSE from forecasting regressions 
Comparing forecasting performance of model-forecast based on the following regressions of realized monthly average Target rate, 
-TS 
Tt,n' 
'Ft,n 
'Ft,n 
where wr(.Xt, n) is the model's forecast, Xt are filtered state variables from the model and f(t, n) is the observed futures priees 
corresponding to a time-t, l1-mOl1th ahead, forecast of the monthly average of the effective Fed funds rate. Panel (a) compares the 
R2 from each regression (y-axis is from 0 to 1) and Panel (b) compares the RMSE in bps (al1nualized) from each regression. 
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Figure 2.7: Coefficients from the model-based forecast regressions 
The figures displays the coefficients O:n andf3n from regressions of realized monthly average of the Target rate, rt,n, on the model-
forecast, 
Tt,n O:n +f3n lTtr(Xt ,n) + Et,n, 
where ITtf(Xt , n) is the model's forecast and X t are filtered state vai:iables. Panel Ca) displays the estimates of 0: and f3 across 
horizons. Panel (b) displays the (absolute value) t-statistics of the null that 0: = 0 and that f3 1, respectively, for each horizon. In 
both cases the x-axis is the horizon, h, in the regression, from 1 to 360 days ahead. 
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Figure 2.8: Excess returns regressions 
These Figures presents actual excess returns, XTt,n on the n-month ahead futures (Panel 2.9a) and predicted excess returns 
(Panel 2.9b) from regressions of excess retl1rns on the Target rate, the macro factor and the liquidity factor, 
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Abstract 
We introduce the Homoscedastic Gamma [HG] model where the distribution 
of returns is characterized by its mean, variance and an independent skew-
ness parameter under both measures. The model predicts that the spread 
between historical and risk-neutral volatilities is a function of the risk pre-
mium and of skewness. In fact, the equity premium is twice the ratio of 
the volatility spread to skewness. We measure skewness from option prices 
and test these predictions. We find that conditioning on skewness increases 
the predictive power of the volatility spread and that coefficient estimates 
accord with theory. In short, the data do not reject the model's implications 
for the equity premium. We also check the model's implications for option 
pricing and show that the information content of skewness leads to improved 
in-sample and out-of-sample pricing performances as well as improved hedg-
ingperformances. Our results imply that expanding around the Gaussian 
density is restrictive and does not offer sufficient fiexibility to match the 
skewness and kurtosis implicit in option data. Finally, we document the 
term structure of option-implied volatility, skewness and kurtosis and find 
that time-dependence in returns has a greater impact on skewness. 
Keywords: Options, Implied Skewness, Risk Premium, Volatility Spread. 
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A previous version of this paper was titled "The Implied Volatility and Skewness Surface". 
We thank Peter Christoffersen, Redouane Elkamhi, René Garcia, Scott Hendry, Steve 
Heston, Teodora Paligorova and Jun Yang for comments and discussions. We also thank 
seminar participants at the Bank of Canada, Financial Econometries Lunch Group (Duke 
University), CIRANO 2009 Financial Econometries Conference, 2009 Econometrie Society 
NASM, EFA 2009 and FMA 2009. Correspondence:  
118 
1 Introduction 
We propose the Homoscedastic Gamma model [HG] in which innovations 
of market returns are parameterized by their mean, variance and skewness. 
The skewness parameter can be chosen independently and we ne st the Black-
Scholes-Merton [BSM] case if skewness is zero. We follow Christoffersen 
et al. (2009) and provide a Stochastic Discount Factor [SDF] under which 
stock returns are HG under both the historical and risk-neutral probability 
measures. This model delivers a sharp prediction about the relationship 
between the risk premium, volatility and skewness : the equity premium is 
equal to twice the ratio of the volatility spread to skewness. 
The HG model preserves BSM's parsimony and closed-form option prices. 
Thus, we measure the volatility and skewness implicit in option prices. We 
can then perform regressions of SP500 excess returns on the ratio of the 
volatility spread to skewness. We find that coefficients have the correct sign 
and magnitude, and that conditioning on skewness improves the predictive 
power of the volatility spread. In short, the data support the model's restric-
tions on the equity premium. Reversing the relationship, and interpreting 
the volatility spread as the returns on a portfolio of options, we show that a 
version of the CAPM conditional on skewness "explains" the returns on the 
the volatility spread portfolio. This offers an answer to the question posed 
in Carr and Wu (2009) regarding which factor may explain the variance ' 
premium. 
An important implication of this new stylized fact is that an understand-
ing of the volatility spread, and its relationship with the compensation for 
risk, demands an understanding of risk-neutral skewness. Intuitively, both 
the price of risk and the volatility spread are related to the risk-neutral 
skewness. The volatility spread has been linked to variance risk (Bakshi and 
Kapadia (2003), Bollerslev et al. (2008), Carr and Wu (2009)) or to a left-
skewed and fat-tailed returns distribution (Bakshi and Madan (2006), Poli-
menis (2006)).1 While these different channels explain the volatility spread, 
they do not have the same implications for risk-neutral skewness. This should 
help discriminate across competing theories of the observed volatility spread. 
Clearly, understanding the source of risk-neutral skewness is a key research 
objective. 
As a further check for the importance of risk-neutral skewness, we test 
l Bakshi and Madan conclude that historical skewness do not play an important role in 
the determination of the volatility spread but they do not consider risk-neutral skewness. 
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its pricing implications for option contracts written on the SP500 index. We 
consider the simple HG model and variants analogous to the practitioner's 
version of the BSM model [P-BSM and P-HG]. We interpret these variants 
as expansions around the HG distributions but develop, and impose, restric-
tions ensuring the identification of the skewness parameter with the true 
underlying risk-neutral skewness. OveraU, HG-based models significantly im-
prove in-sample and out-of-sample performances relative to Gaussian-based 
models but with the same number parameters or less. They also increase 
hedging performances at horizons up to 4 weeks. 
The results imply that expanding around the Gaussian density is restric-
tive and does not offer sufficient flexibility to match the skewness implicit 
in the data. Another way to view the evidence is to consider the results 
of Bates (2005) and Alexander and Nogueira (2005). EssentiaUy, for any 
contingent claim that is homogenous of degree one, option partial deriva-
tives with respect to the underlying can be computed, model-free, by taking 
partial derivatives of option prices with respect to strike prices. In practice, 
however, a parametric model is fitted to observed prices from which deriva-
tives can be imputed. The relative hedging performances of the P-BSM and 
of the P-HG models imply that accounting for skewness explicitly offers a 
better fit of the option price curve across the strike continuum, and a better 
fit of the true underlying option sensitivities. Still, the improvements come 
with no increase in implementation costs. 
Next, we introduce the implied volatility and skewness surface, an ex-
tension of the implied volatility curve. Beyond its simplicity and ease- of 
computation, the BSM's implied volatility [IV] curves deliver transparent 
comparisons of options through time and across strike prices. Repeating the 
inversion of the IV curve across values of skewness delivers the implied volatil-
ity and skewness surface. The surface provides a transparent understanding 
of IV curve variations in term of skewness. We find that the volatility-
skewness relationship is smooth in practice: negative (positive) skewness 
increases (decreases) the implied volatility of out-of-the-money [OTM] caUs 
and decreases (increases) the implied volatility of in-the-money [ITM] caUs. 
We draw two important conclusions. First, the HG model can restore the 
symmetry of the observed IV curve. Second, the level of the IV curve also 
depends on skewness. 
Finally, we study the term structure of implied volatility, skewness and 
excess kurtosis. This is a first step to understand the impact of time de-
pendence on risk-neutral moments. The HG model delivers estimates of 
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risk-neutral volatility and risk-neutral skewness at longer horizons than a 
non-parametric approach. The evidenee suggests that skewness decays at a 
rate slower than what implied by the i.i.d. assumption. In other words, the 
time-dependenee structure of returns has a larger impact on the term struc-
ture of skewness skewness than on volatility and kurtosis. To our knowledge, 
this differential impact of returns time-dependenee on higher moments has 
never been documented. 
Related Litemture 
The stylized observations that IV curves typically .display a smile, a 
skewed smile or a smirk have been interpreted as evidenee of skewness and 
kurtosis in the underlying risk-neutral distribution of stock priee (e.g. Ru-
binstein and Jackwerth (1998) ). In practiee, the importanee of skewness for 
pricing stock index options has been highlighted in the empirical works of 
Bakshi et al. (1997), Bates (2000) and Christoffersen et al. (2006). Bowever, 
it is generally difficult to invert option priees and obtain estimates of implied 
volatility or implied skewness. In most cases, volatility and skewness are not 
inde pendent or, else, option priees are not available in closed-form, rendering 
inversion computationally expensive. Then, although the increased sophis-
tication allows for a better fit of observed IV curves, our understanding of 
skewness remains incomplete. In particular, the linkages between skewness, 
implicit from option priees, the risk premium, measured from equity returns, 
and the volatility spread remains elusive. The i.i.d. case leads to a stylized 
model but allows us to maintain parsimony and analytical tractability. 
Option pricing based on a Gram-Charlier expansion also offers direct 
parametrization of skewness and kurtosis (Jarrow and Rudd (1982), Corrado 
and Su (1996), Pott ers et al. (1998)). However, approximations of the und er-
lying risk-neutral density often turn negative implying that estimated values 
of cumulants do not belong to a true distribution. Jondeau and Rockinger 
(2001) offer a natural remedy and impose a positivity constraint on the es-
timated density. This is not innocuous. The range of admissible skewness 
values is restrictive for option pricing applications. 2 Finally, models based 
on Gram-Charlier do not provide a change of measure linking the historical 
and risk-neutral measure.3 
2.Jondeau and Rockinger (2001) establish that their restriction imply that skewness 
takes values within (-1.0493, 1.0493). Leon et al. (2006) establishes the impact of this 
restriction for option pricing. 
3Note also that closed-form option priees typically result from a Iirst-order approxi-
mation. This may not be relevant in practice for option pricing but the impact of this 
approximation on estimates of implied skewness has not been discussed. 
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Bakshi and Madan (2000) provide a non-parametric measure of skew-
ness (and other higher-order moments) implicit from option prices. This 
was exploited by Bakshi et al. (2003), who focus on measures of skewness in 
the cross-section and on the link with index skewness. Dennis and Mayhew 
(2000) consider determinants of the cross-section of skewness and Rompolis 
and Tzavalis (2008) attribute the bias in volatility regressions to the risk-
neutral skewness. Christoffersen et al. (2008) explores the information con-
tent of option data for future stock betas. However, the pricing or hedging 
implications of skewness for option prices cannot be handled within this 
model-free framework. 4 
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section II introduces the Ho-
moscedastic Gamma model [HG] as weil as the SDF and contains the main 
asset pricing implications. In particular, it contains the mapping between 
parameters under each measure and derives the option pricing function. Sec-
tion III presents the data. Section IV perform regression-based tests of the 
model's implications for the equity premium and the volatility spread, and 
discusses the results in the context of equilibrium model. We introduce a 
practitioner's analog in Section VI and compare in-sam pie , out-of-sample 
and hedging performances of HG and BSM-based models in Section VII. 
Section V explores the empirical properties of the implied volatility and 
skewness surface while Section VIII provides estimates of the term structure 
of volatility, skewness and kurtosis. Section IX concludes. 
II The Homoscedastic Gamma Model 
This section introduces the Homoscedastic Gamma model for stock returns. 
The model possesses three crucial properties that makes it a natural choice 
to study the linkages between the equity premium, the volatility spread and 
skewness. First, skewness is parameterized directly and is independent of 
the mean and variance. Second, its density and characteristic functions are 
known in closed-form. Third, the distribution of returns remains HG for 
ail investment horizons under both the historical and the risk-neutral prob-
ability measures whenever the SDF is exponential in aggregate wealth. In 
particular, this delivers an explicit mapping between moments under each 
measures. Finally, we obtain closed-form prices for European options of any 
4Note, also, that this approach requires approximations of integrals over the moneyness 
domain. Although Dennis and Mayhew (2000) consider theimpact of sampling error under 
the nul! of the BSM model, the accuracy of skewness estimates areunknown in the presence 
of measurement errors or in a non-gaussian setup. 
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maturity as a function of volatility and skewness. We can then efficiently 
invert option prices to obtain implied volatility and skewness surfaces. In-
deed, when setting skewness to zero our model simplifies to the BSM and we 
recover the usual BSM implied volatility curve. 
A Returns Under the Risk-Neutral Measure 
We assume that stock prices, St, follow a discrete-time pro cess whereas 
the logarithm of gross returns, Rt, over an interval of time Do, say, follows 
ln (St+~/ St) = f.L* Do + V (7*2Do é;+~ 
SG(o.* (Do)), 
(3.1) 
under the risk-neutral measure where f.L* and (7*2 are the risk-neutral drift 
and variance, respectively. Return innovations, é;+~, follow a Standardized 
Gamma [SG] distribution with zero mean, unit variance and skewness 0.*. 
The SG distribution is defined in terms of the Gamma distribution, f(k, 0), 
as 2 2 (4) X rv SG(o.) {::} -(X + -) rv f 2,1 , 
a. a. a. 
(3.2) 
where the scale parameter is fixed to 0 = 1. Given that the Gamma definition 
has mean kO, variance k02 and skewness 2/,jk, it follows that one-period 
returns in the HG model have mean f.L* Do, variance (7*2 Do and skewness o.*(Do). 
We express skewness as function of Do to reflect the choice of the interval's 
length. A key simplifying assumption is that the conditional distribution of 
returns does not vary through time. Still, the model could be thought as 
holding conditionally, with parameters f.Lt, (7t and o.t indexed by time. 
R Returns Under The Historical Measure 
We provide a change of measure for which the historical distribution of 
stock returns also belongs to the HG family. The result holds when the 
SDF is exponential-affine in aggregate wealth returns, which is the case in 
economies with power utility. Under this assumption, we obtain transparent 
interpretations of risk-neutral moments in terms of the historical moments 
and of the compensation for risk. In the HG case, the risk-neutral volatility is 
greater than the historical volatility when the equity premium is positive and 
skewness is negative. AIso, the volatility spread increases with the equity 
premium and with the negative asymmetry of returns. When skewness is 
zero, and returns are Gaussian, only the me an is shifted and the variance is 
the same under both measures. 
First, assume that aggregate returns follow a HG distribution under the 
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historical measure 
(3.3) 
where Ct+~ "" SDG(ex(6.)). Next, define the SDF as 
Mt = exp (-v (6.) Ct + \li (v (6.))), (3.4) 
for sorne v and where \li is the logarithm of the conditional moment generat-
ing function of va2 6. Ct+~. Then, this SDF defines an Equivalent Martingale 
Measure (EMM), under which the discounted stock priee is a martingale, for 
a unique v, as stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 If stock returns follo'w Equation 3.3 and if the Stochastic 
Discount Factor belongs to the class defined by Equation 3.4 for some v, 
then, this SDF defines an Equivalent Martingale Measure for discounted stock 
priees if and only if 
v(6.) = 2 9 (6.) 
ex (6.) v' 0'26. + 9 (6.) - 1 ' (3.5) 
where 
(6.) _ (_ (Ji. - r)6. (6.)2 ex (6.) ~) 9 - exp 4 (} + 2 ' . 
See the Appendix for all proofs. This is a direct application of results from 
Christoffersen et al. (2009). Note that the priee of risk, v(6.), converges to 
the usual result, (Ji. - r) /0'2, when skewness tends to zero. AIso, this result 
does not imply that the EMM is itself unique but that only one solution 
exists within the class defined by Equation 3.4. 
The following Proposition establishes that stock returns are HG under 
both measures and characterizes the link between parameters of returns dy-
namics under each measure. 
Proposition 2 If stock returns under the risk-neutral measure follow Equa-
tion 3.3 and if the Stochastic Discount Factor is as in Equation 3.4 for v 
given in Proposition 1 then stock returns are given by Equation 3.2 and 3.3 
under the risk-neutral and the historical measure, respectively, with ct = 
êt E~tlêtl and where parameters under both measures are linked as 
g(/3(~» 1 
/3(~)g(/3(~» 
0'* -a 
IL + 2 a*(~)JK 
a(~) 
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where we use /3(~) = a(~) to simplify the notation. Note that we have 
0'* --> a and IL* --> IL + !O'2 when a a* --> O. 
Due to risk-aversion and non-normality in returns, the risk-neutral volatility 
differs from its historical counterpart at any horizon. The volatility spread 
depends on the degree of returns asymmetry, a( ~) and the degree of risk 
aversion through the risk-premium, (IL r), implicit in g(.). Whenever skew-
ness is negative and the equity premium is positive, the risk-neutral volatility 
is greater than the historical volatility (i.e. 0'* > a). These results are consis-
tent with Bakshi and Madan (2006) and Polimenis (2006). Finally, because 
of the specific choiee of SDF, the risk neutral skewness is the same as the 
historical skewness.5 
To see the relationship between v and skewness, consider a first-order 
expansion of Equation 3.5 around a(~) O. For small deviations around 
the symmetrie case we have 
) 2 (1"4 r + ï2 {3(~) 
0'3 . , (3.6) 
Note that v (~) tends toward the usual result, , when skewness ap--
proaches zero. Then, as expected, v can be interpreted as the priee of risk. 
Moreover, it is a function of the equity risk premium, of the volatility and 
of skewness. 
Another way to see the link between the equity premium and the volatil-
ity spread is to note that 
where the middle term converges to zero as skewness approaches zero.6 Tak-
50ne can show that an SOF exists such that the returns distribution belongs to the HG 
family under both measures with both the variance and the skewness parameter shifted. 
However, this SOP i8 not in general within the exponential-affine c\ass and the link between 
moments is not transparent. 
6In the limit, as skewness becomes zero, stock returns follow the usual square-root 
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ing expectations and re-arranging reveals the following important restriction 
between the equity premium, the volatility spread and the risk-neutral skew-
ness, 
In the HG model, the volatility spread is solely due to the presence of 
skewness and not to volatility being priced. Indeed, the volatility spread and 
the equity premium increase when skewness is more negative. In particular, 
regressions of excess returns on the ratio of the volatility spread to skewness 
should be more informative than the spread itself. Moreover, the constant is 
zero and the predicted value for the coefficients is -2. This provides a simple 
test that we implement below. 
C Option Priees 
We are now ready to provide a dosed-form price for European style 
contingent daims on a stock. This simple homoscedastic model is stable 
under temporal aggregation. That is, if returns over two successive intervals 
foUow a SDG distribution then returns over the sum of the intervals also 
foUow a SDG distribution. This is a key property to obtain dosed-form 
option prices for all maturities. Consider (log) stock returns over an arbitrary 
investment horizon H. Define M == if as the number of time steps over this 
horizon. Then, 
Rt,M == ~~1 Rt+j~ = In(St+~M / St) 
= J-L* M ~ + Œ*) ~M E;,M' 
where the return innovation, E; M' is given by7 
, 
M E* 
E;,M == L t~ '" SDG(a*(~)/vM). 
j=l yM 
A no-arbitrage price, Ct(K, H), of a European caU option with strike 
price K and maturity H can be obtained from the discounted risk-neutral 
expectation of the terminal payoff, 
Ct(K, H) = E? [exp( -rH) max (St+H - K,O)]. 
As usual, the solution is function of the other model parameters: the risk-
process. 
7This follows directly from the fact that the Gamma distribution is summable. 
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free rate, r, the risk-neutral volatility, u*(6), and the scaled skewness (3(6). 
Moreover, the solution depends on the direction of asymmetry. Specifically, 
the case with no skewness corresponds to the BSM formula while we have 
the following proposition otherwise. 
Proposition 3 If the logarithm of gross stock returns foltows a Homoseedas-
tic Gamma process under the risk-neutral measure, as in Equation 3.2, then 
the priee of a European calt option is 
(3.8) 
where, if the skewness is negative (i.e. a(6) < 0), 
CI,t P ((3(~)2,dl(6)) (3.9) 
C2,t = P ((3(~)2' d2 (6)) , (3.10) 
and, if the skewness is positive, (i.e. a(6) > 0), 
CI,t Q ((3(~)2,dl(6)) (3.11) 
C2,t = Q ((3(~)2' d2(6)) , (3.12) 
The functions P(a, z) and Q(a, z) are the regularized gamma functions8 de-
fined by 
P(a, z) 
Q(a, z) = 
l'(a,z) 
f(a) 
f(a, z) 
f(a) , 
respectively, with l'(a, z) and f(a, z) the upper and the lower incomplete 
gamma functions9 and where dl and d2 are defined as 
ln(K/St ) - (ri + In(1-~t~~~'(~))) H 
(3(6)u*(6) 
d2(6)(1 - (3(6)u*(6)). 
8We use the standard notation for the regularized gamma functions, P(a, z) and 
Q(a, z), possibly at the cost of sorne confusion with the usual notations for the histor-
ical and risk-neutral probability measures P and Q. 
9Note that we have P(a, z) + Q(a, z) = 1, which is a convenient property when com-
puting derivatives (see below). 
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III Data 
This section introduces the data and presents sorne summary statistics. We 
use prices of call options on the S&P500 index observed on each Wednesday 
in the period from 1996 to 2004. Using Wednesday observations is common . 
practice in the literature (e.g. Dumas et al. (1998)) to limit the impact of 
holidays and day-of-the-week effects. Consequently, the return horizon in 
Equation 3.2 is set to one week in the following. We exclude observations 
with less than 2 weeks to maturity, no bid available or with zero transaction 
volume. We also filter observations for violation of upper and lower pricing 
bounds on call prices. 
Next, we introduce a second sample that group option prices at the 
monthly frequency. This reduces the noise in the estimates of volatility 
and skewness used in excess returns regressions. Another benefit of this ap-
proach is that it ensures enough observations to estimate our model in each 
maturity group. This allows us to draw the implied volatility and skew-
ness surface in different maturity groups and, as a byproduct, to obtain a 
term structure of skewness and volatility. To group observations, we use set-
tlement dates rather than calendar months. Since each contract settles on 
the third Friday of a month, we group all observations intervening between 
two successive settlement dates. lO AU weekly observations occurring within 
su ch a sub-period can be unambiguously attributed to one maturity group. 11 
Note that settlement dates follow a regular pattern though time: contracts 
are available for 3 successive months and then for the next 3 months in the 
March, June, September, December cycle. This leads to maturity groups 
with 1, 2 or 3 months remaining to settlement and then between 3 and 6, 
between 6 and 9, and between 9 and 12 months remaining to settlement.12 
Table 1 displays the number of contracts, the average call price and 
the average implied volatility across moneyness (Panel (a)), across maturity 
(Panel (b)), and a detailed cross-tabulation across moneyness and maturity 
(Panel (c)). The Black-Scholes IV curve is asymmetric in the overall sam-
pIe, displaying a rising pattern with moneynesss, and signaling a sharp left 
skew in the risk-neutral distribution of returns. AIso, the IV curve is fiat, or 
lOThese subperiods have varying length depending on the (calendar) months they coyer. 
llTake any contract, on any observation date. This contract is assigned to the I-month 
maturity group if its settlement date occurs on the following third-Friday, to the 2-month 
group if it occurs on the next to following third-Friday, etc. 
12Within a given month, and within a given maturity group, the same contract (i.e. 
same strike price) is observed with successively shorter maturities. However it is priced 
consistently under the null of i.i.d. returns innovations throughout the month. 
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slightly decreasing, with maturity. Disaggregation reveals variations in the 
shape of the IV curve at different maturities. Starting from the shortest ma-
turity, the IV curve initially follows an asymmetric smile with higher volatil-
ity values for in-the-money options. Hereafter, the asymmetry increases as 
we consider longer maturities and the (average) IV curve eventually becomes 
monotone in moneyness for the longer maturities. 
Note that the composition of the sam pIe varies with maturities. Out-of-
the-money contracts dominate for long maturities while in-the-money con-
tracts dominate for short maturities. This is due to the issuanee pattern of 
new option contracts. Newly issued, long-maturity call options are typically 
deep-out-the-money, in anticipation of the index upward drift through time. 
As we consider shorter maturities, the composition becomes more balaneed. 
At the shortest horizon, most call options are deep in-the-money, since the 
exchange does not regularly issue short horizon out-of-the-money call op-
tions. This implies that the average IV curve reflects, in part, a composi-
tion bias with most in-the-money options having short maturities and most 
out-of-the-money options having long maturities. Bec~use short maturity 
options have higher implied volatility on average, this makes the average IV 
curve more smirked. 13 Finally, Panel (a) of Figure 3.1 presents the number of· 
available observations for each day, which averages around 40 and typically 
ranges between 20 and 50 contracts. Panel (b) de composes this number and 
presents the proportion of contracts in each moneyness category. 
IV The Volatility Spread And The Equity Premium 
A Model's Implications 
When the representative SDF can be approximated by the exponential-
shi ft given in Equation 3.4 we have a tight link between the priee of risk, the 
volatility spread and skewness. After sorne manipulation of Equation 3.7, 
we obtain 
(i) (i) _ CT*(i) - CT(i) *(i) * 
ln (St+d St) - r - wt - -2 (i) + CT CHi' 
Œt 
13This highlights the importance of using a model that can handle maturity differences. 
In particular, models based on density approximation are not robust to this composition 
effect. 
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for an investment horizon i and where r(i) is the risk-free rate for that hori-
zon and Wt is the Jensen adjustment term. 14 In the following, we test this 
implication of the HG model and its ability to capture the volatility spread 
and the equity premium. We perform regressions of SP500 (log) excess re-
turns on the ratio of the volatility spread to skewness. The key predictions 
are that the constant should be zero and that the coefficient should be -2. 
B Aggregating Data 
We obtain estimates of risk-neutral volatility and skewness from option 
data. Estimates of skewness for different maturities are noisy in weekly data. 
This is in part due to the number of option priees available each week in each 
category. One simple solution is to group priee observations at the monthly 
level where we define a month as the period between successive expiration 
dates which occur every third Friday (See Section III). Within each month, 
we have repeated observations of the same contracts over a period of 4 (or 
5) weeks. 15 This implicitly assumes i.i.d. return innovations throughout a 
month, which is consistent with the model and reasonable over this short 
time span. It also implies that the maturity date of each contract is constant 
throughout each month and, thus, that the skewness estimate pertains to a 
set of contracts that mature at fixed maturities. Finally, we measure the 
historical volatility using the observed realized volatility. 
We estimate our preferred version of the model each month through mini-
mization of squared pricing errors.16 Figure 3.2 presents the time series of our 
volatility estimates (Panel (a)) and of our skewness estimates (Panel (b)). 
Skewness typically varies around -1 but dipped close to -2.5 in the summer 
of 1998 and in the second half of 1999, and slightly below 1.5 in the Fall of 
1996 and the Spring of 2004. 
C Implied Skewness And The Risk Premia 
Table II presents the results from regressions of excess returns at horizons 
of 1, 3, 6, 12, 24 and 36 months on the ratio of the volatility spread to 
14This term is a function of both skewness and volatility but the first term of its Taylor 
expansion is the usual correction in the Gaussian case, ~a2. 
15Some contracts are not observed each Wednesday within a month. New contracts 
become available to participants as the index moves away from the range of available strike 
priees. Also, sorne contracts are not available each week because they were excluded from 
the weekly sample due to liquidity concerns. 
16Specifically, we estimate a restricted version of the practitioner's HG model that allow 
for kurtosis but maintain the identification of the risk-neutral volatility and skewness (See 
Section VII). As a robustness check (not reported) we repeated the exercise using skewness 
estimated from the simple HG model presented above. The results are not qualitatively 
different. 
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skewness. 17 The results are striking. Point estimates for the slope coefficient 
are close to -2 as predicted by the model. Mo reover , at horizons of 3, 6, and 
12 months, where we would expect the forward-Iooking nature of the option-
implied estimate to be the most relevant, estimates are -2.24, -2.04 and -2.13, 
respectively. In fact, at any horizon, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the coefficient is equal to -2. Next, the constant is not significantly 
difIerent from zero so that the two most important implications of the model 
cannot be rejected empirically. Finally, the predictability of excess returns 
is low at the 1-month horizon (i.e. R2 is 1.85%) but rises steadily with the 
horizon, reaching 5.6%,9.7% and 11.3% at horizons of6, 12 and 36 months. 
For comparison with results available in the existing literature, we also 
consider regressions on the volatility spread which displays sorne predictive 
power at horizons of 9 and 12 months. However, coefficients are not sig-
nificant at other horizons. Finally, we ask if the volatility spread contains 
information beyond that revealed by the volatility to skewness ratio. The 
results from the regressions are presented in Table II. Sinee volatility and 
the ratio of the volatility spread to skewness are correlated, the coefficients 
become unreliable, even changing signs. However, their combined predictive 
power does not rise above that of the volatility to skewness ratio, further 
supporting the implications of the model. 
D Discussion 
We can also interpret the results in the broader context of a general 
equilibrium model. There, the priee of risk is determined by preference 
parameters. In particular, in an economy with power utility, v corresponds 
to the risk-aversion parameter (see e.g. Bakshi et al. (2003)) which can be 
estimated given estimates ofthe risk premium, J.l-r, and return volatility, a, 
obtained from observed returns data. Equation 3.6, which is repeated here, 
shows that ignoring skewness (the last term) leads to upward bias in the 
estimate of the priee of risk and, henee, of risk aversion. Intuitively, when 
agents are risk-averse, and the risk premium is positive, a more negative 
value of skewness corresponds to an increase in the quantity of risk: the 
probability of lower returns increases. Then accounting for skewness reduces 
17precisely, our measures of risk-neutral moments pertain only to the distribution of re-
turns at a horizons of 12 months or less. Nonetheless, if these moments exhibit persistence, 
their predictive power will extend to longer horizons as is indeed the case 
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the priee of risk required to fit the observed equity premium and, ultimately, 
leads to lower estimates of risk aversion in the economy. 
Note that the effect of skewness is economically significant. Sinee 1980, 
the sample me an and volatility of one-year returns is 14.72% and 6.13%, 
respectively, and the first term of Equation 3.6 is equal to 20.5. In other 
words, if risk is summarized by the volatility of market returns, then the 
equity premium appears too large and leads to excessively high estimates of 
the coefficient of risk aversion. However, the coefficient of skewness, a, in 
the last term is 12.88. For a value of skewness, say, of -1, the estimate of the 
priee of risk is 7.63, less than half than if we ignore the impact of skewness. 
Moreover, the estimates of skewness we obtain below are often lower than 
-1. 
The results shows the linkages implied by the HG model between the 
equity premium, the volatility spread and the skewness hold (Equation 3.7). 
This suggests that an understanding of the volatility spread and of the eq-
uity premium demands an understanding of the determinants of skewness. 
Moreover, it shows that properly conditioning on implied skewness is key to 
deciphering the information content of options priees for future returns. In 
fact, reversing the relationship, and interpreting the volatility spread as the 
returns on a specifie portfolio of options, 
we see that a version of the CAPM conditional on skewness "explains" the 
returns on the volatility spread portfolio. This offers an answer to the ques-
tion posed in Carr and Wu (2009) which asks what factor may explain the 
volatility spread. 
Our results contrast with existing results (e.g. Bakshi and Kapadia (2003), 
Bollerslev et al. (2008)) where the spread is linked to varianee risk being 
prieed. In our model, the asymmetry in returns shifts the risk premium and 
the risk-neutral volatility. This induees the link between the volatility spread 
and the equity premium. Similarly, Polimenis (2006) and Bakshi and Madan 
(2006) link the volatility spread to higher order moments of the historical 
distribution. From the tight linkages we uncover, we conclude that an under-
standing of the volatility spread, and its relationship with the compensation 
for risk, demands an understanding of skewness variations. In particular, 
this new stylized fact should help discriminate across competing theories of 
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the observed volatility spread.18 
V Implied Volatility and Skewness Surface 
In the context of the BSM model, it was recognized early that inverting 
option priees for the volatility parameter provided a good measure of future 
returns volatility. However, the HG model offers a separate parametrization 
for volatility and skewness allowing us to easily measure both the volatility 
and skewness implicit in option prices. 19 In this section, we study the trade-
offs involved between volatility and skewness when fitting option prices. We 
first analyze how the implied volatility curve varies across different values of 
skewness and, second, how the implied skewness curve varies with volatility. 
The results are intuitive. The impact of skewness on implied volatility is 
asymmetric, depending both on the sign of skewness and of moneyness. In 
particular, negative skewness tilt a smirked IV curve toward a symmetric 
smile. On the other hand, the impact of volatility on implied skewness 
displays a more complex pattern. 
An important conclusion from this section is that the HG model exhibits 
enough fiexibility to restore the symmetry of the volatility smile. In other 
words, variations of the IV curve can be interpreted directly in term of 
skewness within the HG model. Moreover, both the level and the shape 
of the IV curve are sensitive to the choice of the skewness parameter. In 
particular, this implies that empirical studies of the volatility spread based 
on BSM implied volatility are affected by measurement errors due to the 
impact of skewness. 
A Inveriing The Implied Volatility and Skewness Surface 
Volatility and skewness cannot be inverted uniquely from a single option 
priee. Instead, for each strike priee, the HG model implies a function de-
scribing the set of volatility and skewness pairs matching the observed priee: 
a volatility-skewness curve. This is in contrast with the BSM model where 
any given option priee can be inverted uniquely for the volatility parameter. 
Of course, if the HG model is true, using options with different strike priees 
would identify uniquely a volatility-skewness couple. In fact, only two dif-
18Bakshi and Madan (2006) conclude that the historical skewness plays a relatively 
sm ail role in the determination of volatility spread but they did not consider risk-neutral 
skewness. 
19See Bates (1995) for a review of the literature on the forecasting of volatility using 
option priees and Andersen et al. (2005) for a review of volatility measurement from stock 
returns. See Kim and White (2003) for a discussion of the lack of robustness of the usual 
sample skewness estimator 
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ferent strike priees would be sufficient for this purpose. In practiee, the HG 
model extends the BSM model in only one direction, allowing for a skew-
ness parameter. Other deviations from the underlying assumptions cause 
the volatility-skewness curve to vary across moneyness in such a way that no 
unique couple can match every observed priee. Thus, in the HG model, the 
counterpart to the IV curve is the implied volatility and skewness surface. 
This surfaee is the representation of the set of volatility and skewness pairs 
matching the observed option priees for varying strike priees. 
To draw the volatility and skewness surfaee, we first pick a value of skew-
ness from a grid. Then, each day and for each available strike priee, we invert 
the option priee for the volatility parameter and obtain an implied volatility 
curve. As we vary the value of skewness we obtain different IV curves and, 
together, they yield an implied volatility and skewness surfaee. A section of 
this surfaee at a given value of skewness is one possible IV curve. Each day, 
these different IV curves are alternative, and equivalent, representations of 
the data. Each embodies ail the information about the distribution of returns 
and, in addition, measurement errors due to transaction costs, illiquidity and 
asynchronous trading. The next section provides the results. 
B Impact Of Skewness on Implied Volatility Curves 
The average volatility-skewness surface is given in Figure 3.3 in level 
(Panel (a)) and in pereentage deviations from the benchmark BSM IV curve 
(Panel (b)). Panel (a) displays the usual smirk in the IV curve wh en skewness 
is zero. More interestingly, it shows that the average IV curve is fiat for values 
of skewness around _1. 20 Next, consider the deviations from the BSM curve 
in Panel (b). The case with skewness equal to zero corresponds to a straight 
line at zero. As we consider values of skewness away from zero, the IV curve 
is tilted one way or another depending on the sign of return asymmetry 
considered. For negative values of skewness, the IV curve is tilted toward 
positive values of moneyness. Conversely, for positive values of skewness, the 
IV curve is tilted toward negative values of moneyness. In other words, as we 
shi ft probability mass toward the left (right) tail of the return distribution, 
the implied volatilities required to match observed priees increase (decrease) 
for out-of-the-money calls and decreases (increases) for in-the-money calls 
thereby tilting the IV curve back toward a symmetric smile. In the extreme 
cases, allowing for non-zero skewness can rai se or decrease measured implied 
volatility by more than 15% relative to the BSM case. Clearly, the HG model 
20The curve is not strictly fiat and this may be due to the impact of kurtosis, or to a 
composition effect. We discuss these possibilities below. 
is sufficiently flexible to capture the skewness implicit in option priees. 
C Results For Different Option Maturities 
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Next, Figures 3.4 (a)-(e) present implied volatility and skewness surfaees 
within different maturity groups while Figures 3.5 (a)-(e) report the same re-
sults but in pereentage deviations from BSM values. Starting with skewness 
equal to zero, which corresponds to the BSM case, we see the the shape of IV 
curve varies substantially across maturities. As discussed in section III, the 
average BSM IV curve is a slightly asymmetric smile for short maturities: 
implied volatility obtained from in-the-money options is higher than for out-
of-the-money options. The smile then gradually disappears as we increase 
maturity and the IV curve eventually becomes smirked. For negative values 
of skewness, and for any maturity, the IV curve is tilted toward a symmetric 
smile. For short maturities, small negative values of skewness ar sufficient 
to establish a symmetric smile. As we increase maturity, however, more 
negative values are neeessary. Looking at deviations from the case with zero 
skewness (Figure 3.5) we see that the impact of a given variation in skewness 
decreases as we increase maturity. 
D Impact Of Volatility On Implied Skewness 
Figures 3.6 (a)-(f) present implied values for skewness across different 
values of implied volatility. For at-the-money options, there is no tradeoff 
between volatility and skewness. However, t,he impact of volatility on implied 
skewness is asymmetric and highly nonlinear on both sides of the moneyness 
spectrum. As the volatility of returns decreases, and the probability mass 
is closer to the mean, the skewness value required to match observed priee 
increases for out-of-the-money options, implying a higher right-tail, but de-
creases for in-the-money options, implying a lower left-tail. The reverse is 
true when we increase the value of volatility. In both cases the impact is not 
monotonie as we move away.from at-the-money. Rather, the pattern follows 
a sharp V-shape, or inverted V-shape, where changes of volatility have no 
impact on implied skewness for at-the-money options, the largest impact for 
intermediate moneyness, and a lower impact for distant moneyness. This 
is likely an indication of a trade-off between the skewness and the kurto-
sis in the HG distribution to match observed priees. Finally, the impact of 
volatility on implied skewness rises with the option maturity. 
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VI Practitioner's Models 
The previous section shows that the implied volatility and skewness surface 
can be described as the smooth tilting of the IV curve across values of skew-
ness. However, while the HG model provides enough flexibility to match 
the skewness present in option data, the IV curve typically remains slightly 
curved. This is may due to excess kurtosis2l and may bias our estimates 
of skewness. In this section, we propose HG-based option pricing formula 
that are robust to the presence of excess kurtosis. Intuitively, we consider 
one-term expansions of the HG model that allow for kurtosis. This results is 
the analog of rationalizations of the P-BSM model as a two-term expansion 
around the Gaussian density. 
The practitioner's variants of the BSM model [P-BSM] and of the HG 
model [P-HG] càpture deviations from the Gaussian or HG distributions by 
modeling volatility as a quadratic function of moneyness. That is, in the 
P-BSM case, we have 
and, in the P-HG case, we have 
where ç is moneyness and a and K are the skewness and excess kurtosis of 
the risk-neutral distribution, respectively. 
The practitioner's IV curve smooths through the cross-section of option 
prices, ignores local idiosyncracies and focuses on the impact of higher-order 
moments. This approach is pervasive because of its empirical performance 
and, also, because its parameters (i.e. aQ, /1 and /2) are usually interpreted 
in terms of the variance, skewness and kurtosis of the true underlying risk-
neutral distribution. For these reasons, parameters of the IV curve are com-
monly estimated without restrictions. In the following, we document that 
estimates of aQ, /1, and /2 vary when we allow for skewness. This contrasts 
with the usual interpretation of /1 as a measure of skewness. The remainder 
of the section provides restrictions on parameters of the IV function such 
that we can recover direct estimates of a and K from option priees. 
21In contrast with the Gaussian case, the kurtosis of the HG distribution varies with 
parameter values. Its kurtosis is proportional to the square of the skewness. 
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A Unconstrained IV Curves 
We evaluate empirically the impact of skewness on estimated IV curves. 
To do so, fix the value of Œ and estimate the P-HG model at each date. That 
is, choose values of 0'0, Il and 12 that minimized squared pricing errors. 
Next, average the unconstrained estimates through time. Finally, repeat the 
exercise for different values of skewness and trace the relationships between 
. skewness and estimates of 0'0, Il and ,2 . For simplicity we define 
c = In(SjK)(-rT) 
." iJ'JT' 
and group maturities. 
Figure 3.7 presents the results. Panel (a) presents average estimates of 
0'0. For contracts maturing at the next settlement date, at-the-money im-
plied volatility is 20% on average when skewness is zero. When skewness 
decreases to -3, estimates of at-the-value volatility increase to 23%. Intu-
itively, shifting sorne probability mass toward one side of the distribution 
involves a trade-off for pricing in-the-money versus out-the-money options. 
For a constant level of skewness, this tension can be reduced by an increase 
in the level of volatility. A similar pattern occurs at longer maturities, but 
the impact of skewness gradually decreases. Panel (b) presents the results 
for the asymmetry parameter. In line with intuition we find that il varies 
linearly with the value of f3 : both parameters are measures of the under-
lying skewness. Finally, Panel 3.8c shows that i2 also varies substantially 
with skewness but the relationship is not linear. 22 
The impact of skewness on the IV curve parameter implies that the infor-
mation on the underlying risk-neutral moments will be shared across unre-
stricted parameters estimates. Furthermore, the fact that estimates of Œ and 
of Il are (linearly) correlated suggests that they are poorly idéntified. The 
following section introduces a framework which le'ad to restrictions on 0'0, Il 
and 12 such that only â can capture the risk-neutral skewness. Absent these 
restrictions, parameters of the IV curve capture sorne of the asymmetry in 
the underlying distribution leading to biased estimates of Œ. The unambigu-
22This contrasts with the theoretical results ofZhang and Xiang (2005). They argue that 
in the Gaussian case and up to a first-order approximation ao({J, /';;) is linear in the risk-
neutral volatility, 'Y1 ({J, /';;) is linear in skewness, and 'Y2({J, /';;) is linear in kurtosis. However, 
they assume that the skewness and excess kurtosis of the underlying distribution can be 
chosen independently while in fact there is a tight link between the two for any given 
correctly specified density. Moreover, they linearize around the case where a = 0 and this 
may lead to a poor approximation. 
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ous identification of skewness is necessary to provide a measure of the risk 
premia from implied volatility and skewness and to evaluate the impact of 
skewness on option prices.23 
B HG Madel With Excess Kurtosis 
We now provide a rigorous justification of the P-HG model when the 
true distribution displays excess kurtosis. We can characterize sufficient 
restrictions on the parameters of the IV curve su ch that /3 is identified as 
the risk-neutral skewness in this more general model as weIl. In this context, 
parameters of the IV curve are restricted to (known) functions of excess 
kurtosis. In other words, any deviation from a fiat IV curve can only be 
linked to deviations of K from zero. As a by-product, we obtain an estimator 
of the kurtosis in excess of the Gamma distribution. 
Intuitively, we assume that the true density of returns can be represented 
by an Edgeworth expansion around the Gamma distribution. This is similar 
to earlier work using the Gaussian distribution (Jarrow and Rudd (1982), 
Corrado and Su (1996)) but the Gamma distribution allows an exact match 
of the first three moments. We then impose the equality of the option pricing 
formula under the true model and the P-HG model for at-the-money options. 
Suppose that the true evolution of stock returns under the risk neutral 
measure can be described as 
RT = (r - 5*) T + (7*.../Ty, 
where 5* is a risk-adjustment term, y is a random variable with mean zero, 
unit variance, skewness, a* and kurtosis, À *. We allow for non-normality 
beyond the HG and assume that the probability density of y is given by 
À * 3002 
f( ) = h() 2 - TT d
4h(y) 
Y Y + 4! dy4' (3.13) 
where h(y) is the standardized gamma density. This is a one-term Edgeworth 
expansion of standardized gamma distribution around the case with no excess 
kurtosis. If y is normally distributed, then a = 0 and 5 = 17;2 .This approach 
captures fat tails in excess of the Gamma distribution but ignores deviations 
beyond the fourth moment. Our objective here is to allow for a non-trivial 
implied volatility ari.d skewness surface due to excess kurtosis and to derive 
explicitly the function (70(K), 11(K) and 12(K). Proposition 4 builds on a 
23Note that merely imposing '/'1(0,11:) = 0 does not identify an estimator of 0 with 
skewness. 
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no-arbitrage argument and provides a closed-form characterization of option 
priees and of the risk-adjustment term. 
Proposition 4 If the logarithm of gross stock returns has the density given 
by Equation 3.13, then the priee of a caU option, C*(K, T), with maturity 
T, underlying priee So and strike priee K is 
C*(K,T) = SoP(a*,d~)-e-rT(1+T2(7*4K4)KP(a*,d;) 
T 2(7* 
+ Ke-rT K {3*3 [-h" (d;) + (7* {3* h' (d;) - (7*2 {3*2 h( d;) ] ' 
when {3 < 0 and 
C*(K, T) = SoQ (a*, di) - e-rT (1 + T 2(7*4 K4 ) KQ (a*, d;) 
T 2(7* 
- Ke- rT K {3*3 [-h" (d;) + (7* {3* h' (d;) - (7*2 {3*2 h( dm ' 
À2-~ 
when {3 > o. We define the exeess kurtosis, K = 41 T , and 
a* 
ln(K/So) - [r + ln(l,&a,B)] T + ln(1 + T 2(74K) 
(7{3 
where h is the density of the standard gamma distribution. 
C Identified practitioner's HG 
We are now looking for the restrictions on the parameters of the P-HG 
model such that estimation of {3 delivers a convergent estimate of the risk-
neutral skewness {3*. Zhang and Xiang (2005) provide the restriction for the 
case where the Gaussian density is used in the approximation. To find the 
link between the parameters of the P-HG model with parameters of the true 
distribution, we impose the following restrictions 
C*(K, T) 
8C*(K,T) 
8K 
82C*(K, T) 
8K2 
C(K,T) 
8C(K,T) 
8K 
82C(K,T) 
8K2 
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when evaluated at-the-money (i.e. K = SoerT ). These restrictions are given 
in the appendix but note that they are trivially satisfied whenever /<; = 0 
since in this case the HG model is true and the IV curve is fiat for some 
value of skewness. Of course this corresponds to the case ao = a, (3 = (3* 
and ')'1 = ')'2 = o. We linearize the restrictions around this point (i.e. /<; = 0) 
and obtain 
ao -a 
-- = Al(a,a)/<; 
a 
ao - a 
')'1 = Bl(a, a)-- + B2(a, a)/<; 
a 
ao - a 
')'2 = Cl(a,a)-- + C2(a,a),1 + C3 (a,a)/<;, 
a 
(3.14) 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
where the coefficients are given in the appendix.24 Then, small deviations of 
the underlying density from a HG distribution lead to deviations from a fiat 
implied volatility and skewness surface. This highlights the impact of excess 
kurtosis on the estimates of ao, ')'1 and ')'2. It also makes clear that deviations 
from a fiat IV curve are only due to excess kurtosis. More importantly, these 
restrictions ensure that a corresponds to the risk-neutral skewness and that 
the practitioner's HG model conforms to the true returns density. 
VII Option Pricing Results 
ln this section, we estimate each model and compare their performance. 
The results show that the HG framework substantially improves in-sample, 
hedging and out-of-sample performances. The improvements are robust if we 
impose identification of the skewness parameters, as discussed in the previous 
section. Indeed, the improvements remain when the only deviation from 
the simple HG model is a constant adjustment to kurtosis. Out-of-sample, 
imposing the identifying restrictions does not degrade pricing performance. 
ln other words, a fixed implied volatility and skewness surface combined 
with variations in skewness delivers most of the in-sample and out-of-sample 
improvements. We also compare the hedging performance of each model to 
highlight the importance of skewness. Again, allowing for varying skewness 
but fixing kurtosis provides significant improvement. 
Overall, our approach delivers a reliable measure of skewness while offer-
ing improved forecasting and hedging performance. In contrast, the P-BSM 
24We differ from Zhang and Xiang (2005) who linearize the restrictions around a = O. 
Arguably, linearizing around the HG distribution is likely to provide a better approxima-
tion than linearizing around the deterministic case. 
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model does not allow for sufficient flexibility to match the skewness implicit 
in the data and offers lower hedging and out-of-sample performance. While 
the more general models we consider perform better in-sample, these im-
provements disappear out-of-sample. This implies that skewness captures 
most of the persistent deviations from the Gaussian case and that excess 
kurtosis and other deviations are transitory. 
A Description Of Models 
We evaluate the basic HG model and the usual P-BSM model. We also 
include three different versions of the P-HG model based on the quadratic 
IV curve, 
where the first version, P-HG1, imposes the simple restriction that Il = O. 
This is another way to see that the usual interpretation of Il as a measure of 
skewness, while intuitive, is misleading. The second model, P-HG2, imposes 
the restrictions derived in the previous section and delivers an estimate of 
skewness robust to excess kurtosis. Finally, P-HG3 is unrestricted. This is 
a simple way to evaluate the cost, in ter ms of fit, of estimating skewness 
directly. 
We also introduce "smoothed" versions of these models where sorne pa-
rameters of the IV curves are held constant through the sample. First, the 
smoothed version of the P-HG1 model, labeled SP-HG1, still imposes that 
Il is zero but holds 12 constant through time. Next, SP-HG2 still allows 
for a flexible fit of skewness through time but keep excess kurtosis constant 
through time. We include this model as a simple way to evaluate the relative 
importance of skewness and kurtosis for option pricing and hedging. Finally, 
the SP-HG3 model imposes the following structure on the IV curve, 
which is a simple attempt to implement the observation made in Section VI 
that parameters of the IV curve vary with skewness. Finally, estimation 
is performed through minimization of squared pricing errors in the weekly 
sample. 
B In-Sample RMSE 
HG And BSM Models 
Table III presents in-sample Root Mean Squared Errors [RMSE] where 
each results is expressed as a percentage of the BSM's RMSE. Panel (a) 
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presents results across moneyness while Panel (b) presents results across 
maturities. Although the most flexible (i.e. P-HG3) model achieves an RMSE 
which is 14% of the benchmark, most of the improvement cornes from using 
the HG distribution: the simpler HG model's RMSE is 37% of the BMS's 
RMSE but with only more parameter measuring skewness. 
Practitioner's Variants 
Interestingly, even with one extra parameter, the P-BSM do es not offer 
much improvement (35% vs 37%) over the straightforward HG model. The 
models offer similar results across maturities but their performances differ 
across strike priees. The P~BSM improves pricing for in-the-money options 
at the expense of larger errors for other moneyness groups. On the other 
hand, the P-HG1 and the P-HG2 models achieve RMSEs that are 28% and 
23%, respectively, but with the same number of parameters as the P-BSM 
model. However, in contrast with the P-BSM model, the lower errors for out-
of-the-money options are not compensated by higher errors for options that 
are nearer the money. Thus, models based on the HG distribution appear 
to offer more flexibility than the practitioner's BSM in choosing risk-neutral 
skewness and kurtosis but with equal or less parameters. 
Although the naive 1'1 = 0 restriction seems reasonable, it fails in prac-
tice with larger RMSE. Comparing models, we see that imposing the correct 
identification constraints (P-HG2) provides substantial improvement over 
the P-HG1, especiaUy for short maturity, out-of-the-money caU options. Fi-
naUy, with one more parameter, the P-H3 offers much lower in-sample RSME 
(14%) than any other model across aU moneyness and maturity categories. 
Smoothed Coefficients 
Smoothed models have less parameters but the SP-HG2 model still im-
proves (31%) over the P-BSM model but with less parameters. This model 
has the flexibility to fix skewness from date to date but imposes a constant 
excess kurtosis. That is, deviations of the IV curve from the HG case are 
kept constant. Thus, in-sample, a flexible fit of the underlying risk-neutral 
skewness is key while variations in kurtosis are less important. FinaUy, while 
more flexible HG-based models improve the in-sample fit, the next section 
show that this result is not robust out-of-sample, indicating a relatively mi-
nor role for information beyond the third moment. 
C Out-of-sample RMSE 
The improved performance of models based on the HG distribution may 
be due to over-fitting and may not hold out-of-sample. This section compares 
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the out-of-sample performance of each mode!. First, we estimate each model 
from options in a given week.25 We then fix these parameters and priee 
options observed in the following week. Table IV presents one-week out-
of-sam pie RMSE for each model across strike priees (Panel (a)) and across 
maturities (Panel (b)). 
Out-of-sample, the improvement in fit relative to the BSM decreases for 
ail models. This indicates that sorne of the deviations from the Gaussian 
case are transitory. The lowest relative RMSE is now 57%, obtained for the 
P-HG3 model, with 4 parameters. On the other hand, the worst result is 
68%, obtained for the P-BSM model, with 3 parameters. This add to the 
evidence that the practitioner's version of the BSM model does not properly 
fit the persistent skewness and kurtosis present in the data. Strikingly, the 
SP-HG2 model, whieh uses 2 parameters and fixes excess kurtosis through 
the sample, actually improves out-of-sample RMSE (64%) over the more 
flexible P-HG2 and P-BSM models. Sorne of the variations in excess kurtosis 
required to match (in-sample) option priees in this category are transitory, 
degrading out-of-sample performances. Restricting pararneters of the IV 
curve to capture that part of its variations due to skewness improves the 
out-of-sample fit. 
D H edging Errors 
Hedging errors implied by each model may convey more economie sig-
nificance to risk-managers. Below, we verify that allowing for skewness sig-
nificantly alter hedging strategy theoretically, and improves hedging results 
empirically. AIso, we verify that any improved hedging performance persists 
at horizons beyond one week. The SP-HG2 model, with 2 parameters and 
where skewness is separately identified, offers the next to best performance. 
This highlights, again, the value of theoretically sound restrictions. Again, 
we find that the unrestricted P-HG3 model performs best. 
Comparing The Greeks 
As in the BSM model, we ean compute explicitly the sensitivity of option 
priees to changes in the underlying parameters, including the sensitivity to 
changes in skewness. We provide these in the appendix. These derivatives 
depend on the direction of asymmetry and everywhere the symmetric case 
(Le. {3 0) !eads to the standard results from BSM. To see the impact of 
skewness, we draw options sensitivities across strike priees for different values 
smoothed mode!, we estîmate parameters that are held constant through the 
sam pie in a first pass. 
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of skewness. In the computations, we use the average values of volatility, of 
the interest rate and of the index level. Figure 3.8 presents results for the first 
and second derivatives with respect to the underlying, Delta and Gamma, 
as weil as the derivative with respect to volatility, Vega. The results are 
reported in levels in the toppands (Panel (a) to (c)) and in percent age 
deviations from the symmetric case in the bottom panels (Panel (d) to (f)). 
First, the pattern of Delta across moneyness is familiar. The sensitiv-
ity is small for deep out-of-the-money options but grows to close to one for 
deep in-the-money options. Varying skewness does not alter this picture 
but looking at levels hides significant deviations. At skewness equal to -2.5, 
which occurs in our sample, short positions in the stock are as much as 20% 
higher for sorne out-of-the money or near to at-the money options. Next, 
the impact on Gamma is dramatic. In the symmetric case, Gamma ap-
pears quadratic in moneyness with highest values for at-the-money options. 
Decreasing skewness lowers Gamma for in-the-money options but increases 
Gamma for out-of-the-money options. When skewness is -2.5, Gamma is as 
much as 50% lower then when skewness is zero for in-the-money options and 
50% higher for out-of-the-money options. Finally, skewness has an asym-
metric impact on the sensitivity of options to variations in volatility. When 
skewness is -2.5, Vega decreases by more than 20% for out-of-the-money op-
tions but increases by nearly 20% for in-the-money options. Clearly, ignoring 
the impact of skewness can lead to large hedging errors, which is confirmed 
empirically in the next section. 
Comparing Hedging Performance 
We follow Dumas et al. (1998) and compute hedging errors as 
f - f:l.co.ctual _ f:l.Cmodel 
t - t .t+h t,t+h 
which is a measure of the impact of changes in model errors from t to t + h 
on the hedging strategy.26 By this measure, a good model delivers hedging 
errors that are close to zero on average. Table V and Table VI present the 
results for hedging horizons from one to four weeks ahead (i.e. h = 1,2,3,4). 
Consider hedging errors at the l-week horizon (Table Va). First, the BSM 
model appears to perform weil, with hedging errors averaging 1.6 cents. But 
this hides important disparities across maturities. Average hedging errors 
range from 36.7 cents for out-of-the-money options to -39 cents for in-the-
26This abstracts from the hedging errors due to discrete adjustments. See Galai (1983) 
for details. 
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moneyoptions. Moreover, the more flexible P-BSM model has higher overall 
hedging errors (-4.6 cents) with substantial average errors (-18.8 cents) for 
the lowest strike prices. 
When considering the overall mean and the dispersion of hedging er-
rors across maturities, the best performing models are variants of the P-HG 
model. Identification restrictions for skewness perform weIl. In particular, 
the SP-HG2 model offers both low overall hedging errors and low dispersion 
across moneyness. Averages remain below 10 cents across strike priees. Ta-
ble Vb draws a similar picture at the 2-week horizon. The P-BSM model 
sees its average performance deteriorate to -8.2 cents and mean hedging er-
rors now range from -21.8 to 7.1 cents. Again, HG-based models offer better 
performance. The SP-HG2 model still offers the best performance: the mean 
pricing error is 0.002 cents in the entire sample and ranges from -13.6 cents 
to 8.6 cents across moneyness. Finally, results at the 3 and 4-week horizons 
(Tables (a) and (b)) quickly deteriorate for the BSM and the P-BSM mod-
els. However, the SP-HG2 model still performs weIl. The overall averages at 
3-week and 4-week horizons are -4.3 cents and -2.1 cents. 
E Discussion 
Overall, the results favor the more general P-HG3 model. It offers lower 
in-sam pIe and out-of-sample RMSEs as well as better hedging performances 
at all horizons. This contrasts with the frequent observation that the P-
BSM model offers sufficient flexibility. lndeed, option prices based on the 
HG distribution offer better performance than the P-BSM with as many 
parameters (P-HG1 and P-HG2) or less (SP-HG2). If we interpret the prac-
titioner's models as expansions around the Gaussian or the Homoscedastic 
Gamma distributions, the results imply that expanding around the Gaus-
sian density is restrictive and does not offer sufficient flexibility to match the 
skewness and kurtosis implicit in the data. Moreover, when we consider the 
sequence of models, we see that imposing restrictions such that skewness is 
correctly measured and excess kurtosis constant does preserve most of the 
performance improvement. 
Another way to view these results is to consider the results of Bates 
(2005) and Alexander and Nogueira (2005). Essentially, they show that for 
any contingent daim that is homogenous of degree one, all partial derivatives 
with respect to the underlying can be computed by taking partial derivatives 
of option prices with respect to strike prices. This implies that, if the number 
of observed option prices is arbitrarily large, we can compute delta and 
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gamma exactly from non-parametric derivatives. In practice, however, some 
parametric model is fitted to observed prices from which derivatives can be 
imputed. The hedging performances of the P-BSM and the P-HG models 
imply that the latter offer a better fit of the true option price curve across 
the strike continuum and, therefore, a better fit of the true option's delta and 
gamma. In other words, the relatively poor fit of skewness by Gaussian-based 
expansions translates in inaccurate option sensitivity measures and larger 
hedging errors relative to approximations based on the Gamma density. 
For our purposes, the performance of the SP-HG2 model implies that 
the parametric measure of risk-neutral skewness is relevant. This provides 
a measure of skewness that is easy to compute and requires less data than 
a non-parametric measure. Moreover, together with the regression results 
from Section IV, the importance of skewness for hedging and out-of-sample 
pricing confirms the key link between the risk premium and volatility shift 
across moneyness and skewness. Indeed, imposing the additional restriction 
that excess kurtosis is constant yields the next to best out-of-sample and 
hedging performances. Interestingly, the estimate of K, is negative (-0.042). 
Then relaxing the link between kurtosis and skewness allows for more asym-
metry to be applied to the data than the benchmark HG model does. This 
adjustment is significant: to keep kurtosis constant but with K, equal to zero, 
skewness would have to be reduced (closer to zero) by 0.21. Taken together, 
the results lead us to adopt the SP-HG2 as our preferred model to measure 
the option-implied skewness. 
VIII Term Structure Of Moments 
Section V presented the trade-off between volatility and skewness when fit-
ting option data. One important observation is that a different value of skew-
ness was required to restore the symmetry of the IV curve for different ma-
turities. This suggests that the risk-neutral distribution converges at slower 
rate than implied by the i.i.d. assumption. While the time-dependance of 
returns is weil documented in the literature, the framework presented here 
allows for a transparent presentation of deviations from i.i.d. returns. We 
use the fact that skewness should decay toward zero with the square root of 
horizon, J( H). If this is verified in the data, estimates of skewness multi-
plied by the square root of the horizon should not vary with the maturity 
of an options. Otherwise, the term structure of implied skewness reflects a 
degree of dependence implicit in option prices. Similarly, the excess kurtosis 
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of returns should decay with H and annualized estimates of volatility should 
be fiat across horizons. A key question is on what moment does the time 
dependence of returns have the greater impact. 
An important advantage of our parametric approach is that we can obtain 
estimates of risk-neutral moments at much longer horizons than is usuaUy 
the case with non-parametric methods. We estimate the term structure of 
volatility, skewness and kurtosis using the SP-HG2 model discussed above. 
We minimize pricing errors separately for each maturity (1, 2 and 3 months, 
and then from 4 to 6 and from 7 to 9 months. See Section III). Figure 3.9 
presents the results. 
Figure 3.10a presents the average (annualized) implied volatility for each 
maturity. The time-series average rises from close to 21.4% for the next 
settlement month to 21.8% at a maturity of 3 months. Thereafter, implied 
volatility remains more or less fiat. Figure (b) presents results for (nega-
tive) the implied skewness. In contrast with implied volatility, the implied 
asymmetry rises sharply for aU maturities we consider. Figure 3.10c shows 
the term structure of (negative) the.implied excess kurtosis. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, excess kurtosis relative to the HG distribution decreases with ma-
turity. OveraU, the term structure evidence indicates that the distribution 
of expected returns violates the i.i.d. assumptions. However, the impact 
of dependence appears to have a much greater impact on implied skewness 
than on other moments. In contrast, measures of implied volatilities fiatten 
out beyond a maturity of 3 months while measures of implied excess kur-
tosis decrease with maturity. To our knowledge, this differential impact of 
time-dependence on skewness and kurtosis has never been documented. 
IX Conclusion 
We provide a simple extension of the BSM option pricing mode!. The Ho-
moscedastic Gamma model allows for arbitrary skewness in the distribution 
of returns and delivers closed-form option pricing formula at any maturity. 
We provide a natural change of measure under which returns are HG under 
the historical and the risk-neutral probability measures. An important impli-
cation is that the relationship between the equity premium and the volatility 
spread is conditional on skewness. It is the ratio of the volatility spread to 
skewness that predicts excess returns. EmpiricaUy, we find coefficients that 
correspond to implications from the mode!. Also, the information content 
of the volatility spread improves when we adjust for skewness. This new 
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stylized fact should help to discriminate among competing theories of the 
volatility spread. 
This link between the equity premium, skewness and the volatility spread 
implies that skewness is key for pricing and hedging options. We first intro-
duce the implied volatility and skewness surface, which we study empirically. 
This is a new tool that provide a transparent interpretation of variations in 
the shape and level of the IV curve in terms of skewness. Next, we develop 
the practitioner's version of the HG mode!. This approaches is robust to de-
viation of kurtosis from the HG mode!. Empirically, models based on the HG 
distribution perform better than their Gaussian counterparts. Hedging per-
formances are also substantially improved. The results suggest that allowing 
for flexible time-variation in skewness is key for improving option pricing. 
Fînally, we document the term structure of volatîlity, skewness, and kurtosis 
out to an horizon of 9 months. We find that dependence in returns have a 
larger impact on skewness thàn kurtosis, hîghlighting, again, the importance 
of skewness. 
X Appendix 
A Proposition 1 
Our candidate SDF is, for given v, 
Mt = exp(-v(~)Ct + 'li (v(~»), 
where 'li is the log-cumulant function of c, 
'li (u) = 2u Jh(~~» -~ ln [1 + ~ua (~) Jh (~)] . 
a '-' a (~) 2 
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Following CEFJ, this SDF defines an Equivalent Martingale Measure [EMM] if and only 
if 
'lI(v(~) -1) - 'li (v(~» - 'li (-1) + (J,I-ro)~ = 0, 
which has the following unique solution for v (~), 
v ~ _ _ 2 g(~) 
( ) - a(~) Jh(~) + g(~) -1' 
where 
( A) _ ((J,I- ro)~ (A)2 a (~) Jh(E)) 9 '-' - exp 4 a '-' + 2 . 
Proposition 2 of CEFJ establishes sufficient conditions on 'li for the solution to be unique. 
B Limit of Risk-Neutral Volatility 
Define 
IIo==(J,I-r) 
v'/5. i3(~) == a(~)-2-
17'(~) == Jh·(~)/v'/5., 
and note that the drift correction term can be written as 
2 ~ - Jh(E) = 17' (~) - 17 ~ 
a (~) i3(~)' (3.17) 
We first study the limit of the numerator as skewness tends to zero. Using the definitions 
above we have (see Proposition 2) 
• g(i3(~»-l 
17 (~) = i3(~)g(i3(~» (3.18) 
where, with a slight abuse of notation, 
g(i3(~» == exp(-IIoi3(~)2 + i3(~)I7), (3.19) 
which leads to an indeterminacy when skewness tends to zero. We use the first order 
expansion of the exponential function, exp(x) = 1 + x + x8(x) where 8(x) tends to zero 
when x tends to zero. Substituting in Equation 3.18 leads to, after sorne simplification, 
17' ~ _ -IIoi3 (~) + 17 + 8 (13 (~» 
( ) - 1 - IIoi3 (~)2 + 13 (~) 17 + 13 (~) 8 (13 (~»' 
and taking the limit shows that 17' (~) ...... 17 when 13 (~) ...... O. 
Note then that the limit of 3.17 leads to an indeterminacy. We will again apply a 
Taylor expansion but, first, we compute the first order derivative of (3.18) with respect to 
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(3(D.) using Equation (3.19) to compute the derivative of 9 ((3(D.)) which leads to 
dao ((3(8)) _ 1 - 9 ((3(D.)) + (3(D.) (a - 2IIo(3(D.)) 
d(3(D.) - (3(D.)2g ((3(D.)) 
where again we face an indeterminacy. We use a second-order expansion of g((3(D.)) 
g((3 (D.)) = g(O) + (3 (D.) g' (0) + ~g" (0)(3 (D.)2 + (3 (D.)2 0 ((3 (D.)) , 
where O((3(D.)) tends to zero when (3(D.) tends to zero. Substituting these results in a 
first-order expansion for aO((3(D.)), 
aO ((3(D.)) = aO (0) + da~Jfl~)) (0) (3(D.) + (3(D.)t1 ((3(D.)) , 
leads to 
aO~~l)a =-(IIo+~2)+O((3(D.)), 
which, in the limit, delivers the desired result. Note that we then have 
" ~ -.jh[iS) -J.LU + 2 0:(D. - (r _ ~2) D. + D.O((3(D.)). 
and, finally, that if we substitute the second-order expansion for g(D.) in the solution for 
v, we get 
,,2 J.L-r+2" J.L-r 1 
v(D.) -> a2 = ~ + 2' 
C Taylor Expansion of the Priee of Risk 
We want to show that, 
where 
v ((3) 
g((3) 
_J... + g((3) 
(3a 9 ((3) - 1 
exp( -(J.L - r)(32 + (3a). 
Recall that v (0) = (J.L - r)/a2 + 4 and note that 
Vi ((3) 
g' ((3) 
9' ((3) 
(32a (g ((3) - 1)2 
(-2(J.L - r)(3 + a) 9 ((3), 
We evaluate the limit of this derivative as (3 -> a using, as ab ove , the second-order 
expansion of g((3). After tedious but straightforward computations, the result is 
Vi (0) (J.L - r)2 + ~ - 2(J.L - r)a2 + ~ - (J.L - r)a2 + 2(J.L - r)a2 + (J.L - r)a2 - ~ 
D Proposition 2 
From CEFJ, the logarithm risk-neutral of the risk-neutral Moment Generating Func-
tion is 
-ull!' (v (D.)) + Il! (v (D.) + u) - Il! (v (D.)) 
Jho (D.) 4 [1 0] 2u (D.) - --2 ln 1 + -uo: (D.) ~ , 0: 0:(D.) 2 
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implying that 
The HG model can then be written as 
where 
and with 
vh*V:::'.) = 2(g (~) - 1). 
a (~) 9 (~) 
Substituting back in the equation for returns under the risk-neutral measure, and sim pli-
fying, yields the results. 
E Greeks 
For notational simplicity we introduce a == H/!3(~)2. We begin with the sensitivity to 
changes in the underlying stock priee. The HG option price is homogenous of degree one 
in stock price and strike. Then the standard result holds and the option delta is simply 
oCt 
oSt = C l •t , (3.20) 
which depends on skewness. Next, the sensitivity of the option's delta with respect to the 
stock price is 
02 Ct e-(d,+rfH)d~-l K 
oS; 1!3la*r(a) S;' (3.21) 
which also depends on skewness and moneyness. The sensitivity of option prices to changes 
in the underlying risk-neutral volatility is 
oCt 
oa; 
1!3la*e(-r f H) K e-d'd~ 
a* (1 - !3a*) r(a)' (3.22) 
and, finally, the sensitivity of option prices to changes in the skewness of returns is given 
by 
where 
- ~ [(ln(d2) -w(a)) Ct - Ke(-rfH) P(a, d2) In(l - !3a)] 
+ ~r(a)d~St(1- !3at2FHa, ai a + 1, a + li -dl) 
2a ( ) a (-r f H) - (. .) ~r a d2Ke, F, a,a,a+ 1,a+ 1,-d2 
* -d, da K e( -r fH) __ a ___ e __ 2 
1 - !3a* r (a) , 
W (a, z) = P(a, z) ln(z) - r (a) za ,F,(a, ai a + 1, a + li -z), 
and where ,F,(·) is the regularized hypergeometric function. 
F Proposition 3 
(3.23) 
A no-arbitrage price of a European cali option with strike price K and maturity T can 
be obtained from the computation of the discounted expectation of the terminal payoff 
under the risk-neutral measure. That is, 
E Q [max (SHT - K,O)] 
exp( -rT)StEQ [exp (Rt,M) l[R t ,M>ln(K/se)ll - exp (-roT) KP
Q [Rt,M > In(K/St)]. 
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'Ne can compute pQ [Rt,M > In(Kj St)] from the distribution function of a gamma variable. 
Note first that 
pQ[R > In(KjS)] = pQ [(3 (~) * > In(KjS,) - JL* (~) M~ + J~M] 
t,M t J~MYt,M J~Mu* (~) (3(~)' 
where we define 
2.JM ( * 2.JM) * Q (4M ) 
a (~) Ct,M + a (~) = Yt,M ~ r a (~)2' 1 , 
based on the characterization of the standardized Gamma distribution given in Equation 
:1.2. If a (~) > 0, 
r ( T . T + In(K/s,)-Y'(~)T) 
P Q[R 1 (KjS )]__ ~,~ i3(~)<1'(~) t,M > n t -- ( T ) , 
r i32(~) 
where rra, x) is the upper incomplete gamma function 27 and if a (~) < 0, 
( T . T + In(K/Stl-Y'T) pQ[Rt,M > In(KjSt)] = = "'1 ~,~ T i3(~)<1'(~) 
r (i3(~)2 ) 
r (~. ~ + In(K/Stl-Y'T) i3(~).' i3(~). i3(~)<1'(~) 
=1- . 
r (i3(~)2) 
Similarly, 
E Q [exp (Rt,M) lIRt ,M>ln(K/Stll] 
exp (JL* (~) M ~ - u* ~~~~ ~ ) EQ [exp (u* (~) (3 (~) Y;,M) 1 [gw.Y;,M>"]] 
where we use 
In(Kj St) - JL* (~) M ~ J ~M 
Ii= +--. J~Mu* (~) (3(~) 
Then, if a (~) > 0, and using that Y;,M has a standard gamma distribution with parameter 
M~ h ,3(~)2 ,we ave 
Mil 1 {OO ( * ) (Z;,M) ~(,,)2 - * JI exp -Zt,M M" dZt,M (1-<1*(~)i3(~)) ~~ (1 _ u* (~) {3 (~)) ~(,,)2 r (i3~~2) 
r ( M~ . ( M~ + In(K/Stl-I"(~)~M) (1- * (~){3(~))) i3(~)2, i3(~)2 . i3(~)<1' (~) U 
M" 
r (i3~~~2 ) (1 - u* (~) {3 (~)) ~(")' 
and, using the change of variables (1 - u* (~) (3 (~)) Y;,M = Z;,M, it follows that 
EQ [exp (Rt,M) lIR t ,M>ln(K/Stll] 
(( 
* u*(~))) r(i3(~)2;(i3(~)2+ln(~\~l<1-·1d)~)T)(I-u*(~){3(~))) 
exp JL (~) - (3(~) T T' 
r (i3(~)2 ) (1 - u* (~) (3 (~)) {JI")' 
27The upper incomplete gamma function is defined as r(a,x) = JOOt,,-le-tdt while 
t.he lower incomplete gamma function is defined as "'I(a, x) = Jo" t,,-re-tdt. Note that 
rra) = rra, 0) while "'I(a) = "'1 (a, 00). 
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If, however, o:(Ll) < 0 then 
and then 
G Proposition 4 
Suppose that the underlying stock priee evolution under the risk-neutral measure ls 
given by 
RT = (r - 6) T + (r/Ty 
where 6 ls a risk-adjustment factor, y is a random number with mean zero, variance l, 
skewness, ~ and kurtosis, >'2. Suppose also that the probability density of y is described 
by the following Edgeworth series expansion around the standardized gamma distribution: 
>'2 f (y) = 9 (y) + --:-"---
where g(y) is the standardized gamma density funetion given by 
and where z == '7 y + a. Imposing that gross stock returns are a martingale under the 
risk-neutral measure, 
E~ [exp (RT)l E~[exp ((r - 8) T + av'Ty) 1 
exp ((r - 8) T) J exp (av'Ty) [g (y) + _>'2--;-;-=- ct:y~y)] dy, 
leads to the required risk-adjustment, 
The priee of a European call option is 
c~=e-rT l:. (Soexp(Cr J)T+av'Ty) K)f(y)dy 
2 
where 
We have 
di = ln (SoIK) + Cr - 8)T. 
av'T 
KjOO.t (Y)dY] . 
-d, 
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For the first integral, we have 
and for (3 :s 0, say, and di cl2 (1 - 17(3) we have 
L:. exp (uny) 9 (y) dy == (le~(7:;t P (a, di) 
2 
while 
J. 
Next, for the second Integral above, 
L:. f (y) dy == L:. 9 (y) dy + K L:. a:<:y~Y) dy 
, , 2 
with 
f oo ra-d, "If za-le-z -_d2g (y)dy Jo ~dz=P(a,d2) 
f"" ~g(4Y)dy - • [ P(a-4,cl.) 4P(a 3,d2 )+ ] -a, dy - a 6P(a-2,d2 )-4P(a 1,cl2 )+P(a,d2 ) • 
H Identifying Restriction on the P-HG 
The equality of priees from the true model and the P-HG for at-the-money options 
implies that 
P (a, dD - P (a, d2) = P (a, dr) - (1 + T 2u4K) P (a, d2) 
+ KT;3U [-h" (d2) + u(3h'(d2) u 2(32h(d2)] , 
while the equality of the first derivative of priees implies 
P (a, d;)+ UIOll d'2j3h{d2) = (1 + T 2 u4 K) P (a, d2 ) 
an (1 - (3uOI) 
+ Ka 2 [hlll (d2 ) +'u3 p3h{d2)] , 
and, finally, the equality of the second derivatives implies 
h [1 + (2a - di - d2) j3uIOll + + -;--=:--.!.?'-'''== 
1701 (1 - j3UOI) an {l - a 2T 
(1 + T 2u4K) h ~2) + K;2 [h(4) (d2) + u3j3.3h'(d2)] . 
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Then, linearizing the left sides of the equations around ao = a, "'(1 = 0 and "'(2 = 0, 
respectively, and the right side around ~ = 0 leads to 
aIO - a 
a 
where 
d2 
dl 
a 
~ 
-a ln (1 - a(3) 
a{3 
d2 (1 - a(3) 
T 
/]2 
613' )..2- r 
4! 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for strike priee and maturity categories. 
(a) Summary statisties by moneyness 
Moneyness 
<0.95 <0.975 <1 <1.025 >1.025 Ali 
N umber of Contracts 3343 2418 3859 3077 3809 16506 
Average Cali Priee 28.24 31.80 37.22 47.05 78.85 46.05 
Average IV 19.43 19.23 19.36 20.13 22.66 20.26 
(b) Summary statisties by maturities 
Contract Month 
1 2 3 4-6 7-9 10-12 Ali 
N umber of Contracts 4303 4016 2377 2822 1726 1167 16506 
Average Cali Priee 36.60 39.53 42.91 51.53 61.95 72.74 46.05 
Average IV 20.47 20.24 20.37 20.19 20.15 20.24 20.26 
(e) Summary statisties by moneyness and maturities. For each moneyness and strike priee 
eategory, the first li ne gives the number of eontracts and the second line gives the average 
Implied Volatility. 
Moneyness 
Months <0.95 0.95 to 0.975 0.975 to 1 1 to 1.025 >1.025 
1 96 398 1104 ll72 1533 
21.39 18.65 18.63 19.55 22.92 
2 354 668 1113 848 1033 
19.80 18.66 19.13 20.08 22.75 
3 461 445 647 406 418 
19.75 19.24 19.78 20.94 22.61 
4-6 973 481 504 371 493 
19.27 19.48 20.00 20.88 22.39 
7-9 805 262 280 167 212 
19.18 20.35 20.33 21.26 22.46 
10-12 639 157 194 89 88 
19.44 20.72 20.99 21.48 22.30 
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Table II: Predictability of Excess Returns by Implied Skewness. 
The table reports the results of n-period regressions of returns on the SP500 index in 
excess of a yield of maturity of n months: 
1 t ( (n) [Vi) _ T 
:;; j=l TM,Hj - Yj,t+j + 2 - an + bn PREDt + ên,Hn' 
The regressor PRED is a combinat ion of IV-RV and (IV-RV)jIS, where IV and 18 are 
annualized implied volatility and skewness from aH option contracts, and RV is the an-
nualized realized volatility. Reported in square brackets and in brackets are respective 
robust t-statistics for the nuH that the coefficient is equal to zero, and for the nuIJ that 
the coefficient is equal to -2. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2004. 
3 6 12 24 36 
Constant -22.19 -5.43 -3.50 -7.14 -6.93 -18.96 
[-0.65] [-0.20] [-0.12] [-0.24] [-0.24] [-0.70] 
(IVcRV)jIS -3.28 -2.24 -2.04 -2.13 -1.58 -1.64 
[-2.66] [-2.52] [-2.69] [-3.85] [-2.38] [-2.66] 
(-1.04) (-0.27) (-0.05) (-0.23) (0.64) (0.57) 
Adj. R 2 1.85 3.11 5.59 9.72 8.06 11.28 
Constant 0.10 2.86 -8.13 -10.68 -0.63 2.31 
[0.00] [0.08] [-0.26] [-0.33] [-0.02] [0.07] 
IV-RV 7.33 6.38 8.11 8.28 4.37 2.12 
[1.76] [1.65] [3.01] [3.40] [1.51] [0.75] 
Adj. R2 -0.03 1.18 5.83 9.72 3.52 -0.11 
Constant -11. 78 -3.23 -10.59 -13.93 -5.15 -7.55 
[-0.33] [-0.10] [-0.34] [-0.44] [-0.16] [-0.25] 
IV-RV -7.46 -1.53 4.83 4.63 -1.15 -5.29 
[-0.93] [-0.25] [1.18] [1.24] [-0.27] [-1.71] 
(IV-RV)j18 -4.79 -2.55 -1.06 -1.19 -1.81 -2.59 
[-1.98] [-1.66] [-0.86] [-1.35] [-1.98] [-3.31] 
Adj. R 2 1.27 2.21 5.55 10.05 7.05 14.06 
Table III: In-sample RMSE 
RMSE by moneyness and by maturity in percentage of BSM model's RMSE. BSM is the Black-Scholes Model, HG is the Homoscedastic Gamma Model, 
P-BSM and P-HG are practitioner's versions of these models where volatility is quadratic in moneyness. P-HGl is a version where the linear term is zero 
(i.e. ,1 = 0), P-HG2 imposes that f3 is the risk-neutral skewness (see text) and P-HG3 is unrestricted. SP-BSM and SP-HG are smoothed version of these 
models where the shape of the quadratic IV curve is constant through the sam pie. 
Model 
S/X<O.95 
HG 0.584 
P-BSM 0.487 
P-HG1 0.437 
P-HG2 0.449 
P-HG3 0.298 
SP-BSM 0.545 
SP-HG1 0.562 
SP-HG2 0.488 
SP-HG3 0.485 
Model 
1 
HG D.9I6 
P-BSM 0.891 
P-HG1 0.845 
P-HG2 0.652 
P-HG3 0.547 
SP-BSM 1.018 
SP-HG1 0.892 
SP-HG2 0.771 
SP-HG3 0.916 
(a) In-sample RMSE by moneyness 
Moneyness 
O.95<S/X<O.975 O.975<S/X<1 
0.639 0.649 
0.829 0.901 
0.537 0.536 
0.583 0.579 
0.473 0.471 
0.812 0.919 
0.632 0.709 
0.629 0.709 
0.667 0.744 
(b) In-sample RMSE by maturity 
Maturity 
2 3 
---
0.729 0.585 
0.735 0.614 
0.697 0.544 
0.593 0.529 
0.450 0.405 
0.798 0.624 
0.800 0.669 
0.647 0.612 
0.678 0.542 
1<S/X<l.025 
0.681 
0.665 
0.629 
0.532 
0.453 
0.759 
0.712 
0.642 
0.692 
4-6 
0.385 
0.382 
0.355 
0.335 
0.290 
0.379 
0.493 
0.438 
0.335 
l.025<S/X 
0.570 
0.351 
0.595 
0.410 
0.313 
0.477 
0.655 
0.505 
0.469 
7-9 
0.569 
0.526 
0.420 
0.437 
0.305 
0.592 
0.530 
0.505 
0.525 
AlI 
0.368 
0.350 
0.278 
0.234 
0.135 
0.418 
0.399 
0.312 
0.322 
Ail 
0.368 
0.350 
0.278 
0.234 
0.135 
0.418 
0.399 
0.312 
0.322 >-' 0) 
0 
Table IV: Out-of-sample RMSE 
Weekly out-of-sample RMSE by moneyness and by maturity in percentage of BSM model's RMSE. Parameters obtained for a given week are he Id constant 
to priee options observed the following week. BSM is the Black-Scholes Model, HG is the Homoscedastic Gamma Model, P-BSM and P-HG are practitioner's 
versions of these models where volatility is quadratic in moneyness. P-HG1 is a version where the linear term is zero (i.e. /1 = 0), P-HG2 imposes that f3 is 
the risk-neutral skewness (see text) and P-HG3 is unrestricted. SP-BSM and SP-HG are smoothed version of these models where the shape of the quadratic 
IV curve is constant through the sample. 
(a) Out-of-sample RMSE by moneyness 
Model Moneyness 
S/X<O.95 O.95<S/X<O.975 O.975<S/X<1 1<S/X<1.025 1.025<S/X AU 
HG 0.795 0.895 0.877 0.840 0.715 0.657 
P-BSM 0.718 0.936 0.999 0.914 0.748 0.676 
P-HG1 0.736 0.888 0.869 0.833 0.737 0.621 
P-HG2 0.730 0.906 0.892 0.829 0.840 0.658 
P-HG3 0.656 0.855 0.876 0.832 0.733 0.568 
SP-BSM 0.745 0.930 0.999 0.908 0.683 0.671 
SP-HG1 0.774 0.880 0.904 0.860 0.763 0.665 
SP-HG2 0.724 0.865 0.895 0.852 0.801 0.639 
SP-HG3 0.725 0.885 0.927 0.872 0.696 0.625 
(b) Out-of-Sample RMSE by maturity 
Model Maturity 
1 2 3 4-6 7-9 AU 
HG 1.059 0.894 0.859 0.715 0.757 0.657 
P-BSM 1.069 0.942 0.886 0.727 0.744 0.676 
P-HG1 1.023 0.902 0.871 0.718 0.695 0.621 
P-HG2 1.264 0.914 0.876 0.708 0.695 0.658 
P-HG3 0.996 0.871 0.865 0.717 0.628 0.568 
SP-BSM 1.068 0.923 0.864 0.708 0.764 0.671 
SP-HG1 1.002 0.933 0.896 0.756 0.728 0.665 
SP-HG2 1.055 0.894 0.857 0.725 0.724 0.639 
SP-HG3 1.040 0.877 0.855 0.702 0.726 0.625 f-' Ol 
f-' 
Table V: Hedging Errors 1 
Weekly hedging errors by moneyness in dollars. BSM is the Black-Scholes Model, HG is the Homoscedastic Gamma Model, P-BSM and P-HG are 
practitioner's versions of these models where volatility is quadratic in moneyness. P-HG1 is a version where the linear term is zero (i.e. Il = 0), P-HG2 
imposes that f3 is the risk-neutral skewness (see text) and P-HG3 is unrestricted. SP-BSM and SP-HG are smoothed version of these models where the 
shape of the quadratic IV curve is constant through the sample. 
(a) 1-week Hedging Horizon 
Model Moneyness 
S/X<O.95 O.95<S/X<O.975 O.975<S/X<1 1<S/X<1.025 1.025<S/X Ali 
BSM 0.367 0.200 -0.031 -0.207 -0.390 0.016 
HG 0.141 -0.204 -0.212 -0.021 0.177 -0.035 
P-BSM -0.188 -0.124 -0.022 0.127 0.021 -0.046 
P-HG1 0.072 -0.103 -0.094 0.042 0.127 0.001 
P-HG2 0.085 -0.117 -0.136 0.132 0.174 0.014 
P-HG3 -0.028 -0.105 -0.048 0.101 0.135 0.001 
SP-BSM -0.123 -0.122 -0.070 0.048 0.039 -0.054 
SP-HG1 -0.154 -0.071 0.086 0.260 0.025 0.023 
SP-HG2 0.075 -0.077 -0.096 -0.003 0.024 -0.018 
SP-HG3 -0.041 -0.146 -0.112 0.004 0.070 -0.053 
(b) 2-week Hedging Horizon 
Model Moneyness 
S/X<O.95 O.95<S/X<O.975 O.975<S/X<1 1<S/X<1.025 1.025<S/X AlI 
BSM 0.546 0.219 -0.059 -0.429 -0.817 -0.019 
HG 0.182 -0.311 -0.239 -0.076 0.013 -0.082 
P-BSM -0.219 -0.122 0.018 0.071 -0.130 -0.082 
P-HG1 0.047 -0.129 -0.043 0.060 -0.039 -0.019 
P-HG2 0.131 -0.122 -0.070 0.174 0.168 0.046 
P-HG3 -0.030 -0.090 0.003 0.131 0.030 0.002 
SP-BSM -0.176 -0.168 -0.059 0.006 -0.161 -0.114 
SP-HG1 -0.231 -0.021 0.252 0.363 -0.138 0.037 
SP-HG2 0.086 -0.068 0.034 0.027 -0.136 0.002 >-' 
SP-HG3 -0.082 -0.250 -0.112 -0.019 -0.049 -0.106 0) tv 
Table VI: Hedging Errors II 
Weekly hedging errors by moneyness in dollars. BSM is the Black-Scholes Model, HG is the Homoscedastic Gamma Model, P-BSM and P-HG are 
practitioner's versions of these models where volatility is quadratic in moneyness. P-HGl is a version where the linear term is zero (Le. 1'1 = 0), P-HG2 
imposes that {3 is the risk-neutral skewness (see text) and P-HG3 is unrestricted. SP-BSM and SP-HG are smoothed version of these models where the 
shape of the quadratic IV curve is constant through the sample. 
Model 
S/X<O.95 
BSM 0.707 
HG 0.211 
P-BSM -0.330 
P-HGl 0.067 
P-HG2 0.095 
P-HG3 -0.073 
SP-BSM -0.315 
SP-HGl -0.307 
SP-HG2 -0.002 
SP-BS3 -0.227 
Model 
S/X<O.95 
BSM 0.988 
HG 0.391 
P-BSM -0.291 
P-HGl 0.187 
P-HG2 0.240 
P-HG3 -0.028 
SP-BSM -0.243 
SP-HGl -0.201 
SP-HG2 0.126 
SP-HG3 -0.155 
O.95<S/X<O.975 
0.383 
-0.341 
-0.189 
-0.120 
-0.110 
-0.108 
-0.248 
0.049 
-0.024 
-0.331 
O.95<S/X<O.975 
0.466 
-0.274 
-0.197 
-0.043 
-0.060 
-0.026 
-0.276 
0.135 
0.087 
-0.335 
(a) 3-week Hedging Horizon 
Moneyness 
O.975<S/X<1 
-0.134 
-0.345 
-0.111 
-0.068 
-0.062 
0.014 
-0.176 
0.325 
-0.020 
-0.216 
(b) 4-week Hedging Horizon 
Moneyness 
O.975<S/X<1 
-0.327 
-0.357 
-0.237 
-0.057 
-0.063 
0.024 
-0.303 
0.346 
0.025 
-0.255 
1<S/X<1.025 1.025<S/X Ail 
-0.652 -1.212 0.015 
-0.150 -0.071 -0.116 
-0.081 -0.184 -0.197 
0.024 -0.119 -0.031 
0.185 0.155 0.037 
0.066 0.013 -0.029 
-0.067 -0.233 -0.223 
0.379 -0.250 0.018 
-0.035 -0.233 -0.043 
-0.069 -0.134 -0.211 
1<S/X<1.025 1.025<S/X Ali 
-0.930 -1.709 0.022 
-0.381 -0.391 -0.104 
-0.277 -0.463 -0.278 
-0.155 -0.416 -0.029 
-0.015 0.070 0.058 
-0.093 -0.219 -0.046 
-0.284 -0.460 -0.294 
0.265 -0.502 0.017 
-0.227 -0.483 -0.021 
-0.249 -0.352 -0.249 
>-' 
Cl 
w 
Table VII: Monthly RMSE 
Monthly RMSE by moneyness and by maturity in percentage of BSM model's RMSE. BSM is the Black-Scholes Model, HG is the Homoscedastic Gamma 
Model, P-BSM and P-HG are practitioner's versions of these models where volatility is quadratic in moneyness. P-HG 1 is a version where the linear term 
is zero (i.e. ')'1 = 0), P-HG2 imposes that f3 is the risk-neutral skewness (see text) and P-HG3 is unrestricted. SP-BSM and SP-HG are smoothed version of 
these models where the shape of the quadratic IV curve is constant through the sample. 
Model 
S/X<O.95 
HGM 0.737 
P-BSM 0.615 
P-HG1 0.628 
P-HG2 0.631 
P-HG3 0.540 
SP-BSM 0.647 
SP-HG1 0.676 
SP-HG2 0.641 
SP-HG3 0.571 
Model 
S/X<O.95 
HG 0.908 
Q-BSM 0.855 
Q-HG1 0.880 
Q-HG2 0.867 
Q-HG3 0.841 
SQ-BSM 0.852 
SQ-HG1 0.898 
SQ-HG2 0.861 
SQ-HG3 0.833 
(a) Monthly In-Sample RMSE 
Moneyness 
O.95<S/X<O.975 O.975<S/X<1 
0.894 0.924 
0.897 0.914 
0.832 0.834 
0.834 0.868 
0.777 0.796 
0.891 0.919 
0.862 0.867 
0.835 0.877 
0.800 0.808 
(b) Monthly Out-of-Sample RMSE 
Moneyness 
O.95<S/X<O.975 O.975<S/X<1 
1.019 0.996 
0.988 0.991 
1.028 0.991 
1.020 0.996 
1.001 0.990 
0.990 0.990 
1.024 0.986 
0.977 0.968 
0.998 0.979 
1<S/X<1.025 
0.774 
0.713 
0.728 
0.713 
0.661 
0.750 
0.753 
0.752 
0.686 
1<S/X<1.025 
0.902 
0.925 
0.904 
0.902 
0.918 
0.933 
0.903 
0.907 
0.913 
1.025<S/X 
0.606 
0.463 
0.662 
0.544 
0.465 
0.513 
0.740 
0.603 
0.506 
1.025<S/X 
0.746 
0.761 
0.776 
0.752 
0.764 
0.769 
0.822 
0.789 
0.770 
Ali 
0.757 
0.674 
0.700 
0.679 
0.605 
0.700 
0.747 
0.701 
0.632 
Ali 
0.913 
0.891 
0.906 
0.897 
0.886 
0.892 
0.919 
0.889 
0.881 .... 
0) 
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Figure 3.1: Number of caU option contracts at each date 
Number of Cali Contmcts Per Trading Day 
1 1 j l , 
~.~",'~_~I1~'_~H~~"~_~7~œ~_~1~'~'~~'~'~~~~' ~~~,.~~~ 
Date 
(a) Total number of contracts. 
PropottIQI'I of Ccntrac:ts; SJX<O.95 Propartion of Con1mcts :0,95< 51X<0.915 
40 
PtepOfÙOnof Contract& :1.025< SIX 
(b) Proportion of contracts in each moneyness category. 
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Figure 3.2: Time series of implied volatility and implied skewness from the 
smoothed version of the SP-HG2 mode!. This is a practitioner's version of 
the Homoscedastic Gamma model where the IV curve is restricted to depends 
only on the (constant) excess kurtosis. 
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(a) Implied Volatility 
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Figure 3.3: Implied Volatility curves across values of skewness in level (Panel 
(a)) and in percentage deviation relative to the benchmark (i.e. zero skew-
ness) BSM case (Panel (b)) , The grid covers 41 equidistant values of skew-
ness and moneyness is defined as ln(Sj K)( -TT) to correct for maturity differ-ij,ft 
ences. 
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Figure 3.4: Implied volatility and skewness surfaces for different maturity 
categories where moneyness is defined as In( S / K) ( -TT). Maturity groups 
are defined using settlement dates. 
(a) Month 1 (b) Month 2 
(c) Month 3 (d) Months 4 to 6 
(e) Months 7 to 9 
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Figure 3.5: Deviations of implied volatility and skewness surfaces from the 
BSM IV values for different maturity categories. Moneyness is defined as 
In(S/ K)( -rT) and maturity groups are defined using seulement dates. 
i 
• J 
(a) Month 1 
(c) Month 3 
f 
1 
f 
1 
(e) Months 7 to 9 
(b) Month 2 
(d) Months 4 to 6 
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Figure 3.6: Implied skewness curve for different values of volatility, in per-
cent age deviation from BSM IV values, for different maturity groups. Mon-
eyness is defined as ln( S / K) ( -TT) and maturity groups are defined using 
settlement dates. 
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J 
(a) Month 1 (b) Month 2 
(c) Month 3 (d) Months 4 to 6 
1 J î ! 
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Figure 3.7: Time-series average of estimates of et = ((Tt,'Yl,t,'Y2,t) from 
the P-HG3 (unrestricted) model but for different values of skewness. The 
parameters govern the IV curve: (Ti,t = (TIO,t(1 + 'Yl,tÇi + 'Y2,tÇl,t· 
(a) fI/O,t and Skewness 
Mllurny(,nMonlh.) 
(b) ')'l,t and Skewness 
Matllrny('nMOO'IIhI) 
(e) ')'2,t and Skewness 
(a) First derivative with respect to stock 
priee, in level. 
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(d) First derivative with respect to stock 
priee, in percentage deviation. 
Figure 3.8: Option priees sensitivities. 
(b) Second derivative with respect to stock 
priee, in level. 
0.5 
(e) Second derivative with respect to stock 
priee, in percentage deviation. 
(c) Derivative with respect to volatility, 
in level. 
(f) Derivative with respect to volatility 
, in percentage deviation. 
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Figure 3.9: Term Structure of implied volatility, (minus) the implied skew-
ness and (minus) the implied excess kurtosis from the SP-HG2 model. 
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Discussion Générale Et 
Conclusion 
La liquidité des marchés financiers est le thème central de cette thèse, bien 
qu'il soit abordé de manières bien différentes dans chaque article. Dans le 
premier chapitre je m'intéresse directement à l'importance des contraintes de 
crédit auxquelles font face les intermédiaires financiers. Dans ce context la 
source d'un manque de liquidité ou d'un risque d'illiquidité est bien différente· 
des sources généralement admises. Tout d'abord, il ne s'agit pas d'informa-
tion asymétrique. C'est-à-dire qu'il n'est pas nécessaire que certains agents 
ou intermédiaires n'aient qu'une connaissance imparfaite au sujet de l'actif fi-
nancier qui nous intéresse. Il ne suffit pas non plus que les coûts d'inventaires 
des intermédiaires soient variables et risqués. C'est-à-dire les coûts associés 
à la possibilité qu'un intermédiaire ne puisse pas écouler sur le marché tous 
les actifs acquis alors qu'il offrait des services de liquidité à ses clients. La 
littérature théorique récente met plutôt l'emphase sur les limites à l'emprunt 
et le risque de défaut que doivent coufronter les intermédiaires. Cependant, 
il était jusqu'à maintenant loin d'être clair comment obtenir une mesure des 
conditions d'emprunt et, subséquemment, de mesurer leurs impacts sur le 
prix des actifs financ:iers. C'est à ce niveau que nous apportons une première 
contribution. Intuitivement, nous identifions sur le marché des obligations 
du Trésor américain des paires d'obligations qui ne diffèrent que par l'aise 
avec laquelle les intermédiaires peuvent les financer. Ainsi, les variations de 
la différence entre les prix de ces deux obligations peuvent être attribuées 
aux variations dans les conditions d'emprunt des intermédiaires. Alors que 
ces variations pourraient n'avoir qu'un impact limité sur l'économie, notre 
seconde contribution est de montrer leur importance économique. En particu-
lier, nOus établissons un lieu avec: des variations substantielles de la prime de 
risque, et donc les prix, d'un éventail d'actifs financiers. En conclusion, alors 
que les primes d'illiquidité sont généralement admises comme spécifiques à 
